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ABSTRACT 
SOCIAL SIGNALS FOR CHANGE: EXAMINING THE ROLE OF  
INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION FOR POSITIVE ECOLOGICAL PROGRESS 
 
SEPTEMBER 2019 
MEAGHAN L. GUCKIAN, B.S., ST. LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY 
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Ezra Markowitz  
 
It perhaps goes without saying that society is collectively failing to meet the challenges 
posed by climate change and natural resource management, among other issues. 
Stagnated efforts may in part be driven by social processes that have been shown to shape 
whether, how, and to what extent individuals engage with environmental issues. In light 
of these stalled efforts to advance positive change, there is a pressing need to broaden our 
understanding of the normative processes that support the formation and maintenance of 
situation-appropriate social norms. In this dissertation, I integrate research from various 
fields to explore the role of interpersonal communication as an underutilized application 
of social influence and its capacity to support widespread cooperation. Specifically, I 
focus on what drives individuals to intentionally communicate with others across 
different domain-specific issues as well as examine existing norms concerning angling 
behavior and the use of increasingly popular mediums and channels of communication, 
such as photographs shared on social media. In Chapter II ("A Few Bad Apples or Rotten 
to the Core"), I reveal how variation in consumers' attribution of blame, either to a 
handful of individuals or else corrupt corporate culture, drives responses to unethical 
 viii 
environmental corporate wrongdoing, including engagement in word-of-mouth behavior 
(e.g., badmouthing). In Chapter III ("Peer Pressure on the Riverbank"), I show how 
efficacy beliefs and reputation concerns predict recreational anglers' willingness to 
impose social sanctions on others' inappropriate behavior. In Chapter IV ("Fishing for a 
Photograph"), I reveal how individuals misperceive prevailing norms relative to catch-
and-release handling practices. Finally, in Chapter V ("Communicating for 
Conservation"), I provide a theoretical and empirical overview of interpersonal 
communication concerning environmental collective action problems, categorize the 
normative nature and implications of information exchanged during a conversation, and 
suggest application insights for conservation managers and practitioners. Collectively, 
these chapters shed light on some of the factors that shape individuals' willingness to 
communicate with others and how social norms are created, maintained, and circulated 
through interpersonal interactions. This dissertation contains both previously published 
work (Chapters II, III are co-authored publications) and unpublished material (Chapter 
IV, Chapter V). 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
There is little doubt today about the far-reaching consequences of climate change 
(IPCC, 2014). Nor is there any delusion among the scientific community that human 
activity is to blame (Cook et al., 2016). Rising global temperatures, sea-level rise, and the 
increasing frequency of extreme weather events are paradigmatic of increasing 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Global biodiversity is declining at an alarming rate 
(IPBES, 2019) and among other issues, society is witnessing the sudden collapse of 
commercial and recreational fisheries (e.g., Post et al., 2002). Although environmental 
issues are biophysical in nature, their origins—as well as their solutions—are inextricably 
linked to human behavior and decision-making. Some argue that advancing change is 
contingent on top-down policy instruments (e.g., regulations, infrastructural changes) to 
modify public and organizational-level behavior. Amid the current United States 
administration's significant regress on all environmental endeavors, others argue that 
creating and maintaining the behaviors needed to solidify a thriving ecological state can 
only be achieved through a concerted effort to change social norms (Griskevicius, 
Cialdini, & Goldstein, 2008; Stoknes, 2015). 
Social norms constitute the unwritten rules that guide behavior in specific 
contexts, cultures, and domains. At present, however, one can argue that norms are 
primarily maladaptive, epitomized by society's unsustainable consumption of and 
relationship with the earth's natural resources. In the same way that people are—socially 
and paradigmatically—driven to needlessly consume and/or deny anthropogenic climate 
change, so too can people be motivated—by others—to reduce their strain on the 
 2 
environment (e.g., Rogers, Goldstein, & Fox, 2018; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, 
& Griskevicious, 2007). Indeed, a considerable amount of literature has revealed how 
individuals' behavioral decisions largely pertain to their assessment of what relevant 
others do and perceive as socially accepted (Cialdini, 2009). 
The mechanisms through which social norms are constructed, modified, and 
enforced, however, remains less well examined. Prominent explanations suggest that 
norms are transformed through implicit and explicit forms of interpersonal 
communication, including expressions of approval or disapproval of others' actions (e.g., 
interpersonal sanctioning; Abrahamse and Steg, 2013; Balliet, 2009; Nolan, 2013). 
Interpersonal communication is rooted in the exchange of social information (Berger, 
2014a) and has been shown to play a critical role in enhancing collective outcomes 
(Ostrom, 2010), fostering situation-appropriate social norms (Balliet, 2009; Sally, 1995), 
converging perceptions of risk (Binder, Scheufele, Brossard, & Gunther, 2011; 
Kasperson et al., 2009), and facilitating the diffusion and adoption of goods (e.g., word-
of-mouth; Berger, 2014b). Thus, there are many reasons to suggest that interpersonal 
communication holds considerable promise in amplifying support for and positive 
engagement with environmental issues. To date, however, interventions aimed at 
mobilizing social change have primarily failed to target and activate individuals' voices. 
While difficulties in motivating public action to mitigate and adapt to 
environmental issues continue to be compounded by normative environments that support 
inaction, understanding how social processes, including forms of interpersonal 
communication, function to transform and enforce social norms as well as people's 
willingness to intentionally communicate with others warrants further attention. The 
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focus of my dissertation considers how social processes, namely implicit and explicit 
social signals, materialize to create and reinforce situation-specific social norms. My 
research and review of relevant literature are situated to widen our understanding of how 
normative processes support or hinder engagement with environmental issues. 
Specifically, my work explicates how various contextual and individual-level factors 
shape engagement in communicative acts. Before providing an overview of my empirical 
and conceptual work, the remainder of the introductory chapter offers a theoretical and 
empirical review of relevant literature supporting my rationale for examining 
interpersonal communication and its potential to foster positive social and ecological 
outcomes. The following sections include a discussion on the role of social influence, the 
intersection of norms and social interaction, and an overview of literature exploring the 
implications and drivers of interpersonal communication in the context of the 
environment. 
Social Influence 
 
A vast body of research has revealed much in the way of how human decision-
making and behavior are susceptible to social influences (Abrahamse & Steg, 2013; 
Cialdini, 2009; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). In order to maintain desired group 
identities and/or avoid social isolation (Hogg & Reid, 2006), people tend to conform to 
the actions and beliefs of their peers (Cialdini et al. 1990; Rogers et al., 2018). Adherence 
to social norms, in particular, exerts a robust influence on behavior, especially under 
conditions of uncertainty (Cialdini et al., 1990). Social norms are predicated on 
perceptions about the prevalence of a particular behavior or belief (i.e., descriptive norm) 
as well as on perceptions about what is socially approved of behavior (i.e., injunctive 
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norm; Cialdini, 2009). When aligned and salient in the decision-making environment, 
descriptive and injunctive norms can signal a person to take a prescribed course of action 
(Schultz et al., 2007; Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008). Norms can also be 
antagonistic at times, especially when the descriptive and injunctive norm present 
conflicting information. In such instances, people are prone to follow the majority 
(Schultz et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2012). For instance, Smith et al. (2012) demonstrated 
that while the motivational aspects of injunctive norms are apparent, these effects can 
weaken when descriptive information conveys that the majority of others do not engage 
in the particular action. Thus, in the absence of strong injunctive signals or when norms 
are misaligned, salient descriptive norms can give people license to conform to what most 
others do. 
The interplay of descriptive and injunctive norms provides an important, although 
not an exclusive, contribution toward understanding why society generally fails to 
address environmental issues. For instance, although the majority of people believe that 
ameliorative action should be taken to address climate change (Leiserowitz et al., 2018), 
there is limited descriptive evidence of people publicly expressing or endorsing their 
convictions (e.g., Maibach, Leiserowitz, Rosenthal, Roser-Renouf, & Cutler, 2016). 
Indeed, one of the less obvious, but critical limitations for environmental progress deals 
with the largely invisible nature of environmentally-relevant behavior as well as the lack 
of transparency surrounding individuals' motives for engagement (e.g., Brick, Sherman, 
Kim, 2017). Arguably, most environmental behaviors and decisions are made privately 
(e.g., household energy consumption), while behaviors that are publicly visible tend to 
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lack clear signals about an individual's motive for taking action (e.g., driving an electric 
vehicle to save gas money versus to reduce greenhouse gas emissions).  
 Thus, in many ways, environmentally-relevant behaviors have either unclear, 
weak, or entirely invisible signals that communicate a commitment to environmental 
progress (Stoknes, 2015). To that end, people are regularly subjected to descriptive cues 
that deny rather than affirm underlying beliefs regarding the need for action. This natural 
misalignment of anti-environmental norms promotes a far too common circumstance: not 
adopting a pro-environmental behavior because no one else is perceived as doing so. 
Taken together, social norms in the context of the environment are largely destructive. 
This is important because change will more likely occur when the majority of people 
mutually endorse environmental beliefs and actions (Cialdini, 2009; Stoknes, 2015). As 
part of this understanding, one could also argue that social influence is underutilized in 
the context of the environment and that more explicit, tangible social signals are needed 
to correct existing social misperceptions (e.g., Leviston, Walker, & Morwinski, 2013; 
Mildenberger & Tingley, 2017) and push against larger system components (Stoknes, 
2015). While the literature above is helpful in understanding, at least in part, why anti-
environmental behaviors may persist, it does not directly address how and under what 
conditions existing norms can be transformed.  
Norms and Social Interaction 
An understanding of how social norms materialize to influence human behavior 
and decision-making reveals important insights into the role of interpersonal 
communication in the diffusion of social information and exercise of social influence. By 
their very definition, norms are social phenomena. People construct and modify 
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normative perceptions based on social interaction, observation, and information 
(Abrahamse & Steg, 2013; Cialdini, 2009). The communication of norms can be indirect: 
people can infer norms by observing others' past and present behaviors. For instance, the 
repeated observation of (in)action enables people to develop perceptions about the 
pervasiveness or rather, the rarity of a given behavior. Norms can also be communicated 
directly: people intentionally talk about what is or what is not socially approved of 
behavior (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005; Shank, Kashima, Peters, Robins, & Kirley, 2018). 
Whereas descriptive norms can be inferred by the direct observation of publicly 
observable behaviors, such as the number of neighbors who participate in curbside 
recycling, injunctive norms must be learned and made salient through interpersonal 
communication (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). Thus, topic-relevant conversations are critical 
in the process of generating shared beliefs about what behaviors are accepted by the 
broader community (Bouas & Komorita, 1996).  
Interpersonal communication, defined as the mutual exchange of messages 
between individuals (Berger, 2014a; Berger & Calabrese, 1974), provides an explicit 
pathway to inform, explain, persuade, tell stories, and interpret information (Green & 
Burleson, 2003). Across various fields, the conceptualization and empirical examination 
of interpersonal communication suggest that it is not merely the exchange of information, 
but also entails relationally and socially consequential behavior (Berger, 2005; Southwell 
& Yzer, 2007). The effect of interpersonal communication in enhancing and creating 
norms of cooperation stems from decades of social dilemmas research. Since Garret 
Hardin famously painted a pessimistic view of people's capacity to manage common pool 
resources effectively, a wealth of literature in psychology, behavioral economics, and 
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other disciplines has provided a more optimistic view of people's capacity for cooperation 
(Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 2000; 2015). Among this vast body of empirical research, 
interpersonal communication and sanctioning are widely recognized as two core 
mechanisms in supporting the activation, formation, and maintenance of context-
dependent social norms (Balliet, 2009; Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011; Ostrom, 
Walker, & Gardner, 1992; Sally, 1995). Stemming from early research in which brief 
discussions prior to laboratory prisoner's dilemma games were found to increase 
subsequent cooperation (Deutch,1958), literature has consistently demonstrated that when 
people have the opportunity to communicate with others, cooperation and collective 
outcomes significantly increase (e.g., Balliet, 2009; Ostrom et al., 1992; Sally, 1995; 
Shank et al., 2018). As to be expected, however, discussions are only as influential as the 
content pertains to topic-relevant issues and not unrelated endeavors (e.g., Dawes, 
McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977). For instance, Shank et al. (2018) demonstrated that the 
provision of norm talk, or messages that conveyed what group members 'should' do, 
significantly increased cooperation and yield during rounds of decision-making.  
 Apart from interpersonal communication, one of the most consistent findings in 
social dilemmas research highlights the central role sanctions play in fostering 
cooperation. Sanctions represent the process of providing some form of punishment or 
reward to others for engagement in actions deemed inappropriate or appropriate by others 
(for review see Balliet et al., 2011). The anticipated and actual approval of cooperation 
and disapproval of defection by others exerts a considerable influence on individuals' 
decision to cooperate (Balliet et al., 2011; Ostrom, 2015). Explanations for the effect of 
communication and sanctions argue that these processes function by creating salient, 
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situation-appropriate norms of cooperation (Kerr, 1995; Kerr, Garst, Lewandowski, & 
Harris, 1997). Taken together, this research suggests that individuals' have the capacity to 
influence others through intentional communicative acts. More specifically, it suggests 
that interpersonal sanctioning can serve an important function in transforming and 
enforcing norms of cooperation. To date, however, informal voluntary mechanisms such 
as interpersonal sanctioning and other implicit interpersonal communicative acts have 
rarely been explored as a means of promoting context-dependent norms and/or in 
regulating socially-relevant behavior.  
 Research on the topic of prejudice and discrimination is one of the few areas to 
explore interpersonal communication. Work in this area has been driven by a need to 
explain the persistence of racist remarks and incidents, particularly at a time when equity 
and egalitarian values are more widely endorsed by society (Blanchard, Lilly, & Vaughn, 
1991). The social context approach holds the perspective that a failure to interpersonally 
regulate conspicuously prejudiced statements provides an open space for racism and 
other socially-constructed issues to permeate in society (Blanchard et a., 1991; 
Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham & Vaughn, 1994). For instance, research has found that 
merely overhearing others express racist sentiments decreased participants public and 
private expressions of anti-racist beliefs (Blanchard et al., 1991). Importantly, the 
researchers discovered a similar effect for experiencing anti-racist expressions: 
participants who overheard others expressing anti-racist sentiments subsequently reported 
higher egalitarian beliefs (Blanchard et al., 1994). These findings, taken together with the 
literature on social norms, demonstrate the downstream attitudinal and behavioral 
implications of interpersonal talk on collective outcomes and socially-constructed issues. 
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Perhaps more importantly, these studies accentuate the interpersonal nature through 
which normative beliefs are communicated and furthermore, how daily, seemingly 
inconspicuous, social interactions can leave a tangible impression on others' beliefs and 
behaviors concerning socially-constructed issues. 
Limited work has examined the efficacy of confrontation (i.e., interpersonal 
sanctioning) as a strategy for regulating and reducing prejudice responding. Fundamental 
to the social context approach, Blanchard et al. (1991) reason that interpersonal reactions 
to norm-violating events (e.g., racist remarks) are critical for reinforcing existing norms 
as well as for creating new ones. For instance, in a simulated online conversation, 
researchers prompted participants to express racially-charged stereotypes during a 
photograph-sentence pairing task, where discriminatory responses were confronted by a 
confederate. Participants in the confrontation condition were more likely to reduce their 
use of stereotypical responses compared to those in the control group (Czopp, Montieth, 
& Mark; 2006). Although these findings highlight people's capacity to regulate racist 
sentiments meaningfully, the social costs associated with confronting may significantly 
shape whether or not people engage (e.g., Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 
1999). For instance, women who were primed under high-cost conditions (e.g., 
interviewing for a competitive, prestigious job) were less likely to confront a confederate 
male interviewer who behaved in a prejudiced manner compared to those primed under 
low-cost conditions (e.g., interviewing for a non-competitive, charity organization; Swim 
& Hyers, 1999).  
 Collectively, this string of research highlights the vast opportunities that exist for 
people to encourage or discourage specific beliefs or actions through their everyday 
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interactions with others. Furthermore, the findings above not only demonstrate how 
social displays or signals of one's beliefs hold the potential to increase (or decrease) 
related opinions among others but also illustrate how confrontation can produce 
behavioral outcomes while adhering to more socially accepted and civilly-appropriate 
norms of conversation (Steentjes, Kurz, Barreto & Morton, 2017). Although 
confrontation may be a useful tool for regulating harmful social expressions, findings 
detailing the social costs embedded in engagement suggest that the act of confronting 
may be a non-normative behavior. Thus, accruing the potential benefits of interpersonal 
communication and sanctioning, in particular, may rest on people's willingness to incur 
the costs associated with engagement.  
Interpersonal Communication and the Environment 
 Understanding the implications and antecedents of interpersonal communication 
has received limited attention in the environmental domain. For good reasons, efforts to 
impede environmental degradation at the individual level have predominantly targeted 
behaviors with direct and measurable impacts on environmental outcomes rather than 
mobilizing action through peer persuasion. Although these behavioral endeavors are 
critically important in maximizing ecological outcomes (Dietz, Gardner, Gilligan, Stern, 
& Vandenbergh; 2009), such an approach promotes a limited conceptualization of both 
people's capacity for engendering change as well as the breadth of behavioral responses 
likely needed to achieve widespread societal and environmental progress. What is critical 
to realize here is that communicating with others on these topics and mitigating one's 
impact on the environment are not mutually exclusive endeavors. As people pursue 
change at the individual level, they are also bound to and will encounter others whose 
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actions either reflect or conflict with their values and/or society's collective interests. 
Thus, in addition to directing their own actions, people also possess the capacity to 
encourage compliance among their peers (Ostrom, 2015). 
Only in recent years have academics begun to recognize and consider more bi-
directional, many-to-many forms of communication, arguing that public dialogue is an 
essential component for social and environmental change (Moser, 2016; Stoknes, 2015). 
In order to create a culture of conservation, some ethicists argue that individuals are 
morally responsible for actively signaling to others their commitment to pro-
environmental actions and beliefs (Lawford-Smith, 2015; Nolan, 2013). Engendering 
change through interpersonal communication echoes related calls in the literature to 
situate individual-level engagement in more socio-political contexts and to engage people 
as social citizens who play a more prominent role in disseminating information and 
fostering cooperation within their own social networks (Carvalho, van Wessel and 
Maeseele, 2017; Pearson, Schuldt and Romero-Canyas, 2016; Stoknes, 2015). Provided 
how people view and respond to environmental issues has become deeply entrenched in 
social meanings, "speaking out openly is not just an individual psychological act, it is 
also a political [and social] form of engagement" (Stoknes, 2015).  
Nascent research has begun to elucidate on interpersonal communication in the 
context of the environment, including the drivers and implications of engagement and 
disengagement. Already, this area of research has shown that individuals are mostly 
unwilling to discuss climate-related issues (Maibach et al., 2016; Norgaard, 2011) or 
admonish a peer for their irresponsible environmental behavior (Nolan, 2013). At a 
descriptive level, for instance, a troubling trend has emerged relative to the overall lack of 
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everyday conversations on the issue of climate change. Seven out of ten Americans report 
'never' or 'rarely' discussing it, and even fewer report overhearing climate-based 
discussions among others (Maibach et al., 2016). More concerning, however, is the lack 
of conversations among those very or extremely concerned about the issue. Among those 
most interested in global warming, more than half report 'rarely' or 'never' discussing it 
(57% and 54% respectively; Maibach et al., 2016). Despite the gravity of the inherently 
complex and compounding ecological challenges—climate disruption, resource 
depletion, and species decline—facing society, these issues fail to sufficiently occupy 
people's minds, daily conversations, and pursuits (Spence, Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2012; 
Pew Research Center, 2014). 
Although it is unclear and, perhaps, unlikely that other environmental issues 
evoke a similar silence, research suggests that climate change is largely experienced as a 
silenced—social and cognitive—abstraction (Maibach et al., 2016; Norgaard, 2011; 
Spence et al., 2012). Despite the low incidence of engagement, there are reasons to 
suggest that considerable gains could be made if and when individuals begin to voice 
their commitment to positive environmental progress (e.g., Goldberg, van der Linden, 
Maibach, & Leiserowitz, 2019). For instance, two-thirds of Americans trust family and 
friends as a source of information about global warming and further report that family 
and friends have the greatest ability to convince them to take action to reduce global 
warming (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Feinberg, 2013). Critically, these 
findings, taken together with the literature on normative influence, suggest two important 
insights: (1) people are open to persuasion and (2) they are open to persuasion from 
similar others.  
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The socially-constructed silence around environmental issues, in conjunction with 
the lack of transparency with respect to individual-level action, is problematic because it 
can undermine people's normative perceptions of the issue (Norgaard, 2011; Geiger & 
Swim, 2016). Despite the majority of Americans recognizing anthropogenic climate 
change (Leiserowitz et al., 2018), silence may be misconstrued as passive acceptance of 
anti-environmental norms (Czopp, 2013). Czopp (2013) highlighted this effect, 
demonstrating how witnessing an environmental activist fail to confront anti-
environmental comments resulted in participants reporting less favorable attitudes 
towards recycling as well as reduced intentions to recycle in the future compared to those 
who observed a confrontation. Preliminary research, however, suggests that overt 
expressions of approval or disapproval of others' environmental behaviors can 
subsequently promote or inhibit pro-environmental engagement. For instance, Swim and 
Bloodhart (2013) found that individuals who were admonished for taking the elevator, 
subsequently engaged in pro-environmental acts. These findings parallel prior work on 
prejudice responding, suggesting that social regulation (or the lack thereof) with respect 
to harmful everyday remarks or behaviors can promote positive engagement (or 
perpetuate significant social issues) in the context of the environment (Blanchard et al., 
1991; 1994). 
 Individuals' willingness to communicate with others is influenced by aspects of 
conversational efficacy (Geiger & Swim, 2016), pluralistic ignorance (Geiger & Swim, 
2016), and for fear of social ramifications (Steentjes et al., 2017). For instance, 
misperceiving the distribution of public opinion on climate change in favor of denialism 
reduced climate-based discussions among college students (Geiger & Swim, 2016). 
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Relatedly, Steentjes et al. (2017) found that when compared to confronting racist 
expressions, confronting climate change disregard resulted in more social costs for the 
confronter, as measured through feelings of closeness and warmth. Thus, policing 
conversations of climate change and/or other environmentally-relevant behaviors may 
ultimately rest on individuals' willingness to incur the associated costs. With respect to 
recycling behaviors, Nolan (2013) found a general unwillingness to sanction among 
college students, though students did indicate a greater willingness to reward than punish. 
The more effective each sanction was perceived, the more willing students were to 
impose it (Nolan, 2013). Research by Maki and Raimi (2017) similarly demonstrates that 
perceptions of efficacy may partly drive interpersonal sanctioning. For instance, people 
high in environmental moral exporting, which refers to a willingness to persuade others 
to adopt one's moral values, endorsed the belief that confronting is effective and 
expressed a greater willingness to engage in such acts. These findings, although 
inconclusive and limited, highlight the potential role of different individual-level factors 
in shaping people's willingness to sanction.  
Collectively, this research offers initial insight into both the implications of 
(dis)engagement as well as the conditions under which people are more or less likely to 
engage. Perhaps most important is the work identifying the social costs associated with 
confronting climate change disregard as well as the effect of pluralistic ignorance in 
regulating people's willingness to discuss it (Geiger & Swim, 2016; Steentjes et al., 
2017). The lack of normative status explaining this effect adds to the general notion that 
prevailing social norms act as a barrier rather than a conduit to change (Markowitz & 
Shariff, 2012). People's unwillingness to impose sanctions on others is particularly 
 15 
problematic, provided that interpersonal sanctioning may facilitate the creation and 
maintenance of pro-environmental norms (Czopp et al., 2006; Swim and Bloodhart, 
2013). While the emerging, socially-constructed silence surrounding climate change and 
other environmental issues is problematic, the low rate of incidence suggests that there 
are potentially large gains to be made if researchers are able to identify effective ways to 
increase the frequency of engagement. Although the research highlighted here 
predominantly focuses on the topic of climate change, interpersonal communication may 
play a pivotal role in other domains.   
A Note on Word-of-Mouth and Corporate Wrongdoing 
Just as social interactions can promote or inhibit positive environmental behavior, 
social talk concerning material goods and/or services can play an important role in 
determining how consumers engage with corporations and their brands (e.g. East, 
Hammond, & Lomax, 2008). Consumer word-of-mouth, defined as informal 
communications directed at other consumers about the ownership, usage, or 
characteristics of a particular good or service, is rooted in aspects of social influence 
(Westbrook, 1987; DeMatos & Rossi, 2008). Individuals engage in word-of-mouth for 
the purpose of persuasion, for instance, by recommending others to purchase or boycott 
products from a particular corporation on account of their product quality, corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) or misbehavior (Berger, 2014b). Although word-of-mouth 
can be a valuable currency in the marketplace, it can also present significant challenges in 
the event that consumers engage in negative word-of-mouth as a form of punishment for 
irresponsible or unethical corporate behavior (Reichheld & Sasser, 1990). Thus, 
consumers—through both their purchasing decisions and intentional interactions with 
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others—represent a potentially powerful force for improving and regulating corporate 
environmental responsibility.   
Over the past decade, consumers and in turn, corporations, have placed a 
heightened emphasis on CSR initiatives (Lim & Tsutsui, 2012). These implied or 
regulated contracts dictate that corporations adhere to ethically driven standards of 
conduct (Dahlsrud, 2008). Despite the rise of CSR initiatives on corporate agendas, 
instances of corporate neglect and unethical decision-making, which can contribute to 
significant social and/or environmental harm, continue to make national headlines. For 
instance, since 2015, the marketplace has experienced a number of corporate scandals, 
including, but not limited to the diesel emissions issue at Volkswagen (Gates, Ewing, 
Russel, & Watkins, 2016), Cambridge Analytica’s political interference on Facebook 
(Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018) as well as fraudulent unauthorized bank 
accounts at Wells Fargo (Corkery, 2016; Cowley, 2017). These and other instances of 
corporations failing to meet regulatory or voluntary social and/or environmental 
responsibility contracts can create immeasurable damage for corporations, by 
engendering punitive consumer responses, including negative word-of-mouth (e.g., 
Grappi, Romani, & Bagozzi, 2013; Klein & Dawar, 2004).  
Any consumer who can affect corporate outcomes—by boycotting, badmouthing 
or protesting—becomes a de facto regulator of corporate social and environmental issues 
(Sweetin, Knowles, Summey, and McQueen, 2013). Although research suggests that 
consumers are willing to punish corporate social irresponsibility (Sweetin et al., 2013), a 
dearth of literature has examined how consumers view and respond to actual instances of 
corporate wrongdoing and, furthermore, what individual-level and contextual factors 
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drive consumer-related outcomes. Limited empirical research suggests that consumer 
reactions to corporate social irresponsibility (e.g., purchase intentions, negative word-of-
mouth) are partly driven by attributions of blame (e.g., Antonetti & Maklan, 2016; 
Folkes, 1988; Lei, Dawar, & Gürhan‐Canli, 2012) and moral self-conscious emotions 
(e.g., anger; Grappi et al., 2013; Romani, Grappi, & Bagozzi, 2013a/2013b; Xie, Bagozzi, 
& Grønhaug, 2019). Blame attribution is considered a cognitive process defined as the 
degree to which consumers perceive a firm to be accountable for the causation of a 
harmful event: greater perceived blame is associated with stronger negative or punitive 
reactions among consumers (Antonetti & Maklan, 2016; Bechwati & Morrin, 2007; 
Grégoire, Laufer, & Tripp, 2010; Joireman, Grégoire, Devezer, & Tripp, 2013).  
These findings support decades of theory and research delineating how harmful 
events elicit an attributional search, where individuals attempt to make sense of what 
went wrong and who or what is to blame (e.g., attribution theory, for review see Kelley & 
Michela, 1980). How individuals arrive at an overall judgment of blame has been 
theorized across multiple domains. Work in moral psychology proposes that blame 
attribution is a step-by-step process involving: (1) discerning that some event or outcome 
deviated from a norm, (2) assessing that an agent was involved and caused the event, and 
(3) deciding whether the agent brought about the event intentionally (Guglielmo, Monroe 
& Malle, 2009; Malle, Guglielmo, Monroe, 2012b). Comparatively, Weiner’s (2000) 
attributional framework, which has been leveraged to explain consumers’ blame 
attributions, suggests that blame is formed based on the assessment of three causal 
dimensions: stability (enduring or temporary), locus (internal or external) and 
controllability (controllable or not). Empirical evidence corroborates this causal flow. 
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When consumers attribute blame to internal causes, view the brands actions as a stable 
characteristic, and determine that the event could have been avoided, the more they 
ascribe blame to the corporation and the less likely they are to engage with the brand 
positively in the future (Antonetti & Maklan, 2016; Folkes, 1988; Folkes, Koletsky, & 
Graham, 1987; Klein & Dawar, 2004; Lei et al., 2012).  
Theories of moral judgment and blame stipulate that in order to be held 
responsible and punishable, an agent must have conclusively and intentionally caused an 
event (Guglielmo et al., 2009; Malle et al., 2012; Weiner, 2000). However, when 
corporations engage in acts of intentional deceit and are admittedly at fault, important 
questions remain about whether and how variations in ascriptions of blame concerning 
the causal agent (e.g., whom or what within the organizational hierarchy caused the 
event) may differentially shape consumer reactions. That is, when corporations are 
irrefutably to blame for an intentional act, do differences in consumer responding (e.g., 
negative word-of-mouth) emerge as a function of whether they assign culpability to 
individual actors within the corporation (e.g., CEO, software engineers) or else, to the 
corporation as a collective whole (e.g., corporate culture)? 
Motivations for Dissertation Research 
 
There are many reasons—theoretical, empirical, and practical—to suggest that 
leveraging forms of interpersonal communication as an alternative pathway to 
engagement holds considerable promise. Although significant strides have been made in 
recent years to enhance the field's understanding of what motivates individuals to 
confront unethical corporate behavior and others' (in)appropriate environmental behavior, 
important questions remain about how and whether other contextually-salient social and 
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individual-level (e.g., reputational concerns) factors drive engagement across disparate 
contexts. Additional research is also needed to understand how social influence impacts 
decision-making in non-traditional, albeit increasingly utilized communication mediums 
and channels (e.g., information conveyed on social networking platforms). Vast 
opportunities now exist for people to share information, in the form of text or 
photographs, yet limited work has explored individuals' personal and normative 
perceptions of sharing nature-based experiences on social media. An understanding of 
individuals' personal and normative perceptions of such practices may present valuable 
insights for conservation managers or organizations seeking to promote a shared 
conservation ethic among users who actively participate in and share nature-based 
experiences on social media. 
Building off these ideas and the initial empirical efforts explored throughout the 
introduction, this dissertation focuses on the intersection of normative influence and 
interpersonal communication. In broadening the field's understanding of interpersonal 
communication in the context of the environment, the studies and conceptual framework 
I discuss address several far-reaching and context-dependent questions: 
•    First, how willing are individuals to impose social sanctions on others' 
(in)appropriate behaviors in order to sustain coupled human-ecological systems or 
take retributive actions (e.g., badmouth) in the wake of corporate environmental 
wrongdoing? 
•    Second, what is the effect of contextually-salient social and individual-level 
factors in shaping individuals' willingness to sanction environmental 
transgressions across scales and contexts of decision-making?  
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•    Third, what are anglers’ personal and normative perceptions concerning 
whether and how a fish should be held and exposed to air post-catch? 
•    Fourth, do normative misperceptions exist concerning recreational angling 
practices as well as the use of social media for depicting angling-related events? 
Overview of Papers 
 
 This dissertation examines these research questions in a series of three empirical 
papers. Additionally, the final chapter (Chapter V, 'Communicating for Conservation') 
summarizes theoretical and empirical research on interpersonal communication, proposes 
a conceptual framework delineating the types of information exchanged during a 
discussion, and highlights relevant approaches conservation managers and practitioners 
can employ to create and scaffold meaningful interactions among relevant stakeholders. 
The thrust of my dissertation focuses on understanding what shapes individuals' 
willingness to confront perceived or actual harm, including consumers' badmouthing 
unethical corporate behavior (e.g., organization-level) as well as recreational users 
imposing social sanctions on others' (in)appropriate conservation behavior. Although 
each empirical Chapter (Chapters II-IV) addresses a distinct aspect of interpersonal 
communication, the three overlap in ways that begin to shed light on the drivers and 
implications of communicating with others. Below, I briefly introduce and summarize 
key findings from each of the three empirical papers and outline the content of the final 
chapter. Chapter II has been published as a co-authored article in the Journal of 
Consumer Behavior (with Daniel Chapman, Brian Lickel, and Ezra Markowitz) and 
Chapter III has been published as a co-authored article in the Journal of Environmental 
Management (with Andy Danylchuk, Steven Cooke, and Ezra Markowitz).  
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 In the first paper (Chapter II, ‘A Few Bad Apples or Rotten to the Core’), I begin 
by examining brand patrons' reactions to unethical environmental corporate behavior and 
the extent to which variation in ascriptions of blame, as well as consumers' proximity to 
the scandal, drive future engagement with the brand (e.g., purchasing decision, word-of-
mouth). The study draws on an isolated incident of corporate wrongdoing, in which 
Volkswagen intentionally circumvented emissions regulations on upwards of 6 million 
vehicles worldwide (Gates et al., 2016). Specifically, I explore how brand patrons' 
ascriptions of blame for causing the wrongdoing, either to 'a few bad apples' or else to 
'rotten corporate culture,' drives consumer reactions to the scandal, including their 
intentions to badmouth the corporation to others. Findings from this correlational 
research suggest that patrons who attributed blame to Volkswagen's 'rotten corporate 
culture' were less likely to engage positively with the brand in the future (e.g., buy their 
products, spread positive WOM). This effect was mediated by feelings of anger and 
perceptions of trust related to Volkswagen behaving ethically in the future. These 
findings highlight the importance of attributions in shaping expressions of blame for 
corporate wrongdoing (e.g., Folkes, 1988). The content of this chapter is reproduced in 
full as it appears in print (see Appendix A for full citation and publication details). 
 The second paper (Chapter III, ‘Peer Pressure on the Riverbank’) examines a 
similar, although distinct, question in the context of recreational fishing. Over the past 
decade, research in this domain has consistently demonstrated how anglers' behavior and 
decision-making influences the way fish biologically respond to catch-and-release 
angling events (e.g., Cooke et al., 2013a). The relationship between anglers' behavior and 
the condition of released fish has raised important questions about anglers' capacity and 
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willingness to monitor and enforce best practices among the fishing community. In this 
paper, I build on work by Chapman et al. (2017), to explore recreational anglers' 
intentions to impose social sanctions on others' (in)appropriate handling practices. 
Findings reveal that several individual-level (e.g., perceived efficacy) and contextually 
salient—social—factors (e.g., reputational concerns) drive anglers' past sanctioning 
behavior and future sanctioning intentions. In particular, efficacy beliefs relative to the 
impact of sanctioning in promoting change as well as anglers' concern about their 
reputation in the angling community predicted both past engagement and future 
sanctioning intentions. Age, concern for fishing populations, and management familiarity 
also predicted anglers' past sanctioning behavior. Additionally, though anglers reported 
low engagement in past sanctioning behaviors, they simultaneously expressed elevated 
intentions to sanction others in the future. These findings also echo recent work, 
suggesting that formal conservation policies, such as the institution of formal angling 
capture and handling regulations, may support people's ability to detect norm-violations 
and therefore, impact their willingness to interpersonally regulate and enforce others' 
actions (e.g., Nolan, 2017). The content of this chapter is reproduced in full as it appears 
in print (see Appendix A for full citation and publication details). 
 In the third paper (Chapter IV, ‘Fishing for a Photograph’), I begin to explore 
existing norms around catch-and-release handling practices, particularly those dealing 
with whether and how a fish should be held and exposed to air post-catch. Building on 
the literature detailing how fish respond to the angling event, it is important to understand 
which handling and social media sharing practices are widely endorsed in the angling 
community. Specifically, I assess anglers' personal and normative beliefs towards 
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handling and social media sharing practices that differentially depict a fish post-catch 
(e.g., partially submerged in water, air exposed), and whether and how individuals' own 
beliefs relate to their perceived level of agreement among other anglers. I find that the 
majority of participants agree with the practice of handling (and sharing images of) fish 
partially submerged or fully underwater, whereas greater disagreement exists for the 
horizontal and the vertical holds. Additionally, results indicate evidence of both 
overestimation and underestimation of normative beliefs (e.g., perceived level of support 
among other anglers) with respect to handling and social media sharing practices. For 
instance, although the majority of anglers in the sample disagreed with the vertical hold 
practice, participants simultaneously misperceived that the majority of other anglers view 
it as an appropriate practice. These findings, particularly those detailing the relationship 
between participants personal and normative beliefs about the appropriateness of 
handling and social media sharing practices suggests that there is a need to correct 
existing misperceptions. Given the effect of perceived norms on behavior, such an effort 
may be necessary in fostering the adoption of catch-and-release best practices among the 
angling community. 
 In the final paper (Chapter V, ‘Communicating for Conservation’), I summarize 
the capacity of interpersonal communication to promote widespread cooperation in the 
context of environmental collective action problems. Drawing on direct and indirect 
evidence, I propose a typology that characterizes the nature of information exchanges that 
exist when people talk with one another about such problems. As part of this discussion, I 
highlight how such exchanges differentially convey, either implicitly or explicitly, 
normative information about what is socially approved or disapproved of behavior. The 
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chapter also details how features of many environmental collective action problems, 
including attributes of the target behavior as well as the issue itself, position interpersonal 
communication as a unique and necessary social influence approach. Notable social, 
contextual, and individual-level factors are discussed in terms of how each can impact 
engagement as well as conversational outcomes. In conclusion, I underscore several 
approaches conservation managers and practitioners can employ to leverage the power of 
social influence through interpersonal communication. 
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CHAPTER II 
“A FEW BAD APPLES” OR “ROTTEN TO THE CORE”: PERCEPTIONS 
OF CORPORATE CULTURE DRIVE BRAND ENGAGEMENT  
AFTER CORPORATE SCANDAL 
 
Introduction 
With consumers expressing a growing interest in patronizing corporations on 
account of their ethical conduct, corporate social responsibility initiatives are occupying 
an increasingly important role in corporate agendas (Brown & Dacin, 1997; Creyer, 
1997; Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006; Mohr & Webb 2005; Mohr, Webb, & Harris, 2001; 
Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001). When confronted with egregious corporate scandals, brand 
patrons are faced with difficult decisions about how and whether to engage with the 
offending company in the future. To date, limited research has examined the specific 
factors that influence how and to what extent consumers are differentially motivated to 
engage with a brand following actual instances of intentional corporate malfeasance that 
affect both brand patrons and the general public. 
In 2008, the Volkswagen Group (VW) launched the ‘Clean Diesel’ engine ad 
campaign designed to debunk the ‘diesel is dirty’ (mis)conception and announced their 
new line of environmentally friendly, high performance diesel engine vehicles 
(Pemberton, 2015). However, less than a decade later VW admitted to intentionally 
installing ‘defeat device’ software on their turbocharged direct injection (TDI) diesel 
engine vehicles to evade U.S. emissions regulations. Volkswagen’s fraudulent 
engineering has resulted in excess nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from over 500,000 
vehicles (TDI models 2009-2015) registered in the U.S. and an additional 11 million 
vehicles worldwide (Gates et al., 2016). Volkswagen’s unethical conduct could have 
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potentially drastic negative effects on existing owners’ intentions to remain loyal to the 
brand in the future. 
Here, we report findings from a matched samples survey of TDI and non-TDI 
VW consumers in which we investigated how reactions to the scandal predict future 
brand engagement intentions. Specifically, we explored how two important factors—
consumers’ proximity to the scandal and perceptions of VW’s corporate culture—predict 
expectations of future wrongdoing, feelings of anger and consumers’ intentions to engage 
with the brand in the future. Further, to more comprehensively explore the effects of 
proximity and perceptions of corporate culture on consumers’ future brand engagement, 
we also examined how and to what extent both expectations of future ethical action and 
anger mediate these effects. 
Predicting Future Brand Engagement 
In the wake of corporate scandals, consumers can play an instrumental role in 
determining the financial success of corporations by choosing to either engage or 
disengage from the company (Reichheld & Sasser, 1990). Underscoring consumers’ 
future brand engagement is the basic choice of whether or not to continue purchasing 
from a corporation. Additionally, consumers can also affect company outcomes by 
talking with other potential consumers about the company, its behavior and its products. 
The examination of such word of mouth behaviors (Westbrook, 1987) is not a trivial 
endeavor, as research demonstrates that interpersonal communication influences 
individuals’ decision-making, including in the context of consumption (Christiansen & 
Tax, 2000; Engel, Langner, & Schmitt, 1995; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955; Walker, 1995).  
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Thus, in the present study, we measured brand engagement not only in terms of future 
purchasing intentions but also in terms of interpersonal communication about the brand. 
Extant research examining the antecedents of consumers' purchase and word of 
mouth intentions following corporate product and service failures highlights a variety of 
factors, including customer satisfaction (Andreaseen, 1999; Bolkan, Goodboy, & 
Bachman, 2013; Susskind, 2005), corporate social responsibility evaluations (Klein & 
Dawar, 2004; Russell, Russell, & Honea, 2016), prior consumer-brand relationships and 
expectations (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Grégoire & Fisher, 2008; Grégoire, Tripp, & 
Legoux, 2009; Lei et al., 2012; Trump, 2014), and moral or self-conscious emotions 
(Antoletti & Maklan, 2016; Grappi et al., 2013; Johnson, Matear, & Thomson, 2010; 
Romani et al., 2013a). However, as far as we have been able to determine, no past 
research has explicitly examined whether individuals’ beliefs about the nature of an 
organization’s ‘corporate culture’ influence future brand engagement. Given that media 
coverage of corporate scandals often seems to highlight the role of corporate culture in 
driving unethical decisions, e.g., indicating that either the entire company is morally 
bankrupt or else that just a few “bad apples” are responsible for the wrongdoing, we 
hypothesized that variation between individuals with respect to such beliefs may help 
explain differential responses of consumers to the VW emissions scandal.   
Predicting consumers’ future brand engagement, as a function of both how 
consumers attribute blame as well as how proximately or distally affected they are by a 
corporation’s actions, has the potential to inform how organizations’ design and direct 
effective communication, marketing and organizational responses. If consumers perceive 
an instance of wrongdoing to be a symptom of a pervasive corrupt corporate culture, 
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which may have negative downstream effects on future brand engagement, this may 
provide a powerful motive for the organization to make changes to respond to 
consumers’ ethical expectations of organizational culture moving forward. Thus, the 
recent VW diesel emissions scandal provides a unique real-world context within which to 
study these consumer decision-making dynamics and build on preexisting themes in 
consumer behavior research. 
Ascribing Culpability: Immoral Characters or Corrupt Culture 
Addressing the question of consumers’ beliefs about corporate culture is an 
important consideration in the present context as VW has accepted internal responsibility 
for intentionally installing the ‘defeat device’ software. While the chairman of VW has 
claimed that the scandal was caused by the ‘misconduct and shortcomings of individual 
employees’ (Boston, Varnholt, & Sloat, 2015), others have suggested the scandal was the 
result of VW’s corporate culture, once described as ‘cutthroat, confident, and insular’ 
(Ewing & Bowley, 2015). Examining whether VW owners’ divergent beliefs about 
corporate culture for causing the scandal predicts future brand engagement extends 
existing literature on attributions of responsibility with respect to corporate wrongdoing 
and product failures (Antolleti & Maklan, 2016; Coombs, 2007; Folkes, 1984; Folkes, 
1988; Lei et al., 2012). 
Extensive theory and research suggests that individuals seek out and develop 
causal stories that allow ascriptions of blame and responsibility after witnessing unethical 
behavior (Heider, 1956; Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014; Weiner, 1985). Thus, in the 
wake of a corporate scandal, it is reasonable to assume that consumers will first seek to 
address the question of culpability. Indeed, attributions of responsibility influence 
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consumers’ reactions to corporate failures (Coombs and Holladay, 2002; Folkes, 1988; 
Klein & Dawar, 2004; Laufer & Coombs, 2006; Lei et al., 2012). However, most of this 
research has examined consumers’ attributions either as the function of three causal 
dimensions of locus, stability and controllability (Folkes, 1984), the influence of 
contextual base-rate information (Lei et al., 2012), or else the degree to which consumers 
hold corporations responsible (Antoletti & Maklan, 2016). When consumers attribute 
blame to external corporate factors, view the brand’s actions consistent with similar 
organizations, or ascribe lower levels of responsibility to the corporation, they are more 
likely to positively engage with the brand in the future (Antoletti & Maklan, 2016; 
Folkes, 1988; Folkes et al., 1987; Klein & Dawar; 2004; Lei e al., 2012).  Yet, when 
corporations are admittedly responsible for the wrongdoing, attempts to answer the 
question of culpability often implicate the extent to which the corporation’s 
organizational culture, characterized by widespread corruption, enabled or even 
supported the malfeasance (e.g., ‘Enron’: Simms & Brinkmann, 2003).  
Building on this idea and the work cited above, we hypothesized that consumers’ 
ascriptions of responsibility, either to an entire organization (i.e., as a result of a 
perceived corporate culture that is “rotten to the core”) or else to a small handful of 
employees (i.e., “bad apples”) may strongly influence intentions to engage with the 
organization in the future (e.g., purchase its products, speak positively with others about 
it). Consumers should be more willing to engage with a corporation if the incident is 
perceived as an uncharacteristic, isolated event attributable to the actions of a handful of 
rogue employees rather than to an organizational culture characterized by deep-seated, 
persistent corruption. Therefore, the following prediction was made: 
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H1: Perceiving the scandal to be a symptom of a rotten corporate culture rather 
than a small number of individual employees will negatively influence future 
brand engagement intentions. 
In addition, we also sought to examine mechanisms that might shed light on 
reasons why corporate culture beliefs would influence future brand engagement. Based 
on past literature, we focused on expectations of future ethical action and anger about 
corporate wrongdoing as two important factors to explore. 
Trust and the Expectation of Future Ethical Action 
Intentional corporate deception and unethical behavior, such as that perpetrated 
by VW in the emissions case, likely undermines consumers’ trust in the corporation, 
which is to say, consumers will have low confidence in the reliability, honesty, and 
responsibility of the organization (Morgan & Hunt, 1994) as well as a missing 
‘expectation of ethically justifiable behavior’ (Hosmer, 1995, p. 399).  This is important, 
as research in relational marketing indicates that trust plays a central role in helping to 
build and maintain positive consumer-company relationships (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003; 
Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Sirdeshmukh, Singh, & Sabol, 2002). Stronger levels of brand 
trust are associated with greater brand loyalty (Delgado-Ballester & Luis Munuera-
Alemán, 2001; Lau & Lee, 1999), positive word of mouth (Gremler, Gwinner, & Brown, 
2001; Ranaweer & Prabhu, 2003) and purchase intentions (Kang & Hustvedt, 2014). 
Hence, the following hypothesis was made: 
H2:  Expectations of future ethical action will have a positive effect on 
future brand engagement. 
 31 
We also expected that consumers’ expectations of future ethical behavior should 
depend at least in part on their beliefs about the root causes of the wrongdoing. Thus, 
confidence in a corporation’s propensity for future ethical action should increase if 
consumers perceive that the culpable party (i.e., ‘a few bad apples’) represents only a 
small subset of the entire corporation (and thus, presumably, can be easily removed). 
Conversely, if consumers perceive the root of the wrongdoing as endemic (i.e., a ‘rotten’ 
corporate culture), than we should expect lower expectations of future ethical action and, 
in turn, a reduced willingness to engage with the brand in the future. Indeed, trust is 
shown to be an important factor in regulating consumer-company relationships (Esch, 
Langner, Schmitt, & Geus, 2006; Morgan & Hunt, 1994), explaining the effect of 
attributions of corporate social responsibility initiatives on purchase intentions (Kang & 
Hustvedt, 2014; Vlachos, Tsamakos, Vrechopoulos, & Avramidis, 2009). We anticipate 
that owners who believe that the emissions scandal reflects the decisions of a ‘few bad 
apples’ will report stronger expectations of future ethical action and that these 
expectations should result in an increased likelihood to engage with the brand. Therefore, 
we also hypothesized that: 
H3: Expectations of future ethical action will partially mediate the effect of 
corporate culture beliefs on future brand engagement. 
Affective Reactions to Corporate Wrongdoing 
Corporations’ ethical misconduct is likely to arouse an emotive response, 
providing consumers with an additional source of motivation to act. An emerging body of 
literature highlights the role negatively valenced emotions, such as anger, play in shaping 
consumers’ future brand engagement following instances of corporate social 
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irresponsibility (Antoletti & Maklan, 2016; Grappi et al., 2013; Johnson et al., 2010; 
Romani et al., 2013). Heightened feelings of anger can motivate retaliatory consumer 
actions, including boycott behavior (Cronin, Reysen, & Branscombe, 2012; Klein, Smith, 
& John, 2004) and negative word of mouth (Antoletti & Maklan, 2016; Grappi et al., 
2013). Given the extent of VW’s corporate social responsibility failure, we hypothesized: 
H4: Anger will negatively influence future brand engagement intentions. 
We also anticipated that the extent to which individuals are angry may be 
contingent on whether they believed the scandal was the product of ‘a few bad apples’ or 
a ‘rotten corporate culture’. As with trust, prior research indicates that anger influences 
consumer-company relationships following instances of corporate wrongdoing. For 
example, anger regulates the effect of evaluations of perceived corporate social 
irresponsibility (Antoletti & Maklan, 2016) and moral/social transgressions on negative 
word of mouth (Grappi et al., 2013). Perceiving that a scandal reflects a corporate culture 
that is ‘rotten to the core’ should elicit elevated feelings of anger about the scandal, and 
in turn, a decreased willingness to engage with the brand. If consumers ascribe a ‘few bad 
apples’ responsible, then we should expect lower expressions of anger, and increased 
future brand engagement. Thus, we hypothesized that: 
H5: Anger will partially mediate the effect of corporate culture beliefs on future 
brand engagement. 
Proximity Effects on Future Brand Engagement 
In addition to the anticipated effects of corporate culture beliefs, we also 
anticipated a second potentially critical factor affecting future brand engagement in the 
context of the VW emissions scandal, namely, whether current brand patrons were 
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directly affected by the scandal (i.e., TDI owners) or only indirectly affected (i.e., other 
VW owners that may suffer from reputational and lesser financial damage from being 
associated with the brand).  
Many of the consequences of the VW scandal are diffuse and have impacts on the 
general public in the form of respiratory illness, air pollution, and even premature death 
(Barrett et al., 2016; Holland, Mansur, Muller, & Yates, 2016; US EPA, 1999). In 
addition to these diffuse consequences, current patrons of VW suffer additional proximal 
forms of harm. In the US, those facing the most direct impacts are the roughly 500,000 
TDI owners that have been unwittingly put in a position of both owning and operating 
vehicles harmful to environmental and public health, and being forced to make a decision 
of whether to sell back or repair their vehicle under the partial settlement with U.S. 
regulators (US EPA, 2016). There are likely also negative psychological and social costs 
of the scandal (e.g., loss in reputation, feelings of guilt or shame) felt both by directly 
affected owners as well as others affiliated with the VW brand through their vehicle 
ownership. Therefore, we examined whether owners’ proximity to the scandal (TDI 
owner vs. non-TDI VW owner) influenced future brand engagement intentions. In 
addition to testing the direct effects of proximity on brand engagement, we also explored 
(a) whether proximity moderates the influence of corporate culture beliefs on future 
brand engagement, and (b) whether expectations of future ethical action and anger at VW 
also function as mediators of the hypothesized proximity effect. 
The role of personal proximity relates to Jones’ (1991) concept of moral intensity, 
which argues that individuals make ethical decisions contingent on the characteristics of 
the issue, including the dimension of proximity or a feeling of nearness (e.g., social, 
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cultural, physical, psychological; McMahon & Harvey, 2006). In effect, heightened 
proximity leads to increased moral intensity and ultimately, a moral obligation to take 
action, such as disengaging from a brand after an instance of unethical corporate 
wrongdoing. Whereas prior research has largely assessed proximity based on participants 
perceived degree of similarity and/or closeness to hypothetical victims (e.g., McMahon & 
Harvey, 2006), here proximity is operationalized by individuals’ actual vehicle ownership 
status, as TDI owners are more directly affected than non-TDI owners. In a related vein, 
past research on corporate wrongdoing indicates that while brands do sometimes benefit 
from a ‘halo effect’ among patrons, such that greater brand connectedness or loyalty can 
buffer the negative effects of a scandal on company engagement  (Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, 
Unnava, 2000; Ahluwalia, Unnava, & Burnkrant, 2001; Cheng, White, Chaplin, 2012), 
these benefits are often reduced or disappear altogether when a brand’s actions are 
personally relevant or directly harm consumers (Grégoire et al., 2009; Grégoire & Fisher, 
2008; Johnson et al., 2010; Trump, 2014). Thus, the following hypothesis was made: 
H6: Proximity to the scandal will negatively affect future brand engagement. 
TDI owners directly affected by VW’s actions should be less likely to engage 
with the VW brand in the future than VW owners only indirectly affected by the scandal. 
When considering potential mediators of these effects, anger at VW for the scandal seems 
likely to be a particularly potent factor. That is, those most directly affected by a 
company’s actions are likely to be those most angry at the company. While we expected 
anger to be the primary mediator of effects of proximity, it is also theoretically plausible 
that individuals’ expectations of future ethical action would be negatively impacted by 
being more proximally harmed by the company. This direct experience of harm may 
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extend the salience of the company’s wrongdoing, making it more difficult for the 
company to restore the trust of these consumers. We therefore tested both anger and 
future expectations of ethical action also as mediators of the effects of proximity on brand 
engagement but expected anger to be the stronger mediator: 
H7: Anger and expectations of future ethical action will mediate the effects of 
proximity on future brand engagement; the mediation effect will be stronger for 
anger than expectations of future ethical action. 
Interactive or Independent Effects? 
The generation of parallel hypotheses for proximity and corporate culture beliefs 
raises questions with regard to whether and how these two potent factors interact to 
influence consumer responses. On the one hand, corporate culture beliefs and proximity 
may both play important but independent roles in influencing expectations of future 
ethical action, anger at VW, and ultimately future brand engagement. On the other hand, 
proximity may in fact moderate the influence of corporate culture beliefs on these 
outcomes. For example, being a VW TDI owner directly affected by VW’s actions may 
amplify the effects of perceiving VW’s corporate culture as ‘rotten to the core’ such that 
individuals in this category may be the least likely to expect future ethical action from 
VW, the most angry at VW for the scandal, and the least motivated to exhibit positive 
brand engagement in the future. We examined of these possible patterns of results. Figure 
1 depicts a full conceptual model of the study predictions. 
H8: Proximity and beliefs about corporate culture will interact, such 
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that TDI owners ascribing responsibility to a ‘rotten corporate culture’ will 
amplify (i.e., multiplicative interaction) feelings of anger and expectations of 
future ethical action. 
 
 
Figure 1. The conceptual model representing the anticipated direct and indirect effects 
among the study measures using TDI owners and “Rotten” corporate culture as the 
reference levels for proximity and beliefs about corporate culture, respectively. The lines 
extending from proximity to scandal to the lines indicating the effects of culture on anger 
and expectations of future ethical action represent the potential interactive relationship 
between corporate culture and proximity, such that TDI owners' ascribing responsibility 
to VW's corporate culture will amplify (i.e., multiplicative interaction) feelings of anger 
and expectations of future VW ethical action in the indicated directions. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Owners of Volkswagen vehicles residing in the United States were recruited to 
participate in a survey by the marketing research firm, YouGov. Initial ownership criteria 
included owning or leasing a Volkswagen 2.0L TDI vehicle manufactured between 2009 
and 2016. Volkswagen owners of non-TDI vehicles (e.g., unrestricted model years of 
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non-diesel engines) were recruited as a matched sample to participate in the study based 
on age, gender, education, income and geographical region.1 The survey was 
administered after the tentative announcement of the settlement agreement with U.S. 
regulators in June, 2016 and prior to release of information about the final agreement.  
Aside from ownership and the matching criteria, no other exclusion criteria were applied. 
The study was approved by the University of Massachusetts Institutional Review Board 
(Protocol ID: 2015:2808). A total of 5921 surveys were completed, and participants were 
compensated for completing the survey. Table 1 displays socio-demographic 
characteristics. 
Table 1. Socio-demographics characteristics by VW ownership group 
Gender (n = 
592) TDI % NonTDI % Income  (n = 592) TDI % NonTDI % 
Female 124 48.2 178 53.1 0 - 29,999 24 9.3 45 13.4 
Male 133 51.8 157 46.9 30,000 - 49,999 29 11.3 45 13.4 
Race (n = 592) TDI % NonTDI % 50,000-69,999 50 19.5 58 17.3 
White 210 81.7 281 83.9 70,000 - 99,999 50 19.5 73 21.8 
African 
American 5 1.9 12 3.6 > 100,000 78 30.4 72 21.5 
Hispanic 11 4.3 18 5.4 Non Disclosure 26 10.1 42 12.5 
Asian 13 5.1 6 1.8 Region (n = 592) TDI % NonTDI % 
Native Am. 4 1.6 0 0.0 Northeast 49 19.1 65 19.4 
Mixed 5 1.9 11 3.3 Midwest 37 14.4 62 18.5 
Other 9 3.5 7 2.1 South  96 37.4 112 33.4 
Educ. (n = 592) TDI % NonTDI % West 75 29.2 96 28.7 
No high school 1 0.4 3 0.9 
Party identity (n = 
592) TDI % NonTDI % 
High school 
grad. 24 9.3 26 7.8 Democrat 81 31.5 142 42.4 
Some college 38 14.8 71 21.2 Republican 66 25.7 59 17.6 
2-year college 32 12.5 19 5.7 Independent 82 31.9 104 31.0 
4-year college 78 30.4 124 37.0 Other 14 5.4 21 6.3 
Post Graduate 84 32.7 92 27.5 Not Sure 14 5.4 9 2.7 
 
 
1 When indicated, further detail on study and analysis procedures is located in the supplementary 
information.  
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Measures 
Participants responded to a large survey, which included questions to investigate 
the predicted relationships. One dichotomous item gauged beliefs about Volkswagen’s 
corporate culture by asking the following: “Do you think the Volkswagen emissions 
situation reflects the decisions of a “few bad apples” within the company or instead 
reflects that the company’s corporate culture is “rotten to the core”?”. A single item 
measured participants’ expectation of future ethical action by VW: “Do you trust 
Volkswagen to act ethically in the future?” (1 = not at all, 7 = completely). Feelings of 
anger about the VW emissions situation was assessed by one item: “How angry do you 
feel about the Volkswagen emissions situation?” (1 = not at all angry, 7 = extremely 
angry). 
Three items measured participants’ intentions to engage with Volkswagen in the 
aftermath of the emissions situation. Participants indicated how unlikely or likely they 
would be to purchase a Volkswagen vehicle in the future (1 = extremely unlikely, 7 = 
extremely likely). Two additional items assessed participants’ positive and negative word-
of-mouth intentions. Participants indicated the extent to which they were motivated to 
‘Recommend Volkswagen vehicles to other people’ (1 = not at all motivated, 7 = 
extremely motivated) and ‘Encourage other people not to buy a Volkswagen because of 
the scandal’ (1 = not at all motivated, 7 = extremely motivated, reverse coded). The three 
items were averaged to create a composite measure of future brand engagement that was 
used throughout the analyses (α = .71). See Table 2 for an overview of descriptive 
statistics and correlations between study measures. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations for study independent and 
dependent measures 
  Count %       
Beliefs about corporate culture      
A few bad apples' 419 70.8    
Rotten to the core' 172 29.1    
No response 2 0.8       
 M SD (1) (2) (3) 
Expectations of future ethical action 4.46 1.75 1   
Feelings of anger   -0.510 1  
Future brand engagement     0.682 -0.507 1 
Note. For all correlations p's < .001       
 
Results 
Analytic strategy 
 The analyses below were performed in several stages to test the hypotheses. First, 
the relationship between corporate culture beliefs and proximity to the scandal were 
examined, as well as potential interactive effects of these variables on the other study 
measures. As described in the results that follow, there was insufficient statistical 
evidence in support of analyzing the full interaction model depicted in Figure 1. 
Therefore, for both beliefs about corporate culture and proximity to the scandal, separate 
sets of independent t-tests, regressions and mediation analyses were performed to test for 
the hypothesized effects. In addition to hypothesis testing using traditional frequentist 
methods, where possible the hypotheses were also tested using Bayes factors (BF) under 
a Bayesian model comparison framework (Jeffreys, 1961; Morey, Romeijn, & Rouder, 
2016b). Bayes factors are a Bayesian alternative to null hypothesis significance testing, 
and reflect the relative support for a specified alternative model (BF10; e.g., a model 
predicting that the true effect size is greater than 0) or a null model (BF01; e.g., a model 
predicting that the true effect size is equal to 0). BF10 > 1 provides evidence in favor of 
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the alternative (with larger values providing greater evidence), while BF10 < 1 indicates 
evidence in favor of the null. An expanded discussion of this approach, related references 
and a description of the specific model priors utilized for our hypothesis testing can be 
found in the supplementary materials.1 A full analysis of the individual items from the 
future engagement composite measure is also located in the supplementary materials (see 
Appendix B). Unless otherwise stated, all analyses were performed in R version 3.3.1. (R 
Core Team, 2016). The relevant data, analysis code, and survey materials can be accessed 
at [https://osf.io/ghc5y/].   
Relationship Between Corporate Culture Beliefs and Proximity to the Scandal 
A χ2 test was first calculated to examine whether proximity to the scandal (VW 
TDI owner vs. VW non-TDI owner) influenced perceptions of corporate culture leading 
to the scandal as the product of a rotten corporate culture, relative to a few bad apples. 
Results suggest a small statistical effect, χ2 (1, N = 591) = 4.038, p = .044, Fisher’s Zr = 
.083, 95% confidence intervals of Zr [.002, .164]
2, BF10 = .847. The probability of 
selecting “rotten corporate culture” was slightly greater given the respondent was a TDI 
owner (.3359), than a non-TDI owner (.2567). However, the effect size of this analysis is 
small with a lower-bound confidence interval just above zero, suggesting a weak effect. 
Furthermore, the Bayes factor of .847 indicates weak, anecdotal evidence in favor of the 
null hypothesis (i.e., that the two factors are independent) over the alternative. 
Conditional probabilities calculated using Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling for the 
posterior distribution (10,000 iterations) revealed similar estimates to the χ2 analysis. The 
 
2 Unless otherwise stated, values in brackets displayed immediately after a reported statistic represent 95% 
confidence intervals for that statistic. 
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conditional probability of selecting rotten corporate culture given the participant was a 
TDI owner was higher (.3372, 95% credibility interval [2816, .3964]) than for a non-TDI 
owner (.2581, 95% credibility interval [.2122, .3064]).1 
We also examined whether beliefs about corporate culture and proximity to the 
scandal interacted to influence expectations of future ethical action by VW, anger, and 
future brand engagement intentions. There was not a significant interaction for 
expectations of future ethical action, F (1, 587) = 2.061, p = .152, anger at VW, F (1, 
587) = .307, p = .580, or on future engagement intentions, F (1, 587) = 2.031, p = .155. 
For each of these analyses, Bayesian model comparison indicated that models containing 
no interaction term were between 2 and 7 times better than models containing the 
interaction terms. Therefore, a full moderated mediation model was not tested and we 
instead performed separate t-tests, regressions, and mediations for the corporate culture 
measure and proximity to the scandal. 
Effects of Corporate Culture Beliefs on Expectations of Future Ethical Action, 
Anger, and Future Brand Engagement 
 
Independent samples t-tests were performed to examine the effects of beliefs 
about corporate culture on expectations of VW to act ethically in the future, anger, and 
future brand engagement intentions. Due to disparate sample sizes between groups on the 
corporate culture beliefs measure, Welch’s two sample t-tests were performed for all 
analyses. Table 3 displays the results of these analyses.  Beliefs about corporate culture 
had strong effects on expectations of future ethical action, anger and future brand 
engagement, such that those who blamed VW’s rotten corporate culture reported lower 
expectations of future ethical action by VW, more anger and lower intentions to engage 
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with VW in the future. Figure 2 graphically displays the effects of corporate culture 
beliefs on expectations of future ethical action and anger. Panel A of Figure 3 depicts the 
effects of corporate culture beliefs on future brand engagement intentions. 
Table 3. Regression model predicting future brand engagement from corporate culture 
beliefs, expectations of future ethical action by VW, and anger 
Predictor b SE p lmg 
95% Confidence 
Intervals of b 
LCI UCI 
Corporate Culture Beliefs  
(0 = rotten culture) 
.289 .108 .008 .141 .077 .501 
Expectations of Future Ethical 
Action 
.454 .030 < .001 .615 .395 .512 
Anger -.143 .025 < .001 .244 -.193 -.093 
Note. The lmg metric is a calculation of the relative importance of each indicator in a regression model and 
reflects the partitioning of the R2 averaged over all possible orders of entering the variables into the model 
(Grömping, 2006; Lindemann, Merenda, & Gold, 1980). Thus, higher lmg metrics indicate a greater 
contribution to the R2. Lmg was calculated using the “relaimpo” package for R (Grömping, 2006, version 
2.2-2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Violin plots of the effects of corporate culture beliefs on expectations of future 
ethical action by VW (a) and anger as a result of the scandal (b). Violin plots depict a 
boxplot within a rotated kernel density plot (Hintze & Nelson, 1998). 
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Figure 3. Violin plots of the effects of corporate culture beliefs (a) and proximity to the 
scandal (b) on future engagement intentions. 
 
Multiple Regression and Mediation Analyses Predicting Future Brand Engagement 
Prior to testing the mediation model, a regression analysis was performed entering 
beliefs about corporate culture, future expectations of ethical action by VW, and anger as 
simultaneous predictors. Table 4 displays the results of this analysis. This model 
accounted for 50% of the variance in future patronage intentions (adj. R2 = .5037). 
Believing the scandal to be a product of a few bad apples was associated with greater 
future engagement intentions, as was expectations of future ethical action by VW. In 
contrast, anger about the emissions situation was a significant predictor of lower 
intentions to engage with VW in the future. 
Additionally, model comparison was performed using Bayes factors to evaluate 
how well the model performed compared to a null model (i.e., intercept only model; 
Rouder & Morey, 2012). Of all possible model combinations involving corporate culture 
beliefs, expectations of future ethical action, and anger, the model containing all three 
had the largest Bayes factor, BF10 = 7.625e+85.  When compared against the next best 
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model—one only containing future expectations and anger (BF10 = 3.613e+85)—the full 
model performed roughly 2 times better (BF10 = 2.110). 
To examine whether expectations of future ethical behavior and anger mediate the 
relationship between corporate culture beliefs and future engagement, a multiple 
mediation model was tested and the significance of the indirect effects were quantified 
using bias-corrected bootstrapped confidence intervals (10,000 samples, calculated using 
lavaan version 0.5-22 for R, Rosseel, 2012). Figure 4 displays the mediation model and 
the regression coefficients for each path. Results of the analysis indicate that expectations 
of future ethical action by VW partially mediated the effects of corporate culture beliefs 
on engagement, b = .801, SEboot = .092, bootstrapped 95% CI’s [.629, .990]. Anger about 
the emissions situation also partially mediated the effects of corporate culture beliefs on 
future engagement intentions, although to a lesser degree, b = .258, SEboot = .052, 95% 
bootstrapped CI’s [.163, .368]. We also performed the multiple mediation analysis 
controlling for proximity to the scandal. The covariate analyses were performed using 
Hayes’ (2013) macro for SPSS 22, which provides easily implementable templates to 
perform more complex regression-based analyses. The results did not substantively 
change, and the indirect effects of expectations of future ethical action, b = .807, SEboot = 
.091, bootstrapped 95% CI’s [.644, .997], and anger, b = .207, SEboot = .050, bootstrapped 
95% CI’s [.117, .312], were nearly identical to the prior analysis. 
Table 4. Effects of proximity to the scandal on expectations of future ethical action by 
VW, anger, and future brand engagement 
 
TDI Owners 
(n = 257) 
Non-TDI Owners 
(n = 335) 
   
 M SD M SD t (df) 
Cohen’s d 
[95% CIs] 
BF10 
Expectations of 
Future Ethical 
Action 
4.304 1.732 4.573 1.751 
-1.868† 
(553.779) 
-.154 
[-.317, .009] 
.502 
 45 
Anger 4.424 1.969 3.236 1.856 
7.460*** 
(533.769) 
.623 
[.457, .790] 
2.929e+10 
Future Brand 
Engagement 
4.545 1.508 5.085 1.384 
-4.473*** 
(525.698) 
-.375 
[-.539, -.211] 
1728.41 
Note. *** p < .001, † p = .062 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Multiple mediation model for the effects of corporate culture beliefs on future 
VW engagement intentions. Unstandardized regression coefficients are displayed with 
95% confidence intervals in brackets and the direct effect of corporate culture beliefs on 
future engagement intentions is displayed in italics. 
 
Influence of Proximity to Scandal on Expectations of Future Ethical  
Behavior and Future Brand Engagement 
 
Welch’s independent samples t-tests were also calculated to examine whether, 
collapsed across corporate culture beliefs, proximity to the scandal (i.e., being a directly 
affected VW TDI owner or a tangentially affected non-TDI VW owners) influenced 
expectations of future ethical action by VW, anger, and/or future brand engagement. 
Table 5 displays the results of these analyses. Proximity only had a weak effect on future 
expectations of ethical action by VW, but had strong effects on anger and future brand 
engagement such that TDI owners directly affected by the scandal reported greater anger 
and lower intentions to engage with VW in the future. Panel B of Figure 3 depicts the 
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effects of proximity on engagement intentions. Figure 5 displays the effects of proximity 
on expectations of future ethical behavior and on anger.  
Table 5. Regression model predicting patronage intentions from proximity to the  
scandal, expectations of future ethical action by VW, and anger 
Predictor b SE p lmg 
95% Confidence 
Intervals of b 
LCI UCI 
Proximity to the Scandal 
(0 = TDI Owner) 
.242 .090 .007 .032 .065 .418 
Expectations of Future Ethical 
Action 
.486 .028 < .001 .697 .430 .542 
Anger 
-
.138 
.026 < .001 .271 -.189 -.087 
 
 
Figure 5. Violin plots of the effects of proximity on future expectations of ethical action 
(a) and anger at VW (b). 
 
Multiple Regression and Mediation Analyses with Proximity 
 to the Scandal as the Predictor 
 
Identical to the regression model involving corporate culture beliefs, the model 
predicting patronage intentions from proximity to the scandal, beliefs about future ethical 
action by VW, and anger at VW also predicted 50% of the variance (adj. R2 = .5037). 
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Table 6 displays the effects of each predictor on patronage in this model. Bayesian model 
comparison using Bayes factors indicates that the best fitting model (relative to the null) 
was the model including all three predictors, BF10 = 7.849e+85. The next best fitting 
model was one omitting the proximity measure, BF10 = 3.613e+10. The Bayes factor 
comparing the full model to the reduced model indicates that the full model fit was 
approximately 2 times better than the reduced model (BF10 = 2.171), providing anecdotal 
evidence for improved model fit. Consistent with the results for corporate culture beliefs, 
these results indicate that once expectations of future ethical action by VW and anger at 
VW are included in the model, being directly affected by the scandal or not has a reduced 
effect on future patronage. 
Table 6. Regression model predicting patronage intentions from proximity to the  
scandal, expectations of future ethical action by VW, and anger 
Predictor b SE p lmg 
95% Confidence 
Intervals of b 
LCI UCI 
Proximity to the Scandal 
(0 = TDI Owner) .242 .090 .007 .032 .065 .418 
Expectations of Future Ethical 
Action 
.486 .028 < .001 .697 .430 .542 
Anger -.138 .026 < .001 .271 -.189 -.087 
 
Mediation analyses were again performed using bootstrapped confidence intervals 
(10,000 samples, 95%, bias-corrected) to quantify the significance of the indirect effects. 
Consistent with our hypotheses, anger at VW significantly mediated the effects of 
proximity on future patronage intentions, b = .165, SEboot = .036, 95% bootstrapped CI’s 
[.102, .245], while future expectations of ethical action by VW were not a significant 
mediator, b = .132, SEboot = .071, 95% bootstrapped CI’s [-.007, .271]. Figure 6 provides 
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a graphical display of the mediation model and estimates for each path. As with the 
results for beliefs about corporate culture, we also performed this mediation analysis 
while entering corporate culture beliefs as a covariate. These results were highly 
consistent, with anger, b = .129, SEboot = .032, bootstrapped 95% CI’s [.073, .201], but 
not expectations of future ethical action, b = .062, SEboot = .059, bootstrapped 95% CI’s [-
.054, .177], mediating the effects of proximity on patronage intentions.  
 
 
Figure 6. Multiple mediation model for the effects of proximity on future VW 
engagement intentions. Unstandardized regression coefficients are displayed with 95% 
confidence intervals in brackets and the direct effect of proximity on future engagement 
intentions is displayed in italics. 
 
Discussion 
 
When confronted with acts of corporate malfeasance, consumers are faced with a 
stark yet oftentimes surprisingly complex and challenging decision: whether or not to 
continue patronizing the offending brand. Simultaneously, transgressing brands are faced 
with decisions of how to alleviate the potential negative downstream effects from such 
events. Here, we examined how two previously underappreciated factors—consumers’ 
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proximity to a corporate scandal and their attributions regarding the ‘cultural’ 
underpinnings of a recent case of corporate wrongdoing—relate to intentions to engage 
with the transgressing brand in the future. Results of our survey of TDI and non-TDI VW 
owners reveal that participants’ beliefs about the role that corporate culture played in 
causing the diesel emissions scandal both directly and indirectly influence intentions to 
engage with VW in the future. As predicted, participants who attributed the scandal to a 
‘rotten’ corporate culture reported weaker expectations of future ethical action by VW, 
were more likely to be angry, and were less willing to engage with VW than were those 
who believed the scandal was caused by the actions of a ‘few bad apples’ within the 
organization.  
These findings support the assertion that consumers may largely exonerate 
corporations if they believe the wrongdoing was caused by the actions of a relatively 
small number of errant employees. One plausible explanation for this effect is that these 
consumers believe the problem can easily be fixed by removing the individuals 
responsible, whereas a rotten corporate culture may be viewed as an unmovable barrier to 
positive change in corporate behavior. While corporate scandals materialize under 
varying circumstances, past research on attributions of responsibility has focused on 
whether culpability is internal or external to the corporation (Folkes, 1984; Folkes et al., 
1987). But, when corporations are admittedly at fault, we suggested and our results reveal 
how attributions of internal corporate culpability, either to a handful of ‘bad apples’ 
within the company or else to a corporate culture that is ‘rotten to the core,’ differentially 
affect consumers’ reactions to wrongdoing.  
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Our research also revealed some unexpected yet important findings. Contrary to 
our prediction, participants’ proximity to the scandal did not amplify the effect of beliefs 
about corporate culture when ascribing blame to VW’s rotten corporate culture. This 
follows prior research that finds moral intensity to be a weak predictor of behavior in 
general (McMahon & Harvey, 2007), although it is also plausible that variability in 
owners’ proximity to the scandal failed to reach a threshold necessary to result in 
significant changes of beliefs about corporate culture (Jones, 1991). However, results 
indicated partial support for our expected independent effects of proximity, such that 
participants who were directly affected by the scandal (i.e. TDI owners) were more likely 
to be angry about it and less likely to engage with VW in the future.  
Our results also amplify and extend previous research in relational marketing that 
identifies trust as a vital component in consumer-company relationships (Chaudhuri & 
Holbrook, 2001; Morgan & Hunt, 1994) as well as the emerging body of literature that 
situates anger as a key factor in shaping consumers’ retaliatory actions to corporate social 
irresponsibility (Antoletti & Maklan, 2016; Grappi et al., 2013; Romani et al., 2013). In 
fact, our results reveal that expectation of future ethical action and anger accounted for 
half of the variability in future brand engagement. Also consistent with our predictions, 
expectation of future ethical action emerged as the prominent mediator between beliefs 
about corporate culture and future engagement while anger mediated the relationship of 
proximity on future brand engagement.  
Understanding consumers’ reactions to unethical corporate scandals has important 
implications for corporations seeking to respond to potential negative downstream 
consumer outcomes (Coombs, 2007), for those seeking to further punish the offending 
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company in the marketplace (Johnson et al., 2010) and even for non-transgressing, 
competing brands (Trump & Newman, 2016). In the wake of wrongdoing, it is necessary 
for corporations to evaluate and acknowledge the nature of the scandal, partially as a 
function of consumers’ reactions to it. Here, we highlighted three considerations, in 
addition to consumers’ proximity to the scandal, that corporations can focus on when 
determining their response and communication strategies. Our findings suggest that 
mollifying suspicions about the corporate culture at VW, placating feelings of anger and 
rebuilding a repository of trust that underscores the corporation’s commitment to future 
ethical action may all be necessary steps for VW in the coming years.  
As scandals unfold, corporations, like VW, should be responsive in the way they 
manage consumers’ expectations about the corporation’s culture and their commitment to 
engage in ethical business practices in the future. For transgressing corporations seeking 
to mitigate the residual effects of a perceived corrupt corporate culture (e.g., VW and the 
recent Wells Fargo banking scandal), our results suggest the importance of demonstrating 
a commitment to fostering an ethical corporate culture in the future.  While these efforts 
are intrinsically important for helping to prevent future wrongdoing by the organization, 
it may also help to rebuild consumers’ trust in the corporation. Additionally, research in 
crisis communication provides useful frameworks to analyze the characteristics of 
corporate mishaps and parallel response strategies—including the use of apology and 
proactive versus reactive responses—that corporations can employ to help protect 
themselves in the wake such events (Coombs, 2007).  
Clearly, there are other factors also at work in shaping current VW owners’ future 
behavioral intentions, including financial incentives, brand identification and loyalty 
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(Chapman et al., unpublished; Creyer, 1997). Given research on consumers’ willingness 
to patronize unethical corporations at reduced costs with the understanding that 
corporations are incurring a financial punishment (Creyer, 1997), we suspect that the 
estimated $10 billion USD included in the settlement for owner compensation will play 
an important role in determining owners’ engagement with VW in the future (US EPA, 
2016). Although managing the reactions of directly affected brand patrons may be more 
attainable through direct compensation, corporations might also consider monitoring the 
reactions of indirectly affected brand patrons, as well as the general public. 
Because the present research is correlational and represents existing brand 
patrons’ reactions to a single instance of corporate malfeasance, we are necessarily 
limited in our ability to make causal claims and generalizations to other instances of 
corporate wrongdoing. Study limitations also include the use of single-item measures to 
gauge primary study constructs, as well as the use of self-reported intentions to assess 
future brand engagement. However, we believe our findings provide practical and broad 
insight into how existing brand patrons respond to actual instances of unethical corporate 
behavior and the factors that may differentially shape consumers’ reactions post-scandal. 
Future research is needed to fully address these limitations (e.g., expanded scale 
measures, empirical design) and understand the nature of consumers’ beliefs about 
corporate culture as well as identify factors that may influence consumers’ attributions of 
internal culpability as we define here (e.g., exposure to media coverage of a scandal, pre-
existing corporate reputation). Extending the work conducted here to other instances of 
corporate wrongdoing (e.g., Wells Fargo banking scandal of 2016) would increase the 
generalizability of the observed effects. 
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Conclusion 
The findings presented here further our understanding of how and to what extent 
corporate wrongdoing affects consumers’ willingness to engage with companies after a 
scandal. Our findings suggest that individuals’ beliefs about the role corporate culture 
plays in permitting or causing a scandal as well as personal proximity to the fallout both 
have powerful direct and indirect implications for consumers’ reactions. Additionally, our 
research supports existing literature that suggests trust (i.e., expectations of future ethical 
action) and anger are important mediators of consumer-company relationships, 
particularly in the context of corporate malfeasance. These findings produce a number of 
practical insights, particularly for advocates, regulators and organizations seeking to 
better understand consumers’ reactions to egregious, high profile unethical corporate 
actions that impact not only brand patrons but the general public as well. 
Bridge to Chapter III 
As discussed in Chapter I, this dissertation partly examines how different 
individual-level and contextual factors shape individuals’ willingness to engage in overt 
forms of interpersonal interaction. In Chapter II, the results reveal how existing brand 
patrons, who experienced an unexpected collective action problem, responded to the 
Volkswagen emissions scandal. Specifically, variation in brand patrons’ ascriptions of 
responsibility, either to ‘a few bad apples’ or ‘corrupt corporate culture’, predicted 
responses to corporate wrongdoing, including negative WOM (see Appendix B for 
separate analyses of individual items comprising the future engagement composite 
measure). In Chapter III, I shift from ascertaining what drives blame expressions of 
corporate actors (e.g., Volkswagen) to understanding how such expressions materialize 
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towards individual-level actors (e.g., anglers) in the context of recreational angling. In the 
same vein, the theme of Chapter III remains focused on determining what motivates an 
individual to sanction an agent who is perceived responsible for creating some form of 
harm or violating a norm. However, in Chapter III, I consider individual’s willingness to 
impose social sanctions on their peers (in)appropriate angling practices. Specifically, I 
examine how different individual-level and contextually salient (social) factors, such as 
perceptions of efficacy and reputational concerns, predict anglers’ past sanctioning 
behavior and future sanctioning intentions.  
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CHAPTER III 
PEER PRESSURE ON THE RIVERBANK: ASSESSING CATCH-AND-
RELEASE ANGLERS’ WILLINGNESS TO SANCTION OTHERS’ 
 (BAD) BEHAVIOR 
 
Introduction 
Catch-and-release (C&R) angling constitutes the majority of recreational angling 
activity, as ~60% of the world’s 47.1 billion fish caught annually are released (Cooke & 
Cowx, 2004). As our understanding of the fate of fish released by anglers has grown over 
the past few decades, a stark pattern has emerged illustrating how variability in angling 
behavior (e.g., air exposure, handling) plays a key role in determining the outcome of the 
angling event for the fish (Arlinghaus & Cooke, 2009; Cooke & Schramm, 2007; Cooke 
et al., 2013a; Muoneke & Childress, 1994). While general and species-specific tenets for 
C&R best practices have been recommended to optimize the survival and biological 
fitness of angled and released fish (for review see Brownscombe, Danylchuk, Chapman, 
Gutowsky, & Cooke, 2017), a strong limiting factor to the realized conservation value of 
C&R angling is the extent to which recreational anglers are willing to accept, adopt and 
engage in appropriate (best) practices and refrain from harmful ones. Put another way, 
C&R angling is a tool that relies on individual-level human decision-making to achieve 
conservation and management goals (Cooke, Suski, Arlinghaus, & Danylchuk, 2013c; 
Fulton, Smith, Smith, & van Putten, 2011).  Indeed, more broadly speaking, 
“conservation means behaviour” (Schultz, 2011). 
Recreational C&R fisheries may be conceptualized as paradigmatic common pool 
resource dilemmas as competition for fish and the picture-perfect angling moment can 
fuel uncooperative and socially (as well as biologically) suboptimal angling behavior 
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(Hardin, 1986; Ostrom, 2000). Individual motivation for compliance may be further 
attenuated by the lack of formal monitoring and enforcement capabilities common to 
expansive recreational fisheries (Sutinen, 1993). Thus, the transition to and adoption of 
C&R best practices will likely occur when the majority of recreational anglers 
meaningfully share and hold similar beliefs and values (Arlinghaus, 2006b; Biel & 
Thorgensen, 2007). Recent work by Chapman et al. (2018) and others suggest that one 
underappreciated mechanism to facilitate the broader adoption of C&R best practices, 
and ultimately, the cultivation of a shared conservation ethic, is anglers’ willingness and 
ablility to monitor and advocate for best practices within their angling community 
(Granek et al., 2008). This is important because prior research indicates that various 
forms of interpersonal communication, including informal social sanctions (e.g., 
admonishing bad angling behavior), can shift normative perceptions and shared values, 
and, in turn, can increase cooperative behavior (Balliet, 2010; Cialdini, 2009; Ostrom et 
al., 1992; Ostrom, 2000).  
Interpersonal Communication and Cooperation 
 The importance of interpersonal communication, and social sanctioning in 
particular, in fostering cooperative behavior and facilitating situation-appropriate social 
norms has been illustrated in classic social dilemma and game theory experiments for 
decades (Balliet, 2010; Balliet et al., 2011; Ostrom et al., 1992; Ostrom, 2000). In fact, 
much of this research demonstrates that significant increases in cooperative behavior and 
total yield occur when participants are permitted to communicate (e.g., administer 
sanctions) between rounds of decision-making (Balliet, 2009; Ostrom et al., 1992). The 
communication of topic-relevant information relayed to defectors (or cooperators) can 
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help establish social expectations and norms of cooperation (Ostrom, 2014) by realigning 
transgressors’ behavior toward the acceptable norm (e.g., admonishment) or by 
reinforcing the appropriateness of a compliant action (e.g., praise). Nolan (2013) and 
others have extended this work in the context of environmental behavior, arguing that in 
order to achieve a culture of environmental conservation, concerned individuals must be 
willing to confront or sanction others’ environmental transgressions (Maki & Raimi, 
2016; Nolan, 2017; Swim & Bloodhart, 2013). For example, Swim and Bloodhart (2013) 
found that verbally admonishing individuals following elevator use increased the 
likelihood of subsequently using the stairs, while Schultz et al. (2007) demonstrated how 
impersonal expressions of disapproval can help above-average energy consumers reduce 
their consumption rates.  
Although the effectiveness of social sanctions in buttressing cooperative behavior 
are well-known, it is unclear how or if these behaviors will manifest in the context of 
recreational C&R fisheries. Prior research indicates angler-to-angler interactions as a 
primary channel through which communication about responsible angling practices 
occurs (Nguyen et al., 2012), while exchanges over social media represent another 
avenue to signal one’s commitment to best practices (e.g., #Keepemwet Fishing; 
Danylchuk, Danylchuk, Kosiarski, Cooke, & Huskey, 2018). Thus, there may be a clear 
opportunity to leverage preexisting communication channels among anglers. These 
oftentimes rudimentary and even transient interactions that exist between anglers can 
play a powerful role in shaping individual behavior and beliefs, particularly when 
expressing the approval or disapproval of others’ actions or intentions. Nevertheless, 
realizing the potential benefits of angler-to-angler communication hinges on individuals’ 
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willingness to engage with one another, yet research has only recently begun to examine 
the determinants of such action (Chapman et al., 2018; Maki & Raimi, 2016; Nolan, 
2013; 2017). 
Predicting Engagement 
In recognizing the potential of interpersonal communication to cultivate and 
maintain the adoption of C&R best practices, Chapman et al. (2018) modeled anglers’ 
intentions to sanction others in a golden dorado (Salminus brasiliensis) fishery on the 
Juramento River in Argentina. Results revealed that younger anglers who expressed 
higher environmental concern compared to others, who identified angling as important to 
their lifestyle, and who were more open to engaging in zero air exposure angling events 
were the most willing to admonish other anglers’ C&R transgressions (Chapman et al., 
2018). Left unexamined by Chapman et al. (2018) are two other sets of factors previously 
identified as potentially important drivers of sanctioning behavior: perceived efficacy and 
contextually salient social factors (Nolan, 2013). When considering the question of what 
may motivate recreational anglers to express disapproval or approval of others’ 
[in]appropriate actions or intentions, prior research indicates that particular emphasis 
should be given to the explicit social implications of engagement (e.g., perceived norms) 
as well as the degree to which individuals perceive the result of these socially costly 
behaviors—sanctioning and C&R best practices—as effective in achieving desired 
conservation outcomes (Nolan, 2013).  
One critical factor that may influence the degree to which anglers sanction others 
is whether anglers maintain the belief that cooperative behavior and ecological outcomes 
can be improved by sanctioning and/or through evidence-based C&R best practices, 
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respectively (Nolan, 2013; Norgaard, 2011). Research from a variety of fields suggests 
that individuals’ willingness to take on a behavior is predicated on their perceived 
capacity to take action as well as their beliefs about the efficacy of the action in achieving 
desired outcomes (Bandura, 1986; Ajzen, 1991; Witte, 1992). Among a college sample, 
Nolan (2013) found that the perceived effectiveness of a sanctioning act significantly 
predicted individuals’ willingness to impose a range of social sanctions on others’ 
recycling behaviors. Thus, in the present context, if individuals perceive social 
sanctioning as an effective way to increase cooperative, evidence-based C&R angling 
behavior, they should be more willing to sanction. Likewise, a perception of evidence-
based C&R best practices as an effective conservation angling practice in reducing 
threats to steelhead is also likely to increase sanctioning behavior.  
Another factor that may influence individuals’ willingness to sanction others in 
this context is a belief that their opinions about C&R best practices are shared by other 
anglers. Research on social norms reveals that people’s behavior is often heavily 
influenced both by their understanding of what is socially acceptable (e.g., injunctive 
norms) and by what most other people are doing (e.g., descriptive norms; Cialdini, 2009). 
Social norms are instrumental in shaping environmental decisions (e.g., Schultz, 1999) 
and pro-social behaviors more generally (Krupka & Weber, 2009), and they have been 
recognized as influential in both the social dilemmas (Ostrom, 1990; Biel & Thogersen, 
2007) and recreational fisheries literatures (van Poorten, Arlinghaus, Daedlow, & 
Haertel-Borer, 2011; Stensland, Aas, & Mehmetoglu, 2013; Bova, Halse, Aswani, & 
Potts, 2017; Danylchuk, Tiedemann, & Cooke, 2017). Thus, we anticipate that anglers 
who perceive that the majority of other anglers are aware of and/or use C&R best 
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practices should express a higher propensity to sanction. Sanctioning propensity may also 
be predicted by a somewhat distinct social influence: anglers’ professed concern over 
their reputation within the angling community. Status motives have been demonstrated to 
increase pro-environmental behaviors, especially when behaviors are publicly observable 
and costly (Griskevicius, Tybur, Van den Bergh, 2010). Provided that interpersonal 
sanctioning offers individuals a means to publicly express their commitment to C&R best 
practices (i.e., either by educating transgressors or else praising cooperators), anglers 
highly concerned about their own reputation should be more motivated to engage. In 
order to broaden our understanding of individuals’ motivations to sanction for 
conservation, the factors introduced here and those previously identified by Chapman et 
al. (2018) and others were examined in the context of a highly revered, wild steelhead 
C&R fishery located in the Bulkley River in British Columbia (BC), Canada.  
Study Site and Species 
The Bulkley River has one of the most iconic wild steelhead fisheries remaining 
in the world, with an average run size of 20, 873 steelhead (MFLNRO, 2016). From late 
August to early November, anglers from across the world converge on the river for the 
opportunity to angle for wild steelhead (Onocorhynchus myskiss). Given their physical 
characteristics, steelhead are highly revered by recreational anglers for their size (e.g., 
upwards of 120 cm, 25 kg) and formidable fight. The proximity of the Bulkley River to 
roadways and population centers, non-resident license access, dramatic scenery and wild 
steelhead runs, has situated the river, or ‘steelhead paradise’, as one the most angled 
rivers in BC (MOE, 2010). During the 2010-2011 season, roughly 12,200 angler days 
were logged during the season (Beere, 2014). Various organizations are collectively 
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responsible for managing the river, while access is open to resident, non-resident and 
First Nation peoples, whom secure an aboriginal right to harvest, primarily salmon, for 
dietary, social and ceremonial purposes on their territory (Muckle, 2007). For all other 
recreational anglers, provincial law has mandated since 1997 that all angled wild 
steelhead must be released (MFLNRO, 2016). Although co-migrating salmon are 
primarily harvest-oriented (e.g., catch limits), C&R angling is imposed as a regulatory 
tool for steelhead in order to maximize long-term socio-economic opportunity while 
minimizing mortality (MFLNRO, 2016).  
Given the species’ high vulnerability to human-induced changes to the 
environment, including habitat degradation (NRC, 1996), fishing pressure and fisheries 
interactions (Stewart & Lewysnky, 1988), native (wild) populations of steelhead have 
drastically declined (NOAA, 2016; Kendall, Marston, & Klungle, 2017). Native 
steelhead populations of the Skeena watershed (e.g. Bulkley) stand in contrast to the fate 
of the once iconic steelhead runs of the United States Pacific Northwest (PNW), which 
are now closed to recreational C&R angling due to population collapses. Twelve distinct 
populations of steelhead identified in the US PNW are listed as either threatened or 
endangered under the Endangered Species Act, or a as species of concern under the 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA, 2016). Thus, sustaining the long-term 
viability of the Bulkley River’s wild steelhead fishery has significant economic and 
socio-cultural value for both present and future stakeholders. 
  The influence of C&R angling and angler behavior are of primary concern on the 
Bulkley River, as is the sustainability of the steelhead population. In 2013, the Bulkley 
River Angling Management Plan (BRAMP) was introduced to address longstanding 
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concerns of overcrowding, quality of experience, abundance of jet boat use and general 
lack of angler etiquette (Dolan, 2008; MOE, 2010; MFLNRO, 2016). Upon 
recommendations from the plan, the province adopted regulations that imposed new time 
and area restrictions on anglers, particularly non-resident anglers (e.g., weekday access 
unless guided). Despite these regulations, concerns over access, pressure and etiquette 
remain contentious in the region.  
Present Research and Objectives 
The present study examines individuals’ self-reported sanctioning propensity 
within the context of an internationally renowned wild steelhead C&R recreational 
fishery and in particular illustrates the value of identifying how and to what extent 
various social-psychological factors and angler characteristics shape engagement. We 
draw on recent domain-specific (i.e., Chapman et al., 2018) and domain-general (i.e., 
Nolan, 2013) research to guide item selection in constructing the survey instrument used. 
In addition to items that emerged as important predictors in the preliminary Chapman et 
al. (2018) work—age, years fishing, management familiarity, fishing significance, and 
anglers’ concern about fishery—we also include contextually salient social factors (e.g., 
reputational concern, normative perceptions) and perceptions of efficacy. Based on prior 
research (Griskevicius et al., 2010; Nolan, 2013), we suspect that recreational anglers’ 
sanctioning propensity will largely be determined by their perceptions of others’ beliefs 
and practices, a concern for their reputation, and the extent to which they believe that 
cooperation and/or conservation value is likely to increase as a result of both 
interpersonal sanctioning and implementation of evidence-based C&R best practices. 
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The present research also focused on multiple context-dependent predictors that 
we anticipate would influence recreational anglers’ sanctioning propensity in this C&R 
recreational fishery. These included relevant angler characteristics (e.g., age, fishing 
experience, fishing avidity, angling club membership; Fisher, 1997; Gigliotti & Peyton, 
1993; Oh & Ditton, 2006), as well as key social-psychological constructs, such as 
perceptions of angler threat, familiarity of management practices and concern for 
steelhead populations (Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, Kalof, 1999; Nguyen et al., 2013). 
The present research also examined recreational anglers’ self-reported past sanctioning 
behavior, which has not previously been studied. Thus, the present study investigated 
both anglers’ future intentions as well as their engagement in such behavior in the past.  
Method 
Sampling Frame and Distribution 
The target population included recreational anglers age 18 and older who were 
active in the Bulkley River steelhead fishery (i.e., angled at least one season). Survey 
recruitment and distribution occurred from September 27 to November 30, 2016 and 
coincided with a systematic research study that examined how wild steelhead respond to 
C&R angling events, which aimed to identify species-specific best practices (Twardek et 
al., 2018). Opportunistic in-field intercept sampling, local social media and fishing 
reports were used to recruit respondents. Anglers were recruited to participate at popular 
walk-in fishing sites, boat launches and a fishing outfitter located in Smithers, BC. 
Respondents who completed the survey in-person used a portable electronic tablet. Due 
to time restraints and in recognition of anglers’ primary motivation to be on river, an 
identical online survey was distributed via a regional non-profit organization’s Facebook 
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page and a local online fishing report. The survey was administered using the 
QuestionPro platform. The study was approved by the University of Massachusetts 
Amherst Institutional Review Board (Protocol ID: 2016-3318). 
Survey Instrument and Key Study Measures 
The questionnaire included a series of close- and open-ended questions 
investigating a range of social-psychological constructs and angling segmentation 
characteristics of Bulkley River steelhead anglers. Survey item selection was broadly 
informed by Chapman et al. (2018), with new measures generated to assess perceived 
efficacy, social influences and items specifically relevant to the Bulkley River steelhead 
fishery.  
Eight items assessed respondents’ past sanctioning behavior and future 
sanctioning intentions. Exploratory principle components analysis revealed a two-
component structure. As expected, the four items that measured anglers’ frequency of 
past sanctioning behavior over the past angling season hung together and were combined 
into a composite measure (α = .78; e.g., “Made a comment on social media (e.g., 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram) addressing an individual’s inappropriate post-catch 
handling practices”; 1 = never, 7 = all the time). The four items that assessed future 
sanctioning intentions also formed a reliable composite measure (α = .74; e.g, “If 
researchers were able to develop species-specific catch-and-release best practices for 
Bulkley River Steelhead based on solid scientific research, would this make you more or 
less likely to approach and educate others who do not adopt Steelhead specific catch-and-
release best practices?"; 1 = much less likely, 4 = neither less nor more likely, 7 = much 
more likely). It is important to note that while past sanctioning was assessed on the 
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recalled frequency of prior engagement in such actions, future sanctioning intent was 
measured conditional on evidence-based best practices. As a result, caution should be 
taken in making direct comparisons between respondents’ responses to these two sets of 
related yet distinct items. 
Seven items gauged anglers’ perception of threats to Bulkley River steelhead (1 = 
not at all, 7 = extremely). Exploratory principle components analysis revealed a three-
factor solution, however one item was dropped from the first factor for not meeting the 
critical loading value (e.g., Illegal harvesting’). The factors included (1) angler threat 
(e.g., “Overfishing from recreational anglers”, “Inappropriate angling and handling 
practices”), (2) human-induced environmental threats (e.g., “Impacts of climate change”, 
“Habitat degradation and pollution from industrial activities”) and (3) other catch threats 
(e.g., “Overharvesting [bycatch from commercial salmon fishing]”, “Gillnetting 
practices”). Given our interest in predicting anglers’ willingness to impose sanctions on 
others’ potentially harmful handling practices, only perceived angler threat was included 
in final analyses (r = .565). Full item descriptions, descriptive statistics, zero-order 
pairwise correlations, exploratory principle components analyses assessing sanctioning 
propensity and perceptions of threat are reported in the Supplementary Information.  
One item assessed level of perceived concern for steelhead populations compared 
to other anglers (“Compared to most recreational anglers, would you say that you are less 
or more concerned about the Bulkley River Steelhead population?”; 1 = much less 
concerned, 4 = neither less nor more; 7 = much more concerned). A single item 
measured self-reported management familiarity (“How familiar are you with 
management techniques and approaches used to make decisions about the Bulkley River 
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Steelhead fishery?”; 1 = not at all familiar, 7 = extremely familiar). Three items assessed 
anglers’ belief in science (e.g., evidence-based C&R practices). A three-item composite 
measure for belief in science was calculated (α = .88; e.g., “How confident are you that 
research-based catch-and-release best practices can help maintain and preserve Bulkley 
River Steelhead populations?”; 1 = not at all confidence, 7 = extremely). One item 
assessed the importance of fishing to anglers’ lifestyle (e.g., “How important is 
recreational angling as part of your lifestyle?”; 1 = not at all important, 7 = extremely 
important) 
Reputation concern was assessed with two items and averaged together to create a 
single composite measure (r = .462, e.g., “Are you concerned that other recreational 
anglers might view you negatively if you inappropriately handled a steelhead post-
catch?”; 1 = not at all concerned, 7 = extremely concerned). Two items assessed anglers’ 
normative perception of the pervasiveness of C&R best practices within the Bulkley 
River steelhead fishery. Respondents were asked to indicate the percentage of anglers 
(e.g., 0-100 percent) who they believed know about steelhead C&R best practices as well 
as the percentage of anglers who they believed currently practice C&R best practices. 
The two-items were averaged together to create a composite measure of normative 
perception (r = .755). Respondents also indicated the extent to which they perceived 
sanctioning as effective. A single item measured perceived sanctioning efficacy (e.g., “I 
feel that I can help protect steelhead populations by informing anglers that their post-
catch handling practices might impact steelhead well-being.”; 1 = strongly disagree, 4 = 
neither disagree nor agree, 7 = strongly agree). Finally, respondents indicated their age 
(continuous), years spent fishing on the Bulkley River (continuous), their country of 
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residence (Canadian vs. non-Canadian) as well as whether or not they belonged to an 
angling club (yes or no). 
Analytical Approach 
Two ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression models were run to predict 
anglers’ past sanctioning behavior and future sanctioning intentions. Model 1 included a 
subset of relevant predictors highlighted in Chapman et al. (2018), as well as individuals’ 
membership to angling clubs and/or organizations, which has previously been identified 
as a useful angler segmentation characteristic (Gigliotti & Peyton, 1993). Model 2 
consisted of the same parameters, plus the variables identified through extant research in 
other fields as potentially critical determinants of anglers’ sanctioning behavior and 
intentions (e.g., perceptions of efficacy). Parameter characteristics are highlighted by lmg 
relative importance, a calculation of the contribution of each parameter in the regression 
model that reflects the partitioning of the model’s R2; higher lmg metrics indicate greater 
contribution to the R2 (Grömping, 2007). Model quality and comparison are indicated 
with Akaike information criteria (AIC; Akaike, 1973). To address for potential model 
overfitting, least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO, Tibshirani, 1996) 
linear regression was also performed (see Supplementary Information in Appendix C). 
All analyses were performed in R version 3.3.1 (R Core Team, 2016). Additional survey 
materials can be accessed at https://osf.io/64c3d/. 
Results 
Survey Sample Description 
A total of 197 surveys were completed with a 65.2% completion rate. The 
majority of participants completed the survey online (89.8%) compared to on tablets in 
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the field (10.2%). In addition to basic demographic and angling characteristics presented 
in Table 7, specific information related to angling experience, self-reported knowledge, 
and communication behaviors were collected. Most anglers reported that the majority of 
their recreational angling is C&R (97.3%, 5 or above) and voluntary (98%, 5 or above). 
Further, 93.3% of participants indicated a high level (5 or above) of understanding of 
general C&R best practices and species-specific C&R best practices for steelhead (98%; 
5 or above). Additionally, 55.4% of participants reported regularly communicating with 
friends or acquaintances about C&R practices for steelhead in the past few months, while 
52.8% reported that other recreational anglers have informed their angling practices (5 or 
above).  Only 22.8% (5 or above) of respondents indicated that they use social media 
platforms (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, Twitter) to share C&R-related experiences.  
Table 7. Socio-demographic and angling characteristics for Bulkley River anglers 
Age (n=194)                              M=51.84, SD=14 Yrs fishing Bulkley (n=197)  M=13.02, SD=10.64 
Gender (n=196)  % Country of residence (n=184)  % 
Female 13 6.6 Canada 114 62 
Male 182 92.9 Other 70 38 
Prefer not to say 2 1.0 
Primary handler  
post-catch (n=197)   
Gear type (n=197)       Yes 179 90.9 
Fly fish 170 86.3     No 18 9.1 
Conventional tackle 5 2.5 Education (n=191)     
Use both 22 11.2 Grade 8 or less   
Member of angling club (n=194)  Some high school 2 1.0 
Yes 92 47.4 Graduate high school 12 6.3 
No 102 52.6 Some college or tech. school 62 32.5 
River license access (n=196)   Graduate college 69 36.1 
Guided lodge access 14 7.1 Post-graduate 46 24.1 
Non-canadian unguided access 59 30.1 
Time on Bulkley this  
season (n=195)  
British Columbia resident 95 48.5 A few days 28 14.4 
Non resident canadian access 19 9.7 A week 58 29.7 
Other 9 4.6 A couple weeks 56 28.7 
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Yrs fishing rod and reel (n=195)  A month 15 7.7 
Less than a year   Full season 38 19.5 
1-5 years 3 1.5 
Angled for steelhead in  
other locations  
6-10 years 2 1.0 California 27  
11-15 years 9 4.6 Great Lakes 27  
16-20 years 5 2.6 Idaho 45  
21 or more years 176 90.3 Oregon 86  
    Washington 84   
 
Descriptives 
Participants reported low engagement in past sanctioning behavior (M = 3.21, SD 
= 1.38), but relatively strong future intentions to sanction others (M = 4.97, SD = 1.20). 
Perceived concern for steelhead populations was high (M = 5.79, SD = 1.05), while 
participants’ familiarity with management practices (M = 4.29, SD = 1.66) and belief in 
science or evidence-based C&R angling were slightly above the midpoint (M = 4.91, SD 
= 1.54). Perceptions of angler threat (M = 4.57, SD = 1.40), reputation concern (M = 4.53, 
SD = 1.88), and normative perception (M = 51.12, SD = 22.52) were all similarly 
endorsed. Participants reported strong perceptions of sanctioning efficacy (M = 5.26, SD 
= 1.47). For importance of fishing to anglers’ lifestyle (M = 6.55; SD = .67), 65% of 
respondents indicated ‘very important’. Due to severe skew and ceiling effect, this item 
was removed from further analysis. Additionally, analyses revealed no observable 
difference among anglers whom completed the survey in the field versus online; thus, this 
factor was not considered in subsequent analyses. Zero-order pairwise correlations 
among all key variables are reported in Supplementary Information. 
Model Results 
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Results of the linear regression analyses are presented in Table 8. For past 
sanctioning intentions, Model 1, which included a subset of social-psychological and 
angling segmentation parameters, explained 23% of the variance (adj. R2 = 0.20). 
Concern for steelhead populations contributed the most to the model’s R2 (lmg = 0.067) 
compared to other factors, followed by age (lmg = 0.062) and perceived angler threat 
(lmg = 0.039). Model 2 accounted for 41% (adj. R2 = 0.37) of the variance in past 
sanctioning behavior. Perceived sanctioning efficacy emerged as the predictor with the 
greatest relative importance (lmg = 0.121), almost double the second largest contributor 
in age (lmg = 0.073). In addition, reputation concern (lmg = 0.061), perceived concern 
(lmg = 0.044), and management familiarity (lmg  = 0.033) emerged as significant 
predictors. Model comparison using AIC indicated that Model 2 (AICpast2 = 500.2) was 
the best fitting model for past sanctioning behavior compared to Model 1 (AICpast1 = 
534.9). 
Table 8. Results of linear regression predicting past sanctioning behavior and future 
sanctioning intentions 
    Past Sanctioning 
 Behavior 
  Future Sanctioning  
Intentions 
Model Predictor b t p lmg   b t p lmg 
           
1 Age -0.029 -3.66 .000 .062 
 
-0.006 -0.90 .370 .002  
Perceived concern 0.345 3.48 .001 .067 
 
0.217 2.46 .015 .052  
Angler threat 0.179 2.36 .020 .039 
 
0.320 4.71 .000 .137  
Management 
familiarity 
0.094 1.42 .157 .026 
 
0.008 0.14 .892 .002 
 
Yrs Bulkley 0.012 1.15 .253 .009 
 
0.006 0.64 .523 .004  
Country of residence 0.333 1.55 .122 .025 
 
0.152 0.80 .428 .006  
Club membership 0.094 0.46 .645 .002   0.201 1.10 .271 .010 
  
R2 = .23; Adj. R2 = .20             
df (7,152) 
R2 = .21; Adj R2 = .18           
df (7,152) 
           
2 Age -0.032 -4.45 .000 .073 
 
-0.009 -1.59 .114 .005  
Perceived concern 0.241 2.62 .010 .044 
 
0.067 0.90 .371 .026  
Angler threat 0.003 0.03 .973 .016 
 
0.120 1.87 .063 .064 
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Management 
familiarity 
0.134 2.23 .027 .033 
 
0.041 0.84 .403 .005 
 
Yrs Bulkley 0.013 1.40 .165 .010 
 
0.009 1.15 .252 .005  
Country of residence 0.273 1.41 .160 .022 
 
0.097 0.62 .540 .005 
 
Club membership -0.114 -0.61 .540 .002 
 
0.020 0.14 .893 .004  
Sanction efficacy 0.311 4.60 .000 .121 
 
0.408 7.39 .000 .256  
Belief in science 0.127 1.76 .081 .026 
 
0.066 1.13 .262 .044  
Norm perception 0.002 0.36 .718 .002 
 
-0.004 -1.09 .277 .012  
Reputation concern 0.148 2.79 .006 .061   0.134 3.10 .002 .065 
    R2 = .41; Adj. R2 = .37             
df (11,148) 
 R2 =.49; Adj. R2 = .45            
df (11, 148) 
Note. Regression analysis was completed on complete pairwise observations (n = 160). 
Country of residence referent (1 = Canada; 0 = non-Canadian); Club membership referent (1 = 
Yes; 0 = No). 
 
In contrast to past sanctioning behavior, the models predicting future sanctioning 
intent revealed a different structure, particularly for Model 2. Model 1 accounted for 21% 
of the variance in future sanctioning intentions (adj. R2 = 0.18). Both perceptions of 
angler threat (lmg = 0.137) and perceived concern (lmg = 0.052) emerged as significant 
predictors of future intent. Compared to Model 1, Model 2 explained 49% of the variance 
(adj. R2 = 0.45) in future sanctioning intentions. Perceived sanctioning efficacy 
contributed over half of the model’s R2 (lmg = 0.256), followed by reputation concern 
(lmg = 0.065) and perceived angler threat (lmg = 0.064). AIC model comparison 
indicated that Model 2 (AICfuture = 435.2) out performed Model 1 in predicting future 
sanctioning intentions (AICfuture = 497.3).  
Discussion 
Human decision-making can present pervasive challenges to natural resource 
managers due to negative impacts on ecosystems and species, yet resource users can also 
contribute positively to conservation management outcomes in unexpected ways. In the 
present research, we examined one potentially powerful pathway to maximize the 
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conservation value of the C&R management approach: leveraging interpersonal 
communication, and social sanctioning in particular, to encourage uptake and 
proliferation of C&R best practices. Consistent with our predictions, greater perceived 
capacity to influence the angling practices of others and professed concerns about one’s 
own reputation were strongly predictive of both past and future sanctioning. In fact, 
perceptions of sanctioning efficacy contributed over half of the predictive power of the 
model when predicting future sanctioning intentions. These results are consistent with 
past work demonstrating the effect of social influence on behavior (Bamberg & Möser, 
2007) and further highlight the role that anglers have to play in perpetuating the adoption 
of C&R best practices.  
One of the more intriguing findings of the present work is the high level of 
endorsement we observed for future sanctioning behavior. This is particularly interesting 
given the way in which future sanctioning items were framed: anglers reported their 
intention to act relative to a conditional, if-then scenario that communicated the existence 
of and subsequent transgression against an evidence-based C&R best practice. Based on 
prior research suggesting that the presence of a formal sanctioning system (e.g., 
mandatory recycling program) may support the informal sanctioning of non-cooperators 
(Nolan, 2017), these preliminary but suggestive findings suggest that future research 
should examine whether the presence (or knowledge of) evidence based C&R best 
practices (or formal policies) influences anglers’ willingness to sanction non-compliant 
anglers. In addition, though it is clear that the future sanctioning items were endorsed 
more strongly than the past sanctioning items, we cannot draw strong inferences based on 
the present work because the two sets of items were (intentionally) constructed in 
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different ways. Still, the observed differences suggest a need for additional future 
exploration using parallel measures.  
Although recreational fisheries are context-dependent and function at the 
intersection of site-specific socio-cultural, economic, political and ethical factors 
(Arlinghaus, 2006b), our results suggest that more generalizable social psychological 
factors and angler segmentation characteristics play a critical role in shaping anglers’ 
willingness to engage in behaviors that may promote C&R fisheries health. The results 
highlighted here suggest that in addition to perceptions of concern and typology (e.g., 
age), contextually salient social factors (e.g. reputation) and perceptions of efficacy may 
also be critically important in shaping anglers’ sanctioning propensity. Our findings may 
be particularly useful to fisheries managers seeking to identify ‘soft’ approaches that may 
increase the involvement of anglers in the conservation management process and achieve 
conservation objectives.   
What might this look like in practice? First, managers should identify context-
appropriate ways to increase the social desirability of adopting C&R best practices. 
Because anglers’ propensity to sanction is partially explained by their own professed 
concerns about their reputation, fisheries managers could increase the saliency and public 
visibility of “doing or communicating the right thing”. The promotion of such “see 
something, say something” campaigns or programs could be enticing to individuals who 
are both concerned about anglers’ threat to steelhead and their own reputation within the 
community. Still, concerns over the dynamics of the interaction need to be addressed, 
including the associated real and perceived costs (e.g., social and physical) that may deter 
engagement (Steentjes et al., 2017). Perhaps more importantly, fisheries managers should 
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be encouraged by our results suggesting that anglers’ efficacy beliefs strongly motivate 
their future sanctioning intentions. Thus, encouraging individuals to advocate for C&R 
best practices—and letting them know that their voices matter—within their angling 
communities may go a long way towards increasing cooperative angling.  Given the lack 
of monitoring and enforcement capabilities common to recreational fisheries (Sutinen, 
1993), this belief and alternative framework offers an encouraging and cost-effective 
means to promote valuable and necessary conservation practices. 
Together, the various forms of interpersonal communication highlighted here 
could help overcome notable human dimensions obstacles nested within recreational 
fisheries (and other conservation settings more broadly), including the lack of shared 
values (Arlinghaus, 2006b) and feelings of personal inefficacy to effect positive change. 
Although it is important to consider traditional avenues to accurately foster anglers’ 
knowledge and adoption of C&R best practices, various forms of interpersonal 
communication may enable anglers to develop a deeper understanding and appreciation 
of C&R best practices, by conveying strong social norm messages about what is both 
socially appropriate and commonly practiced by the greater angling community. 
Fortunately, channels between anglers represent a dominant communication pathway 
(Nguyen et al., 2010) and furthermore, social networks are pervasive in recreational 
fisheries. Angling clubs, online forums and social media platforms constitute an array of 
existing arenas through which individuals can spread critical conservation information 
and create a context wherein the consequences of inappropriate angling behavior carry 
salient, potentially costly, social implications. Given the well-established gap between 
intentions and actual behavior (for review see Sheeran, 2002), it remains unclear whether 
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anglers’ observed endorsement of sanctioning in the future will translate into actual 
behavior. This remains an important question for future research, and assessing the 
practical implications of interpersonal sanctioning in the context of conservation 
management. 
With the popularity of recreational angling increasing worldwide and the 
associated negative impacts of anglers’ handling practices, identifying and facilitating 
meaningful opportunities for anglers’ direct involvement in the conservation process 
could help reduce stressors to fish (Cooke et al., 2013b). Such alternative, participatory-
based institutions, ranging from anglers’ direct involvement in advocacy and monitoring 
to research and management design, have been shown to positively impact fisheries 
(Granek et al., 2008). While continuing to examine what regulates anglers’ propensity to 
engage is important, further research is needed to explore the downstream implications of 
such engagement, including both influences on the receiver (e.g., changes in behavior) as 
well as the communicator (e.g., impacts to reputation and perceived self-efficacy). In 
particular, future research should examine what messages are most effective in inducing 
cooperation, how these processes may influence anglers’ sense of stewardship across 
fisheries, and whether sanctioning may spillover into other forms of engagement. There is 
also a clear and pressing need to examine the dynamics uncovered here in other 
conservation and resource management contexts (e.g., forestry, hunting).  
Conclusion 
In isolation, C&R best practices and other user-management guidelines intended 
to mitigate humans’ negative impacts on ecological systems are likely to fail as people 
rarely have the incentive to act alone. While C&R angling offers recreational fisheries 
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managers a sustainable alternative to the traditional catch-and-harvest model, maximizing 
the conservation potential of this approach is largely dependent on anglers’ voluntary 
adoption of C&R best practices. Forms of interpersonal communication that can leverage 
the power of social norms and social influence—including social sanctions—offer a 
potentially powerful yet low-cost avenue through which to increase cooperative behavior 
and persuade individuals to act in socially responsible ways. Although limited research 
has explored this role for resource-users to date, managers should consider how this 
framework manifests and can be applied to other conservation management contexts, 
particularly those that rely on voluntary compliance and which operate with limited 
enforcement capabilities. 
Bridge to Chapter IV 
Chapter II and III present results from correlational research examining 
individuals’ willingness to punish others’ unethical or inappropriate actions, either 
towards corporate actors or at the individual level. Whereas Chapter II highlights the role 
attributions of blame play in shaping consumer responses following corporate 
misconduct, Chapter III reveals how perceptions of efficacy and concerns about one’s 
reputation influences recreational anglers’ willingness to impose social sanctions on 
others’ inappropriate fishing practices. In Chapter IV, I shift from understanding what 
drives individuals’ willingness to sanction normative transgressions and instead, assess 
what the prevailing norms are with respect to handling practices in the context of catch-
and-release angling. Indeed, if individuals are expected to monitor and enforce the 
actions others, there must be a clear and shared understanding of what constitutes socially 
acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Thus, in Chapter IV I explore anglers’ personal 
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and normative beliefs towards catch-and-release handling practices and angling-related 
imagery shared on social media that differentially depict how a fish is held and exposed 
to air post-catch. I further examine how perceptions of other recreational anglers’ 
agreement with such practices (e.g., normative estimations) relates to an individual’s own 
beliefs, whether one’s perceptions of others’ beliefs are accurate or inaccurate, and 
whether differences emerge between relevant subpopulations within the angling 
community (e.g., fly fishing versus conventional tackle). 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
FISHING FOR A PHOTOGRAPH: EXPLORING ANGLERS’ NORMATIVE 
PERCEPTIONS OF CATCH-AND-RELESE IMAGERY 
 
Introduction 
Catch-and-release (C&R) angling is on the rise across the world (Cooke & Cowx, 
2004). Either performed in compliance with mandated regulations or practiced 
voluntarily, C&R angling operates on the premise that fish experience minimal impacts 
upon release (Cooke & Cowx, 2004). Although often employed as a conservation 
management tool, recent research has systematically documented how aspects of the 
angling event can result in negative consequences for the released fish (Cooke et al., 
2013a), including physiological and behavioral impairment (Bower, Danylchuk, 
Brownscombe, Thiem, & Cooke, 2016; Danylchuk et al, 2014; Lennox et al., 2015) and 
increased susceptibility to post-release predation (Danylchuk et al, 2007). Provided 
anglers’ behavior and decision-making partly determines the biological fitness of an 
angled and released fish, maximizing the conservation value of C&R is largely 
contingent on the adoption of scientifically-validated capture and handling techniques 
that reduce fitness consequences (Brownscombe et al., 2017).  
Challenges to anglers’ adoption of and engagement with prescribed best practices 
are not insignificant, particularly in a recreational context where behavior is seldom 
formally or easily monitored and enforced (Green & McKinlay, 2009; Sutinen, 1993). 
Even with mandated regulations, non-compliance has been a persistent problem among 
recreational fisheries worldwide (Arias & Sutton, 2013; Blank & Gavin, 2009; 
Smallwood & Beckley, 2012). In the absence of regulation and enforcement, the 
widespread adoption of C&R best practices is more likely to occur when beliefs about 
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appropriate capture and handling practices are mutually endorsed and performed by the 
broader angling community (Bova et al., 2017; Cialdini, 2009; Ostrom, 2014). Thus, the 
accurate interpretation of socially accepted standards of practice—social norms—is 
critical in guiding situational and/or culturally appropriate behavior (Cialdini, 2009; 
Rogers et al., 2018). However, if prevailing or perceived social norms conflict with 
scientifically-validated best practices, anglers may be inclined to engage in practices that 
result in suboptimal outcomes for angled and released fish. Given the large influence of 
social norms on behavior and decision-making (Cialdini, 2009), important questions 
remain with respect to what post-catch handling practices anglers personally and 
normatively perceive to be appropriate, and whether one’s own beliefs align with the 
broader angling community and scientifically-validated tenets. Understanding how 
anglers collectively view capture and handling practices, particularly those concerning 
whether and how a fish should be held and exposed to air post-catch, could hold 
important outreach implications for conservation managers and practitioners seeking to 
encourage the adoption of best practices. 
Among other aspects of the angling event, one of the key determinants impacting 
how fish respond post-catch involves the amount of time they are exposed to air 
(Brownscombe et al., 2017; Suski et al., 2007). Fish are removed from water for hook 
removal, but also for the purpose of documentation (e.g., photography). Concurrent with 
the advent and rise of social networking platforms (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, Instagram), 
an increasingly common behavior among anglers as well as angling-related companies is 
to photograph and share images of individuals alongside their catch on social media. 
Although it is unclear how exposure to social media images impacts people’s beliefs and 
 80 
attitudes, it is likely that such imagery conveys normative information about the 
prevalence of certain handling and social media sharing practices within the community 
(e.g., Fournier, Hall, Ricke, & Storey, 2013; Litt & Stock, 2011).  
The diversity and breadth of the recreational angling community (Fisher, 1997) 
makes it difficult to discern what constitutes prevailing social norms relative to different 
handling practices, particularly those dealing with whether and how a fish should be held 
and exposed to air post-catch. The present chapter addresses this issue by exploring 
recreational anglers’ personal and normative beliefs (e.g., perceptions of other anglers’ 
beliefs) towards handling practices and social media images that differentially depict how 
a fish is held and exposed to air post-catch. Specifically, I present findings that reveal 
how perceptions of other recreational anglers’ agreement with such practices relates to an 
individual’s own beliefs, and how one’s perceptions of others are often inaccurate.  
Catch-and-Release Angling and Social Media  
Concurrent with the rise of social media platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram, 
and Twitter, visual imagery (i.e., photographs) has become an increasingly popular 
medium and channel for people to share their experiences (Whiting & Williams, 2013), 
promote desired social identities (Barker, 2009; for review see Kuss & Griffiths, 2011) 
and, for companies, a way to lure consumers (Ashley & Tuten, 2014; Murdough, 2009). 
For instance, Instagram, the main mobile photo-sharing network, has emerged as a 
popular online platform worldwide with over one billion active monthly users (Clement, 
2019). For recreational anglers, social media platforms, including Instagram, have 
developed into online resource, enabling anglers not only to document and boast pictures 
of themselves alongside their catch, but also to gain access to other anglers’ experiences, 
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beliefs, and angling-related information (Kuss & Griffiths, 2011). As of June 2019, there 
were 3,291,297 images registered with the hashtag #catchandrelease on the platform, 
which depict different aspects of a C&R angling event. 
The use of social media for documenting C&R-related imagery has been a topic 
of debate among the angling community. Popular media, among other outlets, has 
acknowledged concerns among the angling community regarding the disclosure of secret 
fishing locations and the pervasiveness of C&R images portraying practices that do not 
match scientifically-validated best practices (e.g., elongated air exposure; Danylchuk et 
al., 2018; Holson, 2018). One of the significant impacts of immediate mass 
communication provided by social media is that it can reveal otherwise difficult to access 
information about others’ behaviors and beliefs (Leonardi, 2014). Although such social 
exchanges can be a source for good, the promulgation of images depicting practices that 
conflict with scientifically-validated capture and handling tenets may communicate 
counterproductive information to the angling community. Indeed, beyond the immediate 
physiological consequences of removing a fish from water, sharing images of air exposed 
fish may convey suboptimal normative messages to others that such practices are 
generally accepted and prominent among the angling community (e.g., Litt & Stock, 
2011). 
Out of concern for the proliferation of air exposed fish on social media and how 
fish are being handled generally, the Keepemwet Fishing campaign (KWF; Danylchuk et 
al., 2018) has led a grassroots movement to disseminate information on best practices as 
well as to transition the norms that govern online sharing of photographs showing the 
outcome of a C&R angling event. To achieve these goals, KWF informally introduced 
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the ‘#keepemwet’ hashtag as a way to articulate the best practice of minimizing air 
exposure by using an easily discernable and actionable phrase (Danylchuk et al., 2018). 
The use of the #keepemwet hashtag on social media sites has increased steadily since 
2013; Danylchuk et al., 2018). The campaign has also sought to model appropriate 
practices. For instance, images (and handling practices) promoted on the campaign’s 
social media page tend to display images of fish either partially submerged in water or 
else photographed entirely underwater.  
In addition to scientifically-validated concerns about the way fish are being 
handled post-catch, either for the purpose of documentation or not, trepidations about the 
impact of C&R photographs are not misplaced. Visual imagery, including photographs, 
can promote issue engagement, but also can convey information that may undermine both 
ecological and societal outcomes (Chapman, Corner, Webster, & Markowitz, 2016; 
O’Neil & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; O’Neill & Smith, 2014). Recent research has explored 
how people think about and engage with photographs depicting different aspects of 
climate change, including images related to causes, impacts, and solutions (Chapman et 
al., 2016). Distressing photographs (e.g., natural disasters and melting ice) have been 
shown to prompt strong negative reactions, including feelings of hopelessness that further 
undermine individuals’ willingness to take action (O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009). 
Perhaps more importantly, however, is whether and how the circulation of C&R-related 
imagery online impacts anglers’ normative perceptions about what most recreational 
anglers do and approve of.  
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The Importance of Social Norms 
 For a recreational context primarily dependent on voluntary compliance, 
understanding the role and impact of social norms is paramount. Social norms represent a 
system of shared meanings and beliefs that can guide situation-specific behavior 
(Cialdini, 2009; Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). Descriptive norms are defined as people’s 
perceptions about what most others do, whereas injunctive norms refer to perceptions 
about what is socially approved of behavior (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005; Cialdini, 2009). 
Descriptive and injunctive norms can exert a strong influence on behavior, particularly 
when aligned and salient in the decision-making context (Cialdini et al., 1990; Kallgren, 
Reno, & Cialdini, 2000). For instance, if individuals hold the belief that most people 
don’t litter and are simultaneously presented with clear injunctive signals that do not 
condone littering, an individual is less likely to litter (Cialdini et al., 1990). Much 
research has demonstrated how descriptive norms are an important predictor of behavior 
and decision-making. People are prone to follow the actual or perceived majority, 
especially when the injunctive norm presents conflicting information or is relatively 
ambiguous (e.g., Schultz et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2012).  
The development of perceptions about what others do and approve of is facilitated 
by social interaction. People infer descriptive norms either directly or indirectly by 
observing the prevalence (or rarity) of a given action or belief (e.g., modeling, opinion 
polls; Hogg & Reid, 2006; Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). Although individuals may 
implicitly infer injunctive norms based on the frequency of engagement, explicitly 
understanding what others approve or disapprove of must be made salient through 
interpersonal communication (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). Thus, the direct observation of 
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other anglers’ handling practices is likely to reveal descriptive information concerning 
how most other anglers handle fish post-catch. Images of post-catch C&R angling posted 
to social media may also contribute to anglers’ perceived norms around handling 
practices (Litt & Stock, 2001; Fournier et al., 2013). For instance, recent research 
examining adolescents risk cognition demonstrates that individual’s normative beliefs are 
susceptible to descriptive norm information conveyed on social media (e.g., Litt & Stock, 
2011). In an experimental study, researchers manipulated the descriptive norm by 
adjusting the ratio in which participants viewed alcohol-related content or non-alcohol 
related content in Facebook profiles (e.g., imagery, text) of similarly aged students (e.g., 
3:1 profiles with alcohol versus no alcohol, or vice versa). Participants who observed a 
majority of Facebook profiles with alcohol-related content reported more favorable 
attitudes towards alcohol use and increased willingness to consume alcohol compared to 
participants who viewed a majority of Facebook profiles with non-alcohol related content 
(Litt & Stock, 2011). These findings suggest that the way anglers present their handling 
practices to others on social media likely conveys descriptive information about the 
prevalence of a given behavior, particularly if one handling position is promulgated more 
often than others (e.g., fish held horizontally above the water). 
Attention to the normative underpinnings of C&R handling practices and social 
media engagement is especially important in the context of C&R angling because the 
adoption of best practices is largely dependent on voluntary compliance. Although it is 
said that a picture is worth a thousand words, it remains unclear how recreational anglers 
perceive photographs documenting the outcome of a C&R angling event and whether 
individuals’ personal and normative perceptions vacillate based on the content of the 
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image. That is, does the nature of how the fish is held (e.g., partially submerged in water 
versus air exposed) elicit divergent personal and normative beliefs among anglers in 
terms of the prevalence and appropriateness of a given practice? Furthermore, do 
individual’s normative beliefs relate to their own opinions towards different handling and 
social media practices?  
Social Norm Misperceptions 
Since norms are rarely, if ever, explicitly stated, people can misinterpret the level 
of support for or the extent of engagement with a particular belief or behavior (Cruz, 
Henningsen, & Williams, 2000). Social norm misperceptions can take many forms. 
Pluralistic ignorance describes instances when an individual privately rejects a belief, but 
incorrectly assumes that the majority of others endorse it (Miller & McFarland, 1987). 
Comparatively, false consensus occurs when people overestimate the prevalence of 
beliefs that are similar to their own opinion (Ross, Greene, & Harris, 1977). There is 
fairly widespread evidence of pluralistic ignorance and false consensus effects across 
multiple domains, including beliefs about climate change (Leviston et al., 2013; 
Mildenberger & Tingley, 2017), support for renewable energy technologies (Sokoloski, 
Markowitz, & Bidwell, 2018), and compliance within recreational fisheries (Bova et al., 
2017). For instance, in South Africa’s Eastern Cape rock and surf fishery, Bova et al. 
(2017) found that anglers overestimated the rate of non-compliance among their peers 
with respect to bag limits and undersize fish, among other regulations.   
The practical implications of understanding the role of social misperceptions are 
many. Normative misperceptions are problematic because they can lead people to act in a 
manner that is incongruent with their personal beliefs and/or adopt erroneous perceptions 
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about prevailing social norms, altering not only the salience of an issue, but the perceived 
importance of it as well (e.g., Miller & McFarland, 1987; Prentice & Miller, 1996). For 
instance, after manipulating the distribution of college students’ opinion in a classroom in 
favor of the denialist position, Geiger & Swim (2016) found that students who held the 
actual majority of opinion—that climate change is happening and anthropogenic—were 
less willing to discuss the topic in a subsequent group discussion. Other longitudinal 
research has shown that adolescents are more likely to start smoking when they perceive 
that the majority of their peers and adults smoke (Botvin, Botvin, Baker, Dusenbury, & 
Goldberg, 1992). Thus, irrespective of its actual prevalence, an opinion or behavior that 
is perceived to be descriptively rampant, can problematically function as the norm of 
reference in guiding consequential and at times, counter-attitudinal behavior. In the 
context of C&R angling, although a handling practice may be perceived by most anglers 
as inappropriate, such as holding a fish vertically by gripping the jaw, anglers may 
inaccurately perceive that the majority of others approve of the practice. 
How these social cognitive biases materialize is less unclear, but they are likely 
influenced by a range of motivational, social, and informational processes. False-
consensus effects may be shaped by people’s selective exposure to like-minded others 
and the salience of their shared beliefs or serve a purely functional value in fulfilling 
people’s need for social support (for review see Marks & Miller, 1997). Conversely, 
pluralistic ignorance may arise from systematic media reporting and the 
overrepresentation of minority—though at times completely inaccurate—opinions (e.g., 
Boykoff, 2011; Noelle-Neumann, 1974; Shamir & Shamir, 1997). As social media has 
been shown to play a role in circulating socially-relevant information about what most 
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others do (Litt & Stock, 2011), it may also drive misperception effects (Fournier et al., 
2013). In a recent study, researchers examined whether alcohol-related content posted to 
social media sites, including individuals’ Facebook profiles, influenced college students 
perceived norms around drinking (Fournier et al., 2013). Participants who viewed 
Facebook profiles with alcohol-related content estimated higher drinking norms among 
their peers than those who did not. These findings suggest that exposure to social media 
can influence individuals’ normative estimations relative to what most others do and/or 
believe. Taken together, research on pluralistic ignorance and false consensus effects in 
related environmental domains suggests that an individual’s beliefs about what other 
anglers handling and social media sharing practices may not accurately capture the 
opinions of the recreational angling community.  
Present Research 
No prior work that we are aware of has examined recreational anglers’ personal 
and normative perceptions about whether and how a fish should be held and exposed to 
air post-catch. Thus, the present study had several objectives. At a descriptive level, the 
primary objective was to assess anglers’ personal beliefs with respect to whether and how 
a fish should be held and exposed to air post-catch as well as the appropriateness of 
sharing related imagery on social media. The research also focused on ascertaining 
whether certain handling practices, such as holding a fish partially submerged in water or 
air exposed, are perceived as more or less common than others both in terms of handling 
practices and the types of images anglers encounter on social media. Another avenue of 
this research examined anglers’ estimated level of agreement with handling and sharing 
practices among the broader angling community, and furthermore, how anglers’ own 
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opinion relates to their normative perceptions. Although this research was primarily 
exploratory, the emergence of norm misestimation in related areas of research (e.g., 
fishing compliance) suggests that significant pluralistic ignorance and/or false consensus 
effects may exist between anglers’ own opinion and their estimated level of agreement 
among others. Additionally, since descriptive norms have been shown to fuel 
misestimation effects (Litt & Stock, 2011), the present research also explored whether 
perceptions of prevalence predicted normative estimations. 
In addition to these primary, mostly descriptive trends, the study also explored 
whether differences in anglers’ personal beliefs would emerge as a function of a number 
of relevant individual-level and contextually salient social-psychological factors. For 
instance, do subpopulations of people within the angling community (e.g., anglers who 
predominantly fly fish versus those who use conventional tackle) differ in terms of the 
practices that they deem are appropriate or with respect to the perceived pervasiveness of 
a practice? To examine these and related questions, the study focused on multiple 
context-dependent predictors that might influence recreational anglers’ personal 
agreement with different handling and social media sharing practices. These factors 
included relevant angler characteristics, such as age and the type of gear anglers use for 
C&R angling (e.g., Fisher, 1997; Gigliotti and Peyton; 1993; Oh & Ditton, 2006), as well 
as relevant social psychological constructs, including social media use, the importance of 
documenting one’s catch, relative awareness of best practices, and perceived impact of 
air exposure.  
We expected that factors signifying greater concern for fishing populations, 
awareness of best practices, and perceived impact of air exposure would positively 
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predict anglers’ personal beliefs with handling practices and social media images, 
particularly for handling positions that coincide with scientifically-validated best 
practices (i.e., partially submerged, underwater holds). Additionally, we suspected that 
these same variables would negatively predict anglers’ agreement with handling and 
sharing practices that expose fish to air. Comparatively, we suspected that the importance 
of documenting fish post-catch would positively predict personal agreement for all 
handling positions but be particularly powerful for positions that fully expose fish to air 
(i.e., vertical, horizontal). We also anticipated meaningful differences to emerge relative 
to context-specific demographics, particularly based on the type of gear anglers use to 
practice C&R angling (e.g., fly fishing versus conventional tackle). For instance, we 
suspected that fly fishing anglers would agree with practices that adhere to scientifically-
validated to a greater extent and report encountering these angling practices more 
frequently in images on social media and while fishing (i.e., partially submerged, 
underwater hold) compared to conventional anglers.  
 Finally, the present study was also used as an opportunity to further examine 
anglers’ willingness to impose social sanctions on others’ inappropriate angling 
behaviors. As detailed in Chapter III, the involvement of recreational anglers’ in 
monitoring and enforcement, through their intentional conversations with others, has 
received increasing attention. Anglers’ willingness to impose social sanctions on others’ 
inappropriate angling behaviors is influenced by a number of factors, including levels of 
concern, perceived efficacy, reputation concerns, age, perceived angler impact and 
management familiarity (Chapman et al., 2017; Guckian et al. 2018). To replicate and 
extend our understanding of what drives anglers’ sanctioning intent, several of the 
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aforementioned factors as well as other relevant constructs, including perceived 
responsibility to sanction others and activist identity (Guckian & Markowitz, 
unpublished), were included in the survey to predict sanctioning intent. 
Methods 
Sampling Frame and Distribution 
The target population included recreational anglers above the age of 18 and was 
not restricted to any geographic location. Survey recruitment and distribution occurred 
from May 28th to June 20th, 2019. Participants were recruited through various social 
media sites, including those maintained by regional, national, and international 
recreational angling organizations and industry (e.g., MoldyChum.com, Patagonia Fly 
Fishing, International Game Fish Association). Participants were not compensated for 
their participation, though were entered into a compensation lottery where one participant 
was randomly selected to receive a Patagonia Stormfront Roll Pack. The survey was 
administered online through the software program, Qualtrics, and was approved by the 
University of Massachusetts Amherst Institutional Review Board (Protocol ID: 2018: 
4956). 
Study Measures and Procedure 
 Participants responded to a survey, which included several questions to examine 
participants’ personal and normative beliefs about C&R handling and social media 
sharing practices as well as to investigate predicted relationships. The survey began with 
participants responding to several questions designed to assess relevant angler 
characteristics, concern, identity and social media use. Two items measured participants’ 
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relative concern with respect to the health and condition of an angled and released fish as 
well as the overall health and condition of fish populations (e.g., ‘Compared to other 
anglers you know, would you say that you are less or more concerned about the health 
and condition of an angled and released fish?’, 1 = much less, 7 = much more; ). The 
items were combined into a composite for relative concern (r = .74). Participants were 
then asked about how important a number of social identities are to their sense of self 
(e.g., How important or unimportant are each of the following to your sense of who you 
are as a person, 1 = not at all important, 7 = extremely important). Here we focus on the 
extent participants identified as an activist. Documentation importance was assessed by 
one item: ‘How important, if at all, is it for you to photograph yourself with your catch 
during a catch-and-release angling event?’ (1 = not at all important, 7 = extremely 
important). Only participants indicating that they use social media responded to this 
question. 
Participants were then asked several questions to gauge their personal and 
normative perceptions of images depicting the outcome of a C&R angling event. Figure 7 
displays the images that participants responded to, including those depicting a partially 
submerged fish, a fish held horizontally, vertically, and underwater. For clarity, the 
descriptive text appearing alongside the images in Figure 7 also accompanied each image 
in the online survey. The same images were used for assessing participants’ perceptions 
of handling practices as well as social media sharing. To estimate the perceived 
descriptive norm of handling practices (e.g., perceived handling prevalence), participants 
were asked how often they encounter other anglers engaging in each position depicted in 
the images (e.g., ‘How frequently or infrequently would you say you see other anglers 
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handling fish in ways demonstrated in the images when you are out fishing?’, 1 = never, 
7 = all the time), creating four separate items. The same process was used to assess the 
perceived social media prevalence for each image (e.g., ‘How frequently or infrequently 
would you say that you see images like these on social media?’, 1 = never, 7 = all the 
time).  
Participants then indicated their personal agreement or disagreement with 
handling and social media sharing practices, as well as the percent of other anglers they 
believe agree with the practice. The image conditions (e.g., partially submerged, 
horizontal hold, vertical hold, underwater hold) were presented randomly to avoid the 
potential for order effects. One item assessed participants’ personal agreement with the 
handling practice depicted in each image (e.g., ‘It is ok to handle fish in the way 
demonstrated in the photo’, 1 = strongly disagree; 6 = strongly agree), creating a total of 
four items. Since we were mainly interested in differences between those who agreed and 
disagreed with the practices (rather than the extent of agreement or disagreement), we 
converted the 6-point scale into a dichotomous scale, which was coded as: 0 = disagree; 1 
= agree.  
An identical process was used to assess participants’ personal agreement with 
sharing images on social media. To assess the perceived injunctive norm of each 
handling practice (i.e., perceived norm estimation), participants were asked to indicate 
what percent of recreational anglers would agree with the statement, ‘It is ok to handle 
fish in the way it is being handled in this image’ (continuous scale, 0-100%). This 
process was repeated for each image, creating four separate norm estimation items for 
handling practices. The same process was used to assess participants’ norm estimation for 
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other anglers’ agreement with the appropriateness of sharing images on social media 
(e.g., ‘It is ok to share images like this on social media’ (continuous scale, 0-100%).  
 Relative awareness of C&R best practices was assessed using one item (i.e., 
‘Compared to other recreational anglers that you know, would you say you know less or 
more about catch-and-release practices that increase the likelihood of survival of an 
angled and released fish?’ 1 = much less, 7 = much more). One item was used to assess 
angler impact on the fitness of an angled and released fish (e.g., ‘To what extent (if at all) 
do you think recreational anglers’ decisions and behaviors influence the likelihood of 
survival of an angled and released fish?, 1 = not at all, 7 = a great deal). A separate item 
was used to gauge exposure affect, which assessed beliefs about the impact air exposure 
has on fish (e.g., ‘How do you think a fish is affected by being held out of the water to 
take a photograph?’, 1 = positively affected, 7 = extremely negatively affected). 
Before responding to a series of demographic questions, two measures assessed 
sanctioning intent (e.g., ‘How likely are you to personally express your disapproval to an 
angler that you see engaging in practices that are harmful to the survival of an angled and 
released fish?’; 1 = not at all likely, 7 = extremely likely). The two items were combined 
into a composite (r = .87). Participants were also asked the extent to which they felt 
personally responsible for monitoring and enforcing the angling practices of others (e.g., 
It is my responsibility to approach and educate anglers when they engage in practices that 
are harmful to the survival of an angled and released fish, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree). 
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Figure 7. Images used to depict common handling practices during the C&R angling 
event and photographs that are shared on social media. 
 
Participants 
 A total of 1,857 people agreed to participate in the study. Prior to analysis, a 
number of participants were excluded from the sample for either incomplete data, failure 
to meet basic screening questions (e.g., did not fish recreationally), or for unusually long 
survey response times (longer than 30 minutes), leaving a total of 1,560 participants in 
the sample. Of the participants remaining in the sample, 1,404 identified as recreational 
anglers, with smaller numbers identifying as fishing guides (n = 115) and even less as 
competitive or professional anglers (n = 41). Due to the study’s focus on recreational 
anglers, the descriptive and inferential results reported here examine the subset of 
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participants who identified as recreational anglers (n = 1,404). Analysis of the smaller 
subsamples can be provided upon request. 
 Table 9 displays socio-demographic and angling-related characteristics. In 
addition to the factors presented in the table, the majority of anglers reported residing in 
the United States (n = 1,097), followed by Canada (n = 196), with lesser numbers from 
Australia (n = 7), Great Britain (n = 6), Germany (n = 5), Sweden (n = 4), Argentina (n = 
2), Bahamas (n = 2), Switzerland (n = 2), New Zealand (n = 2), Singapore (n = 2), and 
Japan (n = 2), while several other countries were indicated as primary residence for at 
least one participant (non-disclosure, n = 138). Given the study’s focus on exposure to 
and beliefs about C&R imagery depicted on social media, a number of questions were 
asked to better understand participants’ use of social media. The majority of participants 
reported that they visit social media sites (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, Instagram) ‘at least 
once a day’ (4 or above on 6pt scale; 81.27%), with 115 (8.19%) participants indicating 
that they ‘never’ use social media. Of the participants who reported using social media, 
94.57% report following angling-related accounts and frequently encounter C&R-related 
imagery (e.g., person holding a fish) on social media (5 or above on 7pt scale; 83.79%). 
Furthermore, for participants who use social media, 80.29% had previously shared an 
image of themselves C&R angling on social media. 
Table 9. Socio-demographic and angling characteristics for sample participants 
Age                          M=43.9; SD=15.5  Percent Fishing C&R M=90.3; SD=17.5 
Money spent on 
fishing expenditures  
over past two years 
M=6610; 
SD=28934.59  
Percent C&R Voluntary M=93.1; SD=17.9 
Gender n %  Education n % 
  Female 129 8.7    Grade 8 or less 0 0 
  Male 1315 88.6    Some high school 20 1.3 
  Prefer not to say 10 0.7    Graduated high school 80 5.4 
  Non-disclosure 30 2    Some college  323 21.8 
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Gear type           Bachelor's degree 605 40.8 
  Fly fishing 1113 79.3    Post-graduate degree 421 28.4 
  Conventional 291 20.7    Non-disclosure 35 2.4 
C&R fishing 
location    Belong to angling club   
  Freshwater 1088 73.3    Yes 747 50.3 
  Marine  320 21.6    No 700 47.2 
  Non-disclosure 37 2.5     Non-disclosure 37 2.5 
 
Analytic Approach 
 Analyses occurred in several stages in order to explore response patterns and 
relationships among key variables. First, perceived prevalence was examined to 
determine whether differences emerged between types of handling practices as well as 
social media images. This included an examination of whether and how subpopulations 
(e.g., gear type; fly fishing vs. conventional tackle) differed in terms of the extent they 
viewed each practice or image posted to social media as more or less prevalent. Next, 
response patterns for participants’ personal agreement with each handling and social 
media sharing practice were examined. Chi-square analyses were run to assess the 
relationship between personal agreement and gear type (fly fishing versus conventional 
tackle), followed by a series of logit regressions, which explored the impact of other 
factors in addition to gear type (e.g., documentation important, exposure affect, age and 
relative awareness). As seen in the results, response patterns for the partially submerged 
and underwater hold revealed that the vast majority of anglers agree with the 
appropriateness of each practice. Due to limited variation, additional analyses predicting 
personal agreement (or disagreement) focused on only the vertical and horizontal hold.  
 Next, the relationship between personal agreement and norm estimation (beliefs 
about the level of support among the broader angling community) was examined to 
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determine whether there was evidence of norm misestimation effects. A series of linear 
regressions were run to determine the impact of personal agreement and perceived 
prevalence on norm estimation for the horizontal and vertical hold positions. Finally, an 
ordinary least squares regression examined sanctioning intent. Relative concern, 
sanctioning responsibility, activist identity, angler impact and relative awareness were 
entered into the model. For the sanctioning model, information on lmg relative 
importance is provided as a representation of the contribution of each parameter in the 
regression model that reflects the partitioning of the model's R2; higher lmg metrics 
indicate greater contribution to the R2
 
(Grömping, 2007).  
Results 
Perceived Prevalence of Handling Practices and Images on Social Media 
 Response distributions for perceived prevalence of handling practices are depicted 
in the left-hand panel of Figure 8, while the left-hand panel of Figure 9 displays the 
response distribution for perceived prevalence of images on social media (only includes 
responses of participants who reported using social media). Overall, similar patterns were 
observed relative to what handling practices and social media images participants 
perceived as the most common. Two one-way repeated measures ANOVAs were 
conducted to determine whether there was a main effect of handling practice or image 
type on perceived prevalence. For handling type, a main effect was found F(3, 4202.2) = 
315.26, p < .001, 2 = .19. Post-hoc comparisons revealed significant differences among 
all handling types, with the exception of the contrast between the partially submerged (M 
= 4.03, SD = 1.48) and vertical hold positions (M = 4.13, SD = 1.78, p = .290). The 
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horizontal hold was viewed as the most common handling practice among participants, 
(M = 5.01, SD = 1.40), whereas the underwater hold was the least (M = 3.37, SD = 1.63).  
A main effect was also found for image type on perceived prevalence of images 
on social media, F(3, 3859.4) = 407.59, p < .001, 2 = .24. Post-hoc comparisons 
revealed significant differences between all image types. Notably, the horizontal hold 
image was perceived as the most common handling position depicted in social media 
posts (M = 5.69, SD = 1.14), compared to the partially submerged hold (M = 4.77, SD = 
1.39, p < .001, d = .45), vertical hold (M = 4.52, SD = 1.59, p < .001, d = .58) and 
underwater hold (M = 4.02, SD = 1.57, p < .001, d = .82).  
Relationship between Perceived Prevalence and Gear Type 
The right-hand panels of Figures 8 and 9 display the results for perceived 
prevalence grouped by gear type for handling practices and social media images, 
respectively. To examine the relationship between gear type and perceived prevalence for 
handling practices and social media images, two 4-level within subjects variable (holding 
position; partially submerged, horizontal hold, vertical hold, underwater hold) by 2-level 
between subjects variable (gear type; conventional, fly fishing) models were run. For 
handling practices, a small, significant interaction was found between holding position 
and gear type F(3,4199) = 87.67, p <.001, 2 = .06. Listwise comparisons suggest that 
participants who practice conventional fishing more often see others handling fish 
vertically above the water (M = 4.93, SD = 1.58) than participants who practice fly 
fishing (M = 3.92, SD = 1.77, t(4942) = 9.90, p <.001, d = .73). Fly fishing participants 
indicated that they more often see others partially submerging fish in water (M = 4.19, SD 
= 1.43) or handling fish underwater (M = 3.53, SD = 1.61) compared to conventional 
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fishing participants (Mpartial = 3.42, SD = 1.53, t(4942) = -7.63 , p < .001,  d =.55; 
Munderwater = 2.73, SD = 1.55, t(4942) = -7.86, p <.001, d = .58). No difference emerged 
for the horizontal hold position. 
A similar interaction effect was found between gear type and perceived 
prevalence of social media images, F(3, 3856) = 99.33, p <.001, 2 = .07. Listwise 
comparisons revealed that fly fishing anglers more often encounter images of fish 
partially submerged in water  (M = 4.95, SD = 1.29) and held underwater (M = 4.23, SD = 
1.48) than participants who practice conventional fishing (Mpartial = 4.09, SD = 1.52, 
t(4268) = -9.07 , p < .001, d = .72; Munderwater = 3.20, SD = 1.63, t(4268) = -10.75, p 
<.001, d = .86). Participants who practice conventional fishing more often encounter 
images depicting a vertical hold (M = 5.14, SD = 1.45) compared to fly fishing 
participants (M = 4.36, SD = 1.58, t(4268) = 8.15, p < .001, d = .65). No effect emerged 
for gear type and the horizontal hold position.  
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Figure 8. Boxplot depicting the perceived prevalence of handling practices (left-hand 
panel). The right-hand panel displays perceived prevalence of handling practices grouped 
by gear type. 
 
Figure 9. Boxplot depicting perceived prevalence of images on social media (left-hand 
panel). The right-hand panel displays perceived prevalence of images on social media 
grouped by gear type. 
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Personal Agreement with Handling and Sharing Practices 
 Figure 10 displays response patterns for personal agreement with the 
appropriateness (or inappropriateness) of handling and social media sharing practices. 
Overall, participants largely agreed that holding fish partially submerged or underwater 
are acceptable handling practices. Comparatively, greater variability is observed with 
respect to handling fish horizontally, while most participants disagreed with the practice 
of handling fish vertically. Almost identical patterns of agreement and disagreement were 
found for participants’ beliefs about the appropriateness of sharing images on social 
media (right-hand panel of Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10. Response patterns for personal agreement with handling practice and sharing 
images on social media. 
 
Relationship Between Personal Agreement and Gear Type 
Due to insufficient variation in personal agreement for the partially submerged 
and underwater hold positions for both handling and social media sharing practices 
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(greater than 94% agreement in each case), additional analyses focused only on the 
horizontal and vertical holding positions for both handling and social media sharing 
practices. Chi-square tests were calculated to examine whether gear type influenced 
participants’ agreement with handling and social media sharing practices. Results suggest 
a significant effect of gear type on each handling and sharing practice for both the 
horizontal and vertical hold positions. For handling fish with a horizontal hold, χ2 (1, N = 
1402) = 22.53, p < .001, Fisher's Zr = .127, 95% confidence intervals (CIs) of Zr [.075, 
.180]. The probability of agreeing that holding the fish horizontally above the water is ok 
was greater for conventional anglers (.797) than fly anglers (.652). A slightly weaker 
effect was found for handling fish in the vertical hold position, χ2 (1, N = 1402) = 10.88, 
p = .001, Fisher's Zr = .088, 95% confidence intervals (CIs) of Zr [.036, .141]. The 
probability of agreeing that the vertical hold is ok was greater for conventional anglers 
(.306) than fly anglers (.214). Similar trends emerged when analyzing the relationship 
between gear type and personal agreement with sharing images on social media. For 
sharing images depicting a horizontal hold, χ2 (1, N = 1400) = 17.32, p < .001, Fisher's 
Zr = .112, 95% confidence intervals (CIs) of Zr [.059, .164]. The probability of agreeing 
that sharing images depicting a horizontal hold on social media is appropriate was greater 
for conventional anglers (.821) than fly anglers (.699).  For sharing images depicting a 
vertical hold, χ2 (1, N = 1401) = 16.99, p < .001, Fisher's Zr = .111, 95% confidence 
intervals (CIs) of Zr [.058, .163]. Conventional anglers (.481) were more likely to agree 
that sharing images of a vertical hold is appropriate compared to fly anglers (.350).  
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Predicting Personal Agreement 
 A series of logit regressions were run to examine whether participants’ agreement 
with the horizontal and vertical holding positions (for both handling and social media 
sharing practices) differed as a result of age, gear type, exposure affect, documentation 
importance, and relative awareness. Table 10 displays descriptive statistics for these 
measures, while correlations are reported in Table 11. Results indicate that age, exposure 
affect, gear type (fly fishing), and relative awareness negatively predicted whether a 
person agrees with a handling or social media sharing practice for the horizontal and 
vertical positions, whereas documentation importance positively predicts agreement (see 
Table 12 for logit and odds ratio estimates).  
Table 10. Descriptive statistics for study measures 
  M SD 
Relative concern 5.73 1.02 
Activist 3.97 1.75 
Documentation importance 3.19 1.58 
Angler impact 6.31 0.69 
Exposure affect 5.10 1.08 
Relative awareness 5.30 1.14 
Responsibility 4.68 1.45 
Sanctioning intent 4.32 1.65 
      
Table 11. Correlation for relevant predictors and personal agreement with handling and 
sharing practices for horizontal and vertical positions 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Gear (1) 1 
        
Exposure        
affect (2) 
.07** 1 
       
Documentation 
Importance (3) 
-.06* -.22*** 1 
      
Relative 
awareness (4) 
.02 .12*** -.01 1 
     
Age (5)  -.01 .11*** -.20*** .05* 1 
    
 104 
Handle 
horizontal (6) 
-.13*** -.41*** .28*** -.11*** -.22*** 1 
   
Handle.    
vertical (7) 
-.09*** -.22*** .12*** -.09*** -.14*** .24*** 1 
  
Sharing 
horizontal (8) 
-.11*** -.36*** .30*** -.13*** -.27*** .74*** .22*** 1 
 
Sharing    
vertical (9) 
-.11*** -.26*** .16*** -.13*** -.17*** .28*** .65*** .38**
* 
1 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. For gear type (0 = Conventional; 1 = Fly Fishing). 
 
 
Table 12. Logit regression results for predicting personal agreement for horizontal 
and vertical handling and social media sharing practices 
 
Logit  Odds Ratio 
  
Estimate 
Wald 
χ2  
Pr > 
χ2  
  
Point 
estimate 
95% CI           
lb            ub 
Handling: Horizontal Hold        
  Gear type (Fly) -.720 -3.62 <.001  .487 .327 .714 
  Exposure affect -1.131 -12.36 <.001  .323 .269 .385 
  Documentation importance .299 6.00 <.001  1.349 1.225 1.489 
  Relative Awareness -.111 -1.67 .094  .895 .786 1.019 
  Age -.024 -4.89 <.001   .976 .966 .985 
Handling: Vertical Hold        
  Gear type (Fly) -.429 -2.71 0.007  .651 .479 .890 
  Exposure affect -.417 -6.20 <.001  .659 .577 .751 
  Documentation importance .072 1.62 <.001  1.075 .985 1.173 
  Relative Awareness -.151 -2.57 .106  .860 .767 .965 
  Age -.017 -3.53 <.001   .983 .973 .992 
Social Media Sharing: 
Horizontal Hold        
  Gear type (Fly) -.730 -3.46 <.001  .482 .315 0.722 
  Exposure affect -.934 -10.31 <.001  .393 .328 0.467 
  Documentation importance .370 6.85 <.001  1.447 1.304 1.612 
  Relative Awareness -.233 -3.28 .001  .792 .688 .909 
  Age -.031 -5.87 <.001   .970 .960 .980 
Social Media Sharing: 
Vertical Hold        
  Gear type (Fly) -.523 -3.55 <.001  .593 .444 .791 
  Exposure affect -.425 -6.82 <.001  .654 .578 .738 
  Documentation importance .111 2.77 .006  1.118 1.033 1.210 
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  Relative Awareness -.204 -3.81 <.001  .815 .733 .905 
  Age -.017 -3.88 <.001   .983 .975 .992 
Note. Gear type is coded as 0=conventional tackle; 1=fly fishing. 
      
Perceived Norm Estimation for Handling and Sharing Practices 
 Mean scores for perceived norm estimation for handling and social media sharing 
practices are reported in Table 13 alongside the actual percentage of personal agreement 
for the study sample. Both overestimation and underestimation of actual agreement is 
evident for several variables. For handling practices, respondents slightly underestimated 
the level of agreement with the partially submerged and underwater holding positions and 
overestimated the perceived norm relative to the horizontal holding position. A more 
significant discrepancy is observed for handling fish vertically above the water, where 
respondents largely overestimated other anglers’ level of agreement compared to what 
the actual sample agreed with (by upwards of 36%). Almost identical trends emerged 
with respect to social media sharing practices.  
Table 13. Percent sample agreement and norm estimation for each holding position for 
handling and social media sharing practices 
  Handling or Image Type 
 
Partially 
Submerged 
 
Horizontal 
Hold 
 
Vertical 
Hold 
 
Under-
water Hold 
 Handling practice        
  % Sample Personal Agreement 96.58%  68.19%  23.31%  98.65% 
  Mean Perceived Norm Estimate  87.31%  75.54%  59.69%  90.63% 
Sharing on social media             
  % Sample Personal Agreement 94.22%  72.43%  37.69%  96.86% 
  Mean Perceived Norm Estimate 88.06%   78.92%   65.52%   90.80% 
Note. ‘Percent sample personal agreement’ is calculated based on the percent of sample who 
agreed with the appropriateness of each handling and sharing practice. 
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Perceived Norm Estimation and Personal Agreement 
 The relationship between personal agreement and perceived norm estimations was 
examined in further detail. First, we explored whether perceived norm estimations 
differed depending on participants’ own agreement with the handling and social media 
sharing practice for the horizontal and vertical holds. A series of Welch’s t-test indicated 
significant differences between anglers who agreed versus disagreed with each handling 
and social media sharing practice. Those who personally agreed with handling fish in the 
horizontal and vertical holding positions estimated that significantly more others agreed 
with the practices than those who personally disagreed with it t(657.77) = 13.135, p 
<.001, d = .85 and t(707.7) = 14.677, p <.001, d = .80, respectively. Similarly, those who 
personally agreed that sharing images depicting a horizontal and vertical hold on social 
media overestimated the number of anglers who agreed with their practice compared to 
those who disagreed t(518.96) = 11.357, p <.001, d = .81 and t(1325.2) = 14.499, p 
<.001, d = .75, respectively. Figure 11 provides a visual representation of these trends. 
Additionally, a series of ordinary least squares regressions were conducted to examine 
whether and how personal agreement and perceptions of prevalence predicted 
participants norm estimation for handling and social media sharing practices relative to 
the horizontal and vertical hold positions. Results suggest that when controlling for 
personal agreement, perceptions of prevalence positively predicted participants’ 
perceived norm estimations for handling and social media sharing practice (see Table 
14).  
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Figure 11. Mean perceived norm estimate grouped by personal agreement (e.g., agree 
versus disagree) for handling practices (left-hand panel) and social media sharing 
practices (right-hand panel). The horizontal lines represent the actual percentage of 
participants in the sample who agree with the handling or sharing practice for each 
holding position, respectively.  
 
Table 14. Predicting perceived norm estimation for horizontal and vertical holds 
  β  t p-value R2adjusted 
Handling: Horizontal Hold     
  Personal agreement 13.287 13.00 <.001 .18 
  Perceived prevalence 3.044 8.94 <.001  
Handling: Vertical Hold     
  Personal agreement 16.224 11.45 <.001 .13 
  Perceived prevalence 2.345 6.95 <.001  
Social Media Sharing:  
Horizontal Hold 
 
   
  Personal agreement 14.390 12.60 <.001 .15 
  Perceived prevalence 3.142 7.79 <.001  
Social Media Sharing:  
Vertical Hold 
 
   
  Personal agreement 17.100 12.59 <.001 .14 
  Perceived prevalence 2.722 6.73 <.001   
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Predicting Sanctioning Intent 
 Drawing on previous work (e.g., Chapman et al., 2017; Guckian et al., 2018), I 
further examined the replicability of relevant factors in predicting sanctioning intentions. 
Descriptive statistics for sanctioning intent as well as relevant predictors (e.g., relative 
concern, angler impact, perceived responsibility) can be viewed in Table 10 and 
correlations are presented in Table 15. Since age did not correlate with sanctioning intent, 
it was not included in model. The overall model predicting sanctioning intent was 
significant, F(5, 1380) = 173.0, p <.001, R2adjusted = 0.38. Relative concern (β = .124, p = 
.001, lmg = .015), perceived responsibility (β = .657, p < .001, lmg = .329), and activist 
identity (β = .044, p = .039, lmg = .026) all positively predicted sanctioning intent, while 
angler impact (β = .050, p = .171, lmg = .008) and relative awareness (β = .025, p = .466, 
lmg = .007) had small, positive coefficients. 
Table 15. Correlations between relevant predictors and sanctioning intent 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Relative concern (1) 1       
Angler impact (2) .17*** 1      
Responsibility (3) .15*** .16*** 1     
Age (4) -.01 .04 -.04 1    
Relative awareness (5) .41*** .17*** .15*** .05* 1   
Activist (6) .24*** .10*** .29*** -.12*** .17*** 1  
Sanctioning intent (7) .18*** .14*** .61*** .00 .15*** .24*** 1 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Discussion 
 
Encouraging the adoption of scientifically-validated capture and handling 
practices will be challenging, particularly in a recreational context where compliance can 
be difficult (e.g., Arias & Sutton, 2013). One mechanism that can support anglers’ 
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voluntary cooperation with C&R best practices is the presence of strong, salient social 
norms that facilitate situation-appropriate behavior (e.g., Mackay et al., 2019). However, 
limited research has examined prevailing social norms in the context of C&R recreational 
fishing and, furthermore, if there is convergence or divergence with respect to anglers’ 
beliefs about whether and how a fish should be held and exposed to air post-catch. In this 
study, we sought to address this gap and explore anglers’ personal and normative beliefs 
relative to the perceived appropriateness of various handling and social media sharing 
practices that differentially depicted fish being handled and exposed to air post-catch.  
Overall, findings reveal that the vast majority of anglers agreed with the practices 
of handling fish either partially submerged or underwater, whereas slightly greater 
variation was observed for the horizontal hold position (68% agreement). Of particular 
interest, the majority of participants reported disagreeing with the vertical hold position, 
suggesting that handling (and sharing images of) fish in this position is widely recognized 
as an inappropriate practice. These findings are mostly promising, especially since 
anglers’ personal beliefs generally align with the best practice of limiting (or eliminating) 
air exposure post-catch (Brownscombe et al., 2017). However, results also indicated 
evidence that participants inaccurately overestimated and underestimated levels of 
agreement for handling and social media sharing practices among the angling community 
(i.e., normative estimation). Minor discrepancies (underestimations) emerged between 
personal agreement and normative estimations with respect to the partially submerged 
and underwater holds (handling and sharing practices), with participants estimating that 
the majority of other anglers support the practices. Greater variation emerged with 
respect to anglers’ personal agreement with the horizontal hold position. Those who 
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agreed with handling and sharing images of fish held in this position, overestimated the 
level of support among others.  
Collectively, these findings reveal that anglers tend to inaccurately impute others’ 
beliefs. This suggests that prevailing norms may be a point of confusion or relatively 
unknown within the angling community (see also Mackay et al., 2019). Perhaps most 
critically, evidence of pluralistic ignorance was apparent among participants who 
disagreed with the vertical hold position. For instance, despite holding the majority 
opinion (~76% of sample disagreed with vertical hold as a handling practice), these 
participants vastly overestimated the level of support among other anglers (average norm 
estimation of 60%). Although the present work did not examine the behavioral 
implications of pluralistic ignorance or false consensus effects, evidence of pluralistic 
ignorance contributing to counter-attitudinal and consequential behavior has been well-
documented elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Prentice & Miller, 1996). In the context of 
C&R angling, individuals may feel justified in their decision to handle a fish vertically or 
post a similar image to social media, provided that they perceive that the majority of 
other anglers condone the practice. While further work is needed to assess these 
dynamics in greater detail and whether misperceiving social norms can impact anglers’ 
engagement with scientifically-validated best practices, these findings highlight the need 
for conservation managers and practitioners to correct existing social misperceptions. 
Because of their widespread popularity among the public, social media platforms 
(e.g., Facebook, Instagram) and the images shared on them hold the potential to convey 
important normative information (Litt & Stock, 2011; Fournier et al., 2013). However, 
the current proliferation of images with fish exposed to air may act as a barrier rather than 
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a conduit to change. The results of the study raise additional concerns about the 
alignment of descriptive and injunctive norms with respect to both handling and social 
media sharing practices. Images (and handling practices) depicting partially submerged 
and underwater fish were widely endorsed as appropriate by the majority of participants, 
but at the same time these images (and handling practices) were among the least common 
in terms of perceived prevalence, particularly among conventional tackle users. Previous 
work has shown that when injunctive norms are ambiguous, salient descriptive norms can 
direct consequential behavior (Schultz et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2012). Thus, this 
conflicting information may create further uncertainty surrounding the injunctive norm 
and, perhaps, result in a common social-psychological problem: not engaging in a 
particular action because no one else is perceived as doing so (Cialdini, 2009). Indeed, 
the normative—descriptive—status of C&R angling practices and images displayed on 
social media could potentially undermine individuals’ engagement with C&R best 
practices (Cialdini et al, 1990). Thus, the work of organizations like Keepemwet Fishing 
(Danylchuk et al., 2019), which are seeking to transition the norms that govern online 
disclosure and the types of images promoted on social media, may be critical in shifting 
the preponderance of images (and handling practices) from those that conflict with 
scientifically-validated best practices to those that align with the science.  
It is also worth re-emphasizing the relationship between individuals’ personal 
beliefs and their beliefs about the level of agreement among other anglers. Regression 
analyses revealed that individuals’ personal beliefs predicted their normative estimations, 
suggesting that individuals are prone to assume that others mutually share their beliefs. 
After controlling for personal beliefs, results revealed that the more anglers perceived a 
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practice to be prevalent (i.e., perceived descriptive norm), the higher their norm 
estimation (i.e., perceived injunctive norm). It should be noted that we cannot claim 
causality relative to what drives anglers’ own opinion nor between one’s own opinion 
and perceptions of the beliefs of others. While we suggest that individuals’ own 
agreement with a handling or social media sharing practice predicts their norm 
estimations, research on social influence would suggest that beliefs about others (i.e., 
norm estimations) could influence individuals’ personal beliefs (Cialdini, 2009). It is 
more than likely that these factors mutually influence one another.  
 Findings also revealed several meaningful differences between the two 
subpopulations of interest, both in terms of personal agreement with handling and social 
media sharing practices as well as with respect to perceptions of prevalence. Fly fishing 
anglers were more likely to agree with practices that kept fish at least partially submerged 
in water compared to conventional tackle users, whereas as conventional tackle users 
were more likely to agree with practices that removed fish from water (e.g., vertical 
hold). Although it is unclear what is driving these differences, one possibility is that 
anglers within these communities operate under a different set of assumed norms 
according to their reference group. For instance, our results also revealed that fly fishing 
anglers reported significantly greater interaction with social media images (and handling 
practices) depicting fish either partially submerged or fully submerged in water compared 
to conventional tacklers.  Collectively, these findings suggest, if only preliminarily, that 
when promoting engagement with scientifically-validated capture and handling practices, 
practitioners and conservation managers must be mindful of differences among angling 
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segments and how social expectations may shift within these disparate reference groups 
(Hogg & Reid, 2006). 
 Finally, the results build upon and partly replicate findings from Chapman et al. 
(2018) and Guckian et al. (2018). Anglers with greater expressed concern relative to 
others were more likely to sanction others’ inappropriate capture and handling practices, 
which has previously been shown in both of the aforementioned research to drive 
engagement. Additionally, greater perceived responsibility to sanction and identification 
as an activist positively predicted individuals’ willingness to impose sanctions on others 
non-compliant angling practices. Collectively, this work highlights the capacity of 
anglers to indirectly impact ecological outcomes by implicitly and explicitly signaling 
normative information to others, either by sanctioning their peers or else, by projecting 
their experiences and practices to others (e.g., on social media). However, more research 
is needed to understand how and whether anglers can meaningfully and significantly 
impact the attitudes and behaviors of their peers through their intentional social 
interactions. Enhancing our understanding of these social processes may be critical for 
recreational contexts that rely extensively on voluntary compliance and behavior.  
Limitations and Future directions 
      
There are a number of important limitations to the current work. Perhaps most 
importantly, our study and subsequent findings are limited to our sample. The present 
research consisted of a single, cross-sectional correlational design, which relied 
extensively on angling-related social media platforms to recruit participants. Thus, 
demographics of our sample may vary from typical recreational and not fully represent 
the subpopulations (e.g., fly fishing vs. conventional tackle) of interest. However, our 
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large sample trends in favor of demographics shown to be characteristic of the angling 
population (88% male, Mage = 44 yrs), who are often older and male (Arlinghaus, 2006a; 
U.S. DOI, 2016). While we extend caution in our ability to generalize findings to the 
broader (North American) C&R angling community, we believe our findings offer an 
important contribution toward understanding how social norms are perceived in relation 
to common handling and social media sharing practices among a large subset of the 
angling community. 
On a related note, the study also relied on self-report measures and thus similar 
limitations emerge relative to assessing anglers’ intentions to sanction others and whether 
such communicative acts will materialize in the real-world. Another significant limitation 
of the study concerns the images used to depict the handling practices and social media 
images of interest. Specifically, the images did not control for extraneous variables, such 
as angler characteristics, species type, and fishing location. Although text was provided 
alongside the images to provide clarity and increase the salience of the handling practice 
depicted, these random effects (e.g., angler characteristics, species type) could have 
manifested to influence participants’ reactions. Thus, future work examining anglers’ 
reactions to or the impacts of visual imagery should control for these factors when able. 
 The present findings raise a number of important questions to be addressed by 
future research. Provided the way individuals publicly project their experiences may be 
critical in signaling normative information to others (e.g., Litt & Stock, 2011; Fournier et 
al., 2013), research is needed to examine whether and how repeated exposure to different 
types of C&R-related imagery (or handling practices) impacts anglers’ attitudes towards 
and intentions to adopt scientifically-validated best practices. In the present research we 
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showed how different handling practices were perceived as more common than others, 
future work is needed to understand whether and how anglers’ attitudes and behaviors are 
susceptible to descriptive norm information conveyed on social media or alongside the 
riverbank, (e.g., Litt & Stock, 2011).  
 Future work should examine how best to communicate normative information to 
anglers. For instance, correcting normative misperceptions or communicating about 
dynamic norms (Mortensen et al., 2019; Sparkman & Walton, 2017) are two potential 
intervention-oriented approaches that hold considerable promise in enhancing anglers’ 
engagement with scientifically-validated best practices. Research in other topical areas, 
including alcohol consumption among college students, has shown how providing correct 
normative information (e.g., the actual distribution of opinion on a topic) can lead to 
changes in behavior (Schroeder and Prentice, 1998). As detailed in the present study, 
both overestimation and underestimation effects were evident across all types of handling 
practices and social media images. Most critical, however, was the large discrepancy 
observed between the actual percentage of anglers in the sample who disagreed with the 
vertical hold and the average norm estimation for the practice. Thus, future work should 
explore whether correcting for normative misperceptions has the potential to reduce the 
occurrence of this handling practice among anglers. In addition to examining the impact 
of correcting for normative misperceptions, it may be fruitful to explore the impact of 
dynamic norms. While past research has focused on the communication of static norms, 
nascent research has demonstrated how dynamic norms—information about how 
behavior is changing over time—can motivate desired change despite prevailing static 
norms (e.g., Mortenson et al., 2019; Sparkman & Walton, 2017). The communication of 
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dynamic norms could be particularly important in the C&R angling context where 
scientifically-validated best practices as well as advances in technology (e.g., underwater 
photography) have created a need for and the ability to change the norms that govern 
both C&R handling practices and social media engagement. 
 Another important area that is ripe for future work is to examine the relationship 
between pluralistic ignorance and self-silencing effects (Noelle-Neumann, 1974; Rios & 
Chen, 2014). Prior work in related domains has shown how individuals self-silence when 
they inaccurately perceive that the majority of others agree with a practice (or belief) that 
they themselves personally disagree with (e.g., Geiger & Swim, 2016). For instance, if 
anglers misperceive that their opinion is not mutually endorsed by the majority of other 
anglers, are they less willing to speak out against perceived transgressions? Although this 
situation arose in the present study concerning the vertical hold position, the way 
sanctioning intent was measured did not permit us to explore this relationship in future 
detail. That is, sanctioning intent was measured based on anglers’ reactions to a 
generalized transgression rather than designed to confront a corresponding handling 
practice (e.g., vertical hold). Thus, future work should create sanctioning and normative 
perception measures that align with a specific practice in order to capture whether and 
how self-silencing effects materialize. 
Conclusion 
 
The widespread adoption of scientifically-validated C&R best practices will, in 
part, rely on anglers and angling-related companies promoting these practices by 
conveying strong social norm messages about what is socially approved of and 
commonly practiced among the angling community. Here, we highlighted not only the 
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importance of anglers’ personal beliefs towards different handling practices, but also 
showed how individuals overestimated and underestimated the level of agreement among 
other anglers. Such normative perceptions may play an important role in determining 
whether and how anglers approach scientifically-validated capture and handling practices 
as well as whether and how they share their post-catch experiences to others on social 
media. The findings presented here suggest that anglers are sensitive to different types of 
handling practices and largely favor some practices over others, including those where 
fish remain at least partially submerged in water. Although this research presents 
preliminary results on anglers’ personal and normative perceptions towards C&R 
handling and social media sharing practices, this work has broad implications for C&R 
angling from correcting existing social misperceptions to spreading critical context-
dependent conservation management information and practices.  
Bridge to Chapter V 
 
 Across three empirical chapters, I examined multiple drivers of interpersonal 
communication in two different contexts as well as explored anglers’ normative 
(mis)perceptions with respect to handling and social media sharing practices. Chapter IV 
presented results showing how recreational anglers misperceive prevailing social norms 
with respect to handling and social media sharing practices, and also revealed differences 
between relevant subpopulations of the angling community. Among other important 
findings, results showed that despite the majority of anglers in the survey personally 
disagreeing with holding fish vertically post-catch, they simultaneously misperceived that 
the majority of other anglers are ok with the practice. 
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 Although each empirical chapter presents a distinct aspect of interpersonal 
communication, this work begins to paint a picture of what factors influence individuals’ 
willingness to communicate with others and furthermore, the norms surrounding whether 
and how people should communicate their experiences to others on social media. In the 
final chapter, Chapter V, I summarize the body of literature highlighting the potential of 
interpersonal communication to drive socially and environmentally beneficial outcomes. 
In part, I detail an organizational framework, which considers the normative nature of 
information exchanged during a communicative act and how such exchanges may result 
in change or increase the salience of an issue. Anticipated outcomes and drivers of 
interpersonal communication are discussed, with a particular emphasis on understanding 
the behavioral and situational contexts where interpersonal communication may be well-
situated to drive change.  
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CHAPTER V 
COMMUNICATING FOR CONSERVATION:  
INTERPRESONAL COMMUNICATION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
 
Introduction 
Many of the pressing ecological challenges facing society—climate change, 
resource management, and species decline—can be characterized as paradigmatic 
collective action problems (Ostrom, 2010). Amidst these situations, the provision and 
maintenance of collective goods and resources is contingent on the majority of people 
consistently acting in ways that benefit collective rather than individual interests (Van 
Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). Indeed, the variation in which individuals 
are willing to accept, adopt, and engage in collective-benefitting actions and refrain from 
those that satisfy immediate self-interests presents significant challenges to maximizing 
long-term natural resource abundancy and the accumulation of public goods (e.g., 
community resilience; Adger, 2003; Tompkins & Adger, 2004; Ostrom, 2010).  
Natural resource systems, including forests, watersheds, and fisheries, are often 
collectively managed and/or subject to use by many stakeholders, representing disparate 
interests, values, and motivations (Pretty, 2003). Given the interconnectedness of these 
systems, behaviors that are central to overcoming collective action challenges effectively 
necessitate universal coordination and cooperation. Actions taken by individuals produce 
negligible collective benefits unless they are performed by the majority of individuals 
(Dawes, 1980; Van Lange & Joireman, 2008). For instance, one individual’s decision to 
engage in a collective-benefitting action, such as removing woody debris and 
undergrowth from their property, not only increases their own resilience to wildfire, but 
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can also significantly and meaningfully increase others’ resilience as well (e.g., 
neighboring property owners).  
The idea that collective action problems can only be solved with coercive top-
down institutions, such as laws and regulations, has long been debunked (Ostrom, 2010; 
2014). Management policies intended to mitigate environmental transgressions and/or 
promote socially-desirable behaviors often fail to provide individuals with the incentive 
to act alone. Increasingly recognized, however, is the fact that individuals can produce 
positive collective outcomes through the provision and maintenance of informal 
institutions—social norms—that promote widespread cooperation, by restraining more 
egoistic impulses to defect (Biel, Von Borgstede, Dahlstrand, 1999; Kerr, 1995; Ostrom, 
2014). This process of social change and engagement is guided by socially transmitted 
norms and beliefs about what sorts of behaviors are accepted and endorsed by the 
majority and those which are not (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). The role of social norms is 
particularly powerful when counter-normative behavior results in negative externalities 
for others (Kerr, 1995), a central feature of collective action problems. Because the 
effectiveness of collective action is dependent upon large numbers of people engaging in 
coordinated action, people should—out of their own self-interest—be motivated to 
encourage widespread cooperation among their peers. However, it is important to note 
that such peer encouragement may take place whether the communicator or influencer 
chooses to cooperate or not. That is, an individual can encourage someone to cooperate 
while simultaneously choosing to defect (or freeride off the efforts of others). 
Although social influence approaches represent powerful mechanisms through 
which to manage collective action problems and achieve more collectively desirable 
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outcomes (Abrahamse & Steg, 2013), important questions remain about how and whether 
individuals will actively encourage one another to pursue collective-benefitting 
endeavors. Direct and indirect research suggests that social talk or interpersonal 
communication between relevant stakeholders has important implications on collective 
action and voluntary compliance (Dawes, 1980; Shank et al., 2018). Forms of peer-to-
peer communication have been shown to foster situation-appropriate norms (Balliet, 
2009; Kerr, 1995; Ostrom, 2014; Sally, 1995), amplify perceptions of risk (Binder et al., 
2011; Kasperson et al., 1988), and support the rapid diffusion of technology (e.g., word-
of-mouth, Berger, 2014b). Thus, it is important to consider the social and collective 
capital that individuals represent not only as core contributors of collective action, but 
also as civic actors in the process of information dissemination and social influence. Yet, 
interventions addressing collective action problems have largely failed to consider the 
social pressure individuals can apply—through their intentional conversations—to spread 
context-dependent information and enforce community norms and shared values. 
In recognition of the above, this chapter highlights and summarizes the role of 
interpersonal communication as an underappreciated mechanism for fostering widespread 
collective action. Specifically, I appeal to direct and indirect evidence in support of 
interpersonal communication in the formation of situation-appropriate norms and 
explicate the potential fit of interpersonal communication as a practical intervention in 
promoting environmental collective action. As an organizational framework, I 
characterize the nature of informational exchanges likely to occur between individuals 
and the anticipated implications of such engagement. Finally, I suggest pathways for 
resource managers and others to pursue in scaffolding interpersonal interactions among 
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relevant stakeholders, while bringing attention to contextual and individual-level factors 
that can impact the likelihood of engagement as well as the efficacy of such interactions. 
Social Networks 
 A discussion concerning the communication and influence of social norms would 
be incomplete without recognizing the levels of the social system (e.g., social networks, 
entire society) at which they operate. Social norms emerge and derive meaning from 
interactions shared by members of a group, community, or entire society (Lapinski & 
Rimal, 2005). Thus, social norms function at different scales and vary depending on the 
relational make-up of the social network (Bodin & Crona, 2009; Lapinski & Rimal, 
2005). Within the environmental domain, social networks (and social network analysis) 
have garnered increasing attention among researchers (e.g., Adger, 2003; Bodin & Crona, 
2009; Bodin, Crona, & Ernstson, 2006; Tompkins & Adger, 2004). This is partly driven 
by the normative notion that informal governance structures (e.g., co-management) are 
needed to address contemporary natural resource problems, particularly when top-down 
policies and formal governance systems are failing or entirely absent (Adger, 2003; 
Ostrom, 2014). Social networks (and the norms embedded within them) have been 
identified as common and integral features in research focused on understanding the 
likelihood of collective action and effective natural resource management (Folke, Hahn, 
Olsson, & Norberg, 2005; Olsson, Folke, Berkes, 2004; Olsson, Folke, & Hughes, 2008; 
Pretty & Ward, 2001).  
 Defined as meaningful relations and interactions between actors, social networks 
serve as primary channels for the generation, acquisition, and diffusion of information 
(Bodin & Prell, 2011; Burt, 2009; Rogers, 2010). The fundamental component of a social 
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network is an actor, for example, a landowner who is considering whether to designate 
part of their property as a conservation easement or a government official involved in 
monitoring recreational fisheries. Links or ties between actors create patterns of 
connections and relations, which can have a significant impact on societal and ecological 
outcomes (Bodin & Crona, 2009). Social networks provide a useful conceptual and 
analytical framework for discerning the structural characteristics of a social system, 
including how patterns of relations between various actors enhance or inhibit the 
distribution of information through and between bounded communities (Bodin et al., 
2006; Bodin & Crona, 2009).  
 It is important to note that social networks are characteristically different in terms 
of their structure, density of relations, degree of cohesiveness, and interconnectivity, 
which can affect key social processes, including the degree to which information and 
behaviors spread (Bodin et al., 2006; Bodin & Crona, 2009, Prell, Hubacek, & Reed, 
2009). In terms of environmental collective action, several studies suggest that collective 
action is enhanced by higher network density or greater social ties among actors (e.g., 
Diani & McAdam, 2003; Harn, Olsson, Folke, & Johansson, 2006; Pretty & Ward, 2001). 
Thus, forging and supporting connections among actors, especially between disparate 
actors (e.g., individuals, community groups, government officials, etc.) can increase the 
possibility for communication and ultimately, joint action (Bodin & Crona, 2009). For 
instance, information on sustainable management practices and emerging technologies 
for agriculture has been shown to flow through informal social ties (e.g., Conley & Udry, 
2001; Isaac, Erickson, Quashie-Sam, & Timmer, 2007). While strong, abundant social 
ties facilitate the diffusion of information, excessively high network density can result in 
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homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Homophily arises when 
interactions between similar individuals—as a function of race, ethnicity, gender, age, 
educational attainment, etc.—occur at a higher frequency than among dissimilar people 
(McPherson et al., 2001). While similar or like-minded individuals may be better able 
and willing to communicate with one another, excessively dense networks can result in 
the homogenization of information and knowledge, limiting the introduction and 
circulation of new information and ideas (Barnes, Lynham, Kalberg, & Leung, 2016; 
Friedkin, 2006; McPherson et al., 2001). This is particularly problematic in the context of 
environmental collective action, as successful resource management depends on the 
integration of ideas from and collaboration of diverse stakeholders (Barnes et al., 2016; 
Bodin & Crona, 2009; Crona & Bodin, 2006).  
 Social networks provide distribution pathways that enable actors to diffuse 
information, collaborate, and coordinate for environmental collective action (Bodin et al., 
2005). Just as density and strength of ties between actors can impact outcomes, the 
position of actors within a network can differentially influence the extent information 
circulates through a system (Crona & Bodin, 2006; Prell et al., 2009). Thus, the 
identification and activation of highly connected and well-positioned actors is critical in 
successfully leveraging the power and interconnectedness of an established social 
network (Bodin et al., 2006; Crona & Bodin, 2006). Collectively, research on social 
networks suggests that supporting the development and maintenance of communication 
channels between relevant actors can enhance the propensity for joint action and other 
kinds of ecologically meaningful collaboration (Bodin & Crona, 2009). Although an 
entire chapter can be dedicated to the structural components and consequences of social 
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networks, here, I focus on the type of information actors may share, how norms are 
communicated, and how aspects of the communication process may manifest to influence 
whether and how information is relayed, attended to, and received.  
Interpersonal Communication: An Organizational Framework 
Although considerable variability exists relative to the definition of interpersonal 
communication, many characterize it as the mutual exchange of messages between 
individuals (Cappella, 1987; Burleson, 2010). The interdisciplinary origins of 
interpersonal communication emerged from work primarily concerned with the role that 
it plays in the exercise of social influence (Berger, 2014a), such as Lewin’s (1974) 
seminal work examining the effect of group discussions on individuals’ uptake of 
unattractive consumptive behaviors. Subsequent research across myriad domains has 
continued to examine how interpersonal communication factors into producing 
persuasive outcomes and the achievement of broad individual and societal goals, such as 
generating shared meanings about engagement (Berger, 2014). With respect to promoting 
collective action, interpersonal communication may amplify aspects of issue engagement 
by fostering situation-appropriate social norms (Kerr, 1995; Ostrom, 2014), strengthening 
and converging perceptions of shared risks (Binder et al., 2011; Kasperson et al., 1988), 
fostering solutions toward social change (Mulgan, 2006), and encouraging the diffusion 
of relevant technologies (Berger, 2014b). 
The effects of interpersonal communication vary widely in terms of the type of 
information exchanged between individuals. Ranging from everyday conversations about 
a topic to more valanced discussions about what should or ought to be, conversations can 
differentially influence behavioral and/or attitudinal outcomes. Thus, for the purpose of 
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this organizational framework, the primary focus will be on the type of information 
exchanged between individuals. Drawing on principles of social influence and social 
norms, understanding the types of information exchanged between individuals sheds light 
on how and under what conditions such interactions may materialize to influence 
collective action outcomes. Regardless of the information being traded between 
communicating partners, forms of interpersonal communication share common 
characteristics that can be classified along two different dimensions: (1) injunctive norm 
salience and (2) degree of transformation.  
The first dimension considers the degree to which the injunctive norm is made 
salient (i.e., low versus high). That is, this dimension considers whether or not 
information is conveyed about what is considered socially approved or disapproved of 
behavior (or beliefs; Cialdini, 2009). I focus here on injunctive norm salience for two 
reasons: (1) injunctive norms influence intentions and behavior across a wide range of 
social contexts (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004) and (2) injunctive norm information must be 
conveyed through language-based communication rather than observed (Lapinski & 
Rimal, 2005). Each collective action problem differs in terms of the level of uncertainty 
that may exist relative to what should or ought to be done in a given situation. Situations 
that are masked by uncertainty tend to undermine peoples collective action tendencies 
(e.g., Barrett & Dannenberg, 2012; Gustafsson, Biel, & Garling, 1999; Milinski, 
Semmann, Krambeck, & Marotzke, 2006). This can be particularly problematic when 
people lack information with respect to what relevant others’ expectations are about the 
appropriateness or inappropriateness of a particular behavior (Cialdini et al., 1990). Since 
individuals do not have a direct window to others’ minds, the type of information 
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exchanged during an interpersonal interaction may fill an important gap in peoples’ 
understanding of what is regarded as socially (in)appropriate behavior in these contexts 
(Lapinski & Rimal, 2005).  
The second dimension considers the anticipated degree of transformation. That is, 
the degree to which a communicative act will encourage the uptake of a target behavior 
or belief (e.g., low versus high). High transformative communication acts provide 
information that is more likely to result in a change in another person’s behavior and/or 
beliefs, either by articulating an injunctive norm or by providing information about how 
to perform a particular behavior. This type of information can be critical in shifting 
others’ actions in the direction of a desired, collective-benefitting behavior. 
Comparatively, interactions that are considered ‘low’ transformative acts reveal relatively 
neutral, non-persuasive information about a topic or serve to reinforce the occurrence of a 
desirable behavior. These exchanges (i.e., ‘low’) are not incapable of producing change, 
considering any form of interpersonal communication is likely to exert a greater degree 
of influence on individuals’ attitudes and behaviors compared to traditional, top-down 
communication (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 2017; Nisbet & Kotcher, 2009).  
 As seen in Table 16, the two dimensions combine to result in a number of types of 
informational exchanges that are likely to occur during an interpersonal conversation. As 
part of the following discussion, I highlight characteristics of these exchanges and 
expound on the anticipated implications various informational exchanges may present. It 
is also important to note that these types of information exchanges are not mutually 
exclusive during a single conversation. In fact, it is more than likely that individuals’ 
conversations will intersect and touch upon the many types of information presented 
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here. Additionally, this typology presents a rudimentary and necessarily incomplete 
universe of the types of information that can be relayed during a discussion. Thus, this 
should not be considered as a comprehensive guide, but rather just one way to conceive 
the nature of information exchanges that can exist during an interpersonal conversation.  
 
Table 16. An organizational framework delineating the nature of information exchanged 
during interpersonal conversation. Types of informational exchanges are characterized 
across two dimensions: injunctive norm salience (low vs. high) and nature of 
transformation (low vs. high) 
 
Low Injunctive Norm Exchanges 
 Low injunctive norm exchanges are those that appear on the left-hand column of 
Table 16. These types of exchanges reveal relatively neutral, topical—often factual—
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information about a particular subject, behavior, or state of being, with limited to no 
information conveyed about the injunctive norm.  
Declarative 
Declarative exchanges convey factual information or knowledge, including 
information about an issue, state of being, or behavior (Hines, Hungerford, & Tomera, 
1987). Declarative awareness is identified as the knowledge of fact, representing 
concepts, states of being, ideas, and theories (Hines et al., 1987; Kaiser & Fuhrer, 2003). 
In the present context, declarative information can involve a number of aspects related to 
the collective action problem, including how it works, who or what is at risk, what the 
projected impacts are, and/or what individuals can do about it. For instance, how climate 
change affects the frequency and intensity of natural disasters (e.g., wildfires, hurricanes, 
spread of invasive pests) is a declarative piece of information (IPCC, 2014), whereas 
information about how to maintain wildfire fuel breaks on one’s property is not. 
According to the diffusion of innovation theory, social networks play an important role in 
in the dissemination and acquisition of new information (Rogers, 2010), which can 
include spreading critical context-dependent information about the state of a natural 
resource and/or the actions needed to sustain it. The extent to which information spreads 
through a social network depends on the number and strength of social ties (Granovetter, 
1973). Declarative information may also play an important role in enhancing perceptions 
of response efficacy, by shedding light on how a target behavior can result in a desired 
outcome (Ajzen, 2002; Lam, 2006; Steg & De Groot, 2010).  
Although extant literature reveals that knowledge alone is insufficient in 
motivating changes in behavior (Bamberg & Möser, 2007; Kollmuss and Agyeman, 
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2002), information exchanged between individuals may hold considerably more weight 
given the social processes and meanings attached to it (Abrahamse & Steg, 2013; Lewin, 
1947; Nisbet & Kotcher, 2009). Compared to mass media effects, topical—declarative—
discussions between individuals can amplify perceptions of risk and generate shared risk 
perceptions of environmental threats, by eliciting stronger feelings of personal relevance 
(Binder et al., 2012; Kasperson et al., 1988; Morton and Duck, 2001). For instance, in a 
correlational study, Morton and Duck (2001) found that students who indicated having 
discussed the topic of skin cancer with others were more likely to believe that they 
themselves were at personal risk for it.  
In addition to spreading and increasing the salience of critical conservation 
information, declarative exchanges can also assist in the rapid diffusion of relevant 
technologies (e.g., word-of-mouth; Berger, 2014b; Roger, 2010). Declarative information 
may be particularly important in the adoption of technologies that are not readily 
observable by others, and thus can’t rely on descriptive cues to evoke a social contagion 
effect (e.g., solar panel adoption, Graziano & Gillingham, 2014). But, like most 
interpersonal interactions, which will be discussed in further detail latter on in this 
chapter, whether declarative information is received and acted upon is dependent on a 
number of factors, including people’s prior beliefs about an issue (Binder et al., 2012). 
Although people can develop descriptive norm perceptions based on the prevalence of 
individuals conversing about a topic, declarative information reveals little to no 
information about the injunctive norm. Taken together, declarative information 
exchanges are considered ‘low’ transformative acts, because increases in awareness do 
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not typically translate to changes in behavior (Bamberg & Möser, 2007; Kollmus & 
Agyeman, 2002), perhaps particularly in the context of collective action problems.  
Descriptive 
Descriptive exchanges communicate information about what others do or believe 
relative to a particular behavior or issue (Cialdini et al., 1990). Akin to descriptive norms, 
this entails information about the number of people (pertaining to a specific referent 
group) who have or have not engaged in a particular act or whom endorse a certain belief 
(e.g., support community resilience measures). Although descriptive information can be 
inferred based on observing others’ actions (or inactions), such information can also be 
conveyed through verbal and non-verbal communication (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990; 
Cialdini, 2009; Goldstein et al., 2008). Descriptive information is considered a high 
transformative act because the presence of salient descriptive norms can trigger the 
uptake of a desired behavior (Cialdini et al., 1990; Schultz et al., 2008). Much research 
has found that the provision of descriptive norm messages (i.e., made salient in written 
form) can mobilize cooperative behavior by highlighting what relevant others do, 
including encouraging towel reuse in hotels (Goldstein et al., 2008), soliciting blood 
donations (Reingen, 1982), and increasing voter turnout (Gerber, Green, & Larimer, 
2008; Panagopoulos, Larimer, & Condon, 2013). One example of a descriptive 
informational exchange is telling a non-compliant neighboring landowner that the rest of 
the neighborhood has taken actions on their property to increase their resilience to an 
environmental risk. By way of conformity and/or for fear of social ramifications, such 
descriptive cues can instill motivation in the non-compliant neighbor to adopt a similar 
course of action as the rest of their neighbors.  
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Although descriptive information can be a powerful motivator, conversations that 
present descriptive information alone or in conflict with injunctive information can 
produce unintended effects (Schultz et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2012). For instance, 
conversations that emphasize the prevalence of an undesirable behavior can be 
counterproductive in achieving desired change, provided people are prone to follow the 
majority (Cialdini, 2009). Additionally, in the complete absence of or presence of weak 
injunctive information about the (in)appropriateness of a given act, individuals can 
problematically regress to the mean or freeride off the efforts of others (Schultz et al., 
2007; Smith et al., 2012). For instance, field work by Schultz et al. (2007) demonstrated 
that while providing descriptive information about neighbors’ household energy 
consumption motivated above average energy consumers to reduce their consumption to 
the observed mean, below average energy consumers subsequently increased their 
consumption rates. However, when coupled with injunctive information about the 
appropriateness of a given action, descriptive information can limit unintended backfire 
effects (Schultz et al., 2007). In sum, descriptive information can play an important role 
in the formation and maintenance of perceived social norms and the uptake of a desired 
behavior, particularly when norms are associated with a revered and/or relatable 
reference group (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005; Rimal & Real, 2003). 
Procedural  
Procedural exchanges convey information about how to perform a specific 
behavior or action (Kaiser & Fuhrer, 2003). One of the many significant determinants of 
human behavior and decision-making concerns people’s perceptions about their capacity 
to engage in a particular act (e.g., ‘perceived efficacy’, Bandura, 1977; Gifford & 
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Nilsson, 2014). Indeed, it is practically impossible to expect someone to take collective 
action without first instructing them on why they should do it (e.g., a form of declarative 
information) and how to perform the specific action (e.g., procedural information). 
Although people may be highly motivated to perform a certain task, they may 
simultaneously lack the requisite procedural knowledge to act in ways that are consistent 
with their underlying beliefs and attitudes (De Young, 1993). Empirical findings indicate 
that procedural knowledge can be an important predictor for some pro-environmental 
behaviors, including recycling behavior (e.g., Hornik, Cherian, Madansky, & Narayana, 
1995).Thus, the exchange of procedural information between individuals can serve an 
important role in providing how-to insights about performing a behavior, which may be 
particularly useful when the target behavior is characterized by a high level of perceived 
or actual difficulty. Procedural exchanges may also function as the social proof that it is 
needed to motivate one to undertake a desirable action (Cialdini, 2009). Given the 
relationship between procedural knowledge and behavior, procedural information is 
considered a ‘high’ transformative act. 
High Injunctive Norm Exchanges 
 High injunctive norm or persuasive exchanges are those that explicitly state or 
imply an injunctive norm (e.g., what should or ought to be) in a given context. Since 
injunctive information cannot be directly inferred through observation (Lapinski & 
Rimal, 2005), conversations that convey injunctive information are critical to the creation 
and maintenance of social norms. Below, high injunctive norm exchanges are classified 
as either interpersonal sanctions (e.g., praise, admonishment) or as antecedent exchanges 
(e.g., prescriptive, proscriptive).  
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Praise and Admonishment 
Praise and admonishment represent forms of communication that materialize in 
direct response to social stimuli, such as witnessing a behavioral transgression or 
overhearing a anti-normative expression (e.g., observing someone watering their lawn 
during restricted day-time periods). Built on systems of reward and punishment, 
interpersonal sanctions, such as praise and admonishment, serve the function of 
normalizing desired behaviors (or beliefs) and marginalizing undesired ones (e.g., 
Ostrom et al., 1992; Nolan, 2013; Yamagishi, 1986). In both cases, the salience of the 
injunctive norm is high because praise or admonishment given in response to collective 
action behaviors provides direct situational feedback that a person is violating or 
conforming to an existing social norm, respectively (Ostrom et al., 1992). Indeed, forms 
of peer-to-peer feedback such as praise and admonishment represent a powerful 
mechanism for creating, enforcing, and maintaining norms in social environments 
(Balliet et al., 2011). Evidence that interpersonal sanctioning matters comes from decades 
of social dilemmas research, which consistently highlights how decentralized sanctions 
(e.g., praise, admonishment) between players subsequently increases cooperation and 
yield (for review see Balliet et al., 2011).  
Related research has also demonstrated how failing to confront counter-normative 
behaviors or beliefs, such as anti-environmental statements, can be misconstrued as 
passive acceptance (Czopp, 2013; Blanchard et al., 1994). For instance, Czopp (2013) 
showed how witnessing an environmental activist fail to confront anti-environmental 
comments resulted in subjects reporting less favorable attitudes towards recycling as well 
as reduced intentions to recycle in the future compared to those who observed a 
 135 
confrontation. Thus, if left unchecked, anti-normative actions and beliefs can permeate in 
society and produce negative ecological outcomes.  As to be expected, confronting 
counter-normative actions can promote positive change. Swim and Bloodhart (2013) 
found that when college students were admonished for an anti-environmental behavior 
(e.g., taking the elevator), they subsequently engaged in more pro-environmental actions 
and reported elevated intentions for positive future engagement. Although praise and 
admonishment have been shown to similarly encourage cooperation in social dilemmas 
games (Balliet et al., 2011), I consider praise a low transformative act because it 
primarily functions to reinforce a desired action, whereas admonishment is more likely to 
cause a shift in another person’s behavior, either by them subsequently refraining from 
the negative action again and/or by adopting the desired behavior (e.g., Czopp et al., 
2006; Swim & Bloodhart, 2013). Regardless, each form of interpersonal sanctioning can 
reveal critical information about what is considered socially approved or disapproved of 
behavior.  
Prescriptive and Proscriptive 
Prescriptive and Proscriptive information strongly parallels interpersonal 
sanctions. Communication of prescriptive or proscriptive information entails explicitly 
indicating what should or should not be done in a given context, respectively (Farrow, 
Grolleau, & Ibanez, 2017; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009; Shank et al., 2018). In 
contrast to interpersonal sanctions, prescriptive and proscriptive informational exchanges 
do not necessarily materialize in response to others’ behaviors or belief expressions, but 
rather set the stage, so to speak, with respect to what the social expectations are about 
appropriate behavior in a given context (Farrow et al., 2017; Shank et al., 2018). For 
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instance, proscriptive informational exchanges may be important in dictating how 
individuals ought to behave in a recreational setting, including statements like ‘we should 
refrain going off trail in a recreational area.’ 
 Indeed, extant literature in social dilemmas research highlights that when players 
are given the opportunity to communicate between rounds of decision-making, 
cooperation and yield significantly increases (Balliet, 2009; Ostrom et al. 1992; Sally, 
1995). However, such conversations are only as effective as they pertain to context-
dependent issues (Bouas & Komorita, 1996). For instance, in communication-based 
conditions where cooperation significantly increased, content analyses revealed that 
players ‘emphasize[d] not only the mutual gains obtained from cooperation, but also its 
appropriateness and normative appeal’ (Bicchieri & Lev-On, 2007, p.163). Recent 
empirical work supports these findings, demonstrating how prescriptive and proscriptive 
exchanges directly impact cooperation and the facilitation of situation-appropriate norms. 
For instance, Shank et al. (2018) showed how cooperation immediately spiked after every 
norm talk opportunity, in which concrete prescriptive and proscriptive messages, such as 
‘we should contribute a lot to the group’, were exchanged between participants. Shank et 
al. (2018) argue that prescriptive and proscriptive norm talk represent a more explicit 
form of norm talk, compared to interpersonal sanctions which only imply an injunctive 
norm through the act approval or disapproval. In each of these exchanges, however, the 
salience of the injunctive norm is considerably high and more likely to encourage the 
engagement with a desired behavior compared to other forms of information.  
Taken together, the nature of information exchanged between individuals can 
differentially impact how people come to view an issue, approach collective-action 
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behaviors, and/or perceive social norms. Perhaps most critically, these types of exchanges 
differ in terms of the extent a conversation highlights what ought to be done, which 
people can use to construct, modify, or reinforce their perceptions of social norms in a 
given situation or context. Whereas low injunctive norm exchanges, such as those that 
convey declarative information, can spread context-dependent information, high 
injunctive norm exchanges play a more powerful role in creating and enforcing situation-
appropriate behavior. Collectively, different forms of informational exchanges all share a 
common characteristic. Based on the publicly observable nature of interpersonal 
communication, any interaction holds the potential to bring greater attention to the issue 
or behavior. 
Whether interpersonal conversations produce anticipated outcomes is largely 
contingent on how information is packaged and conveyed. Information is rarely presented 
in a neutral way and thus we must consider how emotionally-charged information, points 
of reference (e.g., referent groups), and belief expressions may impact issue engagement. 
During an interpersonal conversation, in particular, people are likely to—either directly 
or indirectly—attach their own personal beliefs to a statement, such as whether they agree 
or disagree with a specific idea or action. Belief expressions carry more or less weight 
depending on the existing relationship between the communicating partners, which may 
affect whether people attend to or reject the information being transferred (Moser, 2010; 
Wilson & Sherrell, 1993). Similarly, the point of reference (e.g., individual versus group) 
associated with a given statement can also influence its effect. For instance, prescriptive 
statements that lead with ‘you’ rather than ‘we’ may undermine people’s perceptions 
about others’ intention for reciprocal cooperation (Shank et al., 2018). Additionally, the 
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referent group associated with a descriptive statement will differentially impact issue 
engagement depending on whether the group is perceived as personally relevant or well-
respected by the receiver (Hogg & Reid, 2006; Rimal & Real, 2003). Emotionally-
charged expressions are may also determine how individuals attend to and respond to an 
interpersonal conversation (Berger, 2014a), however, less is clear about how emotions 
will materialize to influence conversational outcomes (Chapman, Lickel, & Markowitz, 
2017).  
Perhaps the most significant limitation of interpersonal communication is that 
although it can play an important role in diffusing topical and normative information 
across relevant social networks, these conversations are just as likely to backfire and 
produce negative outcomes. Indeed, the likelihood of everyday conversations producing 
positive, collective-benefitting outcomes is contingent on whether messages support or 
oppose collective action objectives. Just as people can spread critical context-dependent 
information or enforce situation-appropriate social norms, people can also encourage 
engagement with counter-normative behaviors, promote inaction, and/or spread 
inaccurate information, whether intentionally or unintentionally through their 
conversations with others. Thus, despite the potential of interpersonal communication to 
promote cooperation, conversations between stakeholders can also pose significant 
challenges to advancing change, particularly if counter-productive conversations are 
continually reinforced.  
Factors Influencing Willingness and Outcomes 
 Individuals willingness to converse with others as well as the effectiveness of 
interpersonal interactions is influenced by a number of contextual and individual-level 
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factors. It is incorrect to assume that information presented during a conversation is equal 
to the information received. Since many environmental collective action problems have 
become less about scientific facts and more about what these issues mean for the values 
and interests of disparate political and social groups (McCright & Dunlap, 2011), the 
influence of informational exchanges may be more contingent on source characteristics 
(e.g., the communicator) rather than on the content of the message (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986). The social, political, and environmental context of collective action problems may 
also pose similar challenges with respect to suppressing (or motivating) individuals’ 
willingness to communicate with others. Although conversing with others holds 
considerable promise in promoting widespread collective action, there are significant 
barriers limiting engagement with and the efficacy of such interactions, including those 
related to group identity, individual differences, features of the behavior, and the issue at 
hand. Table 17 summarizes some of the features of interpersonal conversations that can 
impact engagement and subsequent outcomes. 
Table 17. Summary of interpersonal communication principles discussed throughout this 
chapter 
Communication enhances cooperation. Forms of interpersonal communication can 
increase the transparency of privately expressed behaviors, facilitate situation-appropriate 
norms and diffuse critical context-dependent information. 
Norms function when salient. Cooperation in collective action behaviors enhances when 
interpersonal discussions highlight what relevant others do and believe is socially accepted. 
Face-to-face is the gold standard. Face-to-face interactions are more effective forms of 
personal influence than written or other non-verbal exchanges. 
Time and people amplify benefits. The benefits of interpersonal communication amplify 
when occurrences accumulate over time and as the number of communicating partners 
increases. 
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Norms are attached to social identities. Normative information (e.g., injunctive and/or 
descriptive norms) that is associated with salient and desired referent groups (e.g., an in-
group identity) will lead to greater cooperation. 
Activate the right messengers. People are more likely to attend to and integrate 
information conveyed from messengers who share a similar social identity and/or life 
experience. 
Issue morality influences outcomes. Collective action issues that are viewed more strongly 
as a moral imperative (and have normative standing as well) should generate more 
interpersonal discussions among relevant stakeholders.  
 
Group Identity 
 Given the heterogeneity of the social environments within which we live, the 
implications of individuals’ social identities cannot be underestimated with respect to 
interpersonal communication. People derive part of their self-concept based on the social 
groups to which they belong and social identity processes can meaningfully and 
significantly effect individuals’ appraisal of and responses to environmental collective 
action problems (Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic, & Mertz, 2007; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, 
& Braman, 2011). Indeed, one of the most significant findings in social psychological 
research over the past decade identifies the role motivated social psychological processes 
play in determining different aspects of issue engagement, including individuals’ 
judgement of and receptivity to new information (Kahan et al., 2007; Kahan et al., 2012; 
Kunda, 1990). With respect to interpersonal communication, people’s ability to attend to 
and integrate new information is largely mediated by perceived attributions of the source 
(Moser, 2010; Nisbet & Kotcher, 2009; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). People more readily 
accept information from trustworthy and/or similar sources, and systematically reject 
information from dissimilar sources (Kahan et al., 2007; Wilson & Sherrell, 1993). Thus, 
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messengers who share strong likenesses with the receiver (e.g., mutual identity or shared 
life circumstance; Malka, Krosnick, & Langer, 2009) can act as ‘seals of approval’ for 
new information that may otherwise be neglected or mistrusted when delivered by less 
credible and/or dissimilar sources (Corner et al., 2015; Moser, 2010).  
Everyone holds multiple goals, values, or identities that can be activated in a 
given situation. Oftentimes these identities can be at conflict with one another or at 
conflict with others (in-group versus out-group dynamics). The nature of interdependence 
surrounding collective action problems (and solutions) may necessitate the formation of 
commonly held identities that encompass the values and interests of disparate groups 
(Buchan et al., 2011). In order for people to be influenced by social norms, they must feel 
some degree of affinity towards the referent group (Lede, Meleady, &Seger, 2019; Terry, 
Hogg, & White, 1999). This is particularly important because cooperation increases in 
situations where there is a strong sense of in-group identity (De Cremer, Van 
Knippenberg, Van Dijk, & Leeuwen, 2008; Gächter & Fehr, 1999). Conversations, such 
as those that highlight descriptive information about what most others do or approve of, 
are more powerful when anchored to meaningful referent groups (e.g., Lede et al., 2019; 
Hogg & Reid, 2006; Rimal & Real, 2003). Given the characteristics of a collective action 
problem, such as whether resources are shared between a bounded community or subject 
to use by many disparate users, communicators will differentially face challenges in 
identifying a salient, in-group identity. In the absence of strong in-group identification, it 
may be particularly difficult for individuals to converse with dissimilar others or for 
information to be effectively relayed.  
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Social identity processes can also determine people’s willingness to engage in 
conversations with others, particularly when presented with the opportunity to confront 
others’ harmful actions or beliefs (Czopp & Montieth, 2003; Kaiser & Miller, 2001; 
Stangor, Swim, Van Allen & Sechrist, 2002). For instance, in the context of prejudice 
responding, research finds that traditional targets of prejudice (e.g., women, African 
Americans) are less willing to register a complaint to groups composed of non-traditional 
targets of prejudice (e.g., men, white; Czopp & Montieth, 2003). The dynamics of social 
identity processes underscores one of the more significant limitations of peer-to-peer 
communication: the potential that people will only communicate with like-minded others. 
Recent social network analyses highlight this effect, demonstrating that informational 
exchanges on social media (e.g., Twitter) tend to be siloed within polarized ‘echo 
chambers’ rather than diffused across disparate social networks (Jasny, Waggle, & 
Fisher, 2015; Williams, McMurray, Kurtz & Lambert, 2015). However, such engagement 
should not necessarily be considered a limitation, provided amplifying issue salience and 
reinforcing shared beliefs within a bounded community may encourage individuals to 
take collective action and secure the provision of a necessary public good (e.g., 
community resilience).   
Communication Channels 
The modalities of communication can also moderate the effects of interpersonal 
conversations based on the degree and intimacy of personal interaction that occurs 
between individuals (Walther, 1992). Face-to-face interactions are considered the gold 
standard with respect to maximizing social influence and compliance (Abrahamse & 
Steg, 2013; Walther, 1992). For instance, face-to-face solicitation of pledges to 
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participate in a recycling program subsequently increased the number of pledges obtained 
as well as the frequency of recycling among participants, compared to less personable 
approaches (e.g., flyer; Reams & Ray, 1993). Reviews of social dilemmas research 
further reveals that verbal rather than written interpersonal communication leads to 
greater cooperation (e.g., Balliet, 2009). Thus, although sending computer-mediated 
exchanges offers a rapid means through which to spread information to many people at 
once, there are significant trades-offs that can undermine the efficacy of such 
interactions. Multiple explanations have been offered to explain this decay of treatment 
effect. Face-to-face interactions evoke and sustain attention to a greater degree that 
computer-mediated exchanges (Berger, 2013). This is partially because computer-
mediated interactions suffer from a loss of non-verbal cues and exposure to less 
immediate social pressures, which can undermine the persuasiveness of an informational 
exchange (Berger, 2013; 2014a; Wather, 1992).  
Frequency of Interaction 
Like most behaviors that are continually reinforced, the benefits of interpersonal 
communication increase with sustained engagement (Ostrom, 2000; Ledyard, 1995; 
Shank et al., 2018). Much of the work examining the effect of interpersonal 
communication in social dilemmas research reveals that norm talk can arrest declining 
levels of cooperation by causing immediate spikes in cooperation, which then gradually 
fades between rounds of decision-making (Shank et al., 2018). Despite cooperation 
oscillating between rounds of decision-making, the overall strength and durability of the 
effect of topic-relevant discussions significantly outperforms conditions that are absent of 
communication (Shank et al., 2018). What this research reveals is that injunctive norms, 
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via interpersonal sanctioning or prescriptive/proscriptive exchanges, must be made salient 
periodically in order to sustain cooperation over time. Within the structure of a social 
dilemmas game, however, there is a greater opportunity to iteratively discuss normative 
information compared to real-world settings where convesations occur less frequently 
and/or inconsistently (Shank et al., 2018). Thus, resource managers and practitioners are 
faced with challenges with respect to making social norms, through interpersonal 
communication, more salient and accessible over prolonged periods of time. When 
occurrences of interpersonal communication accrue over time it may encourage many 
people to similarly engage, provided cooperation has been shown to increase as the 
number of communicating partners increases (Balliet, 2009; Kinukawa, Saijo, Une, 2000; 
Shank et al., 2018).  
Social Costs 
There are real and perceived risks associated with interpersonal communication 
that can weaken or at times, completely deter engagement. Given the politically and 
socially divisive nature of many environmental issues (e.g., McCright & Dunlap, 2011), 
the costs of communication, including the potential for social isolation or even physical 
harm, raises concerns about whether and how an individual will choose to converse with 
others (Steentjes et al., 2017; Geiger & Swim, 2016). Interpersonal sanctioning, in 
particular, can result in negative evaluations for the confronter depending on the 
normative status of the violated norm. For instance, Steentjes et al. (2017) identified that 
people distance themselves, as measured through reduced feelings of closeness and 
warmth, from individuals who confront statements of environmental disregard compared 
to statements of racial bias. Parallel to this finding, literature in moral psychology 
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suggests that confrontation (e.g., expressions of blame) carries significant social costs 
(e.g., loss of face, status, reactive aggression) that can defuse individuals’ willingness to 
publicly blame others (Malle et al., 2012a). Steentjes et al. (2017) found that the social 
costs associated with confronting environmental disregard, were partly determined by the 
morality of issue, suggesting that the moral (or normative) status of the issue results in 
different consequences for the confronter. This finding suggests that issues perceived 
more strongly in terms of a moral imperative are likely to evoke greater interpersonal 
responses than those that are felt less strongly in terms of issue morality. Thus, collective 
action issues that are viewed as requiring immediate action or as a moral imperative may 
provide the necessary motivation for encouraging one to engage in an interpersonal 
conversation with another person. Whereas other scientifically complex issues 
underscored by long-time horizons, may have difficulty in activating the moral judgment 
system (i.e., climate change, Markowitz & Shariff, 2012).   
Behavior Type and Visibility 
The nature of the collective action problem as well as the target behavior can also 
impact engagement. Individuals’ willingness to impose social sanctions on others’ 
actions is not only dependent on the type of sanction (Nolan, 2013), but can also be 
moderated by the nature of the social dilemma (Nolan, 2013; Molenmaker, Kwaadsteniet, 
and van Dijk (2014). As to be expected, individuals are more likely to praise than 
admonish (e.g., Nolan, 2013; Molenmaker et al., 2014), but less obvious is the 
moderating effect played by the type of social dilemma. People are more likely to praise 
and to a greater extent when faced with a public goods dilemma compared to a common 
pool resource dilemma (Molenmaket et al., 2014). This suggests that the commission of a 
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positive contribution is viewed more favorably (or praise-worthy) than the omission of a 
similarly beneficial behavior, which is exercised—albeit invisibly—through resource 
restraint.  
The public visibility of communicating with others may be particularly motivating 
for some, while simultaneously demotivating for others (e.g. Brick et al., 2017; 
Griskevicius et al., 2010; Guckian, Danylchuk, Cooke, & Markowitz, 2018; Sexton & 
Sexton, 2011). Engagement in forms of interpersonal communication may fulfill people’s 
desire to signal a social identity or status that is favored in a particular social context or 
among relevant social groups (Anderson, Hildreth & Howland, 2015; Griskevicius et al., 
2010). For instance, Guckian et al. (2018; Chapter III) found that recreational anglers 
who were more concerned about their reputation within their angling community reported 
sanctioning others’ (in)appropriate angling practices to a greater degree in the past as 
well as elevated intentions to sanction others in the future. These and other related 
findings parallel costly signaling theory, which suggests that people are willing to incur 
costs (e.g., money, time, social) in order to signal valued social attributes (e.g., altruism, 
group identity; Bird & Smith, 2005).  
Blamelessness 
 The normative or moral status of an issue may also influence individuals’ 
willingness and ability to impose social sanctions on others’ actions. Insights from the 
field of moral psychology highlight the social and cognitive conditions under which 
people arrive at judgements of blame and subsequent blame expressions (e.g., 
admonishment; Malle et al., 2012b). This literature suggests that individuals’ judgements 
and subsequent expressions of blame are contingent on delineating whether (1) the 
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behavior violated a norm, (2) the individual was at fault, and (3) the action was 
intentional (‘step model of blame’; Guglielmo et al., 2009). People blame intentional 
norm violations more and to a greater degree than unintentional violations (e.g., 
Guglielmo et al., 2009).  
Thus, in order for a person to arrive at a judgement of blame, social perceivers 
need to maintain the belief that an environmental transgression actually violates a norm 
(e.g., Monroe, Dillon, Guglielmo, & Baumeister, 2018). This suggests that an injunctive 
norm must be established and understood for a person to decipher whether or not a 
violation has occurred. In the absence of well-established norms in support of collective 
action, it is unlikely that individuals will impose sanctions on others non-compliant 
behavior (Monroe et al., 2018; Nolan, 2017). For instance, Nolan (2017) found that 
people were more likely to express disapproval of non-cooperators in towns that had 
formal sanctioning systems (e.g., mandatory town recycling program) compared to 
unregulated townships (e.g., pay-as-you-go or voluntary). Ascertaining the cause or 
intentionality of others’ transgressions is equally problematic. Perceived transgressors 
may lack the financial resources to engage in collective-benefitting behaviors, be 
obligated to perform certain acts (e.g., for a job), or be deprived of structural features that 
support positive engagement (e.g., access to public transportation). Thus, these and 
related factors are likely to confound people’s perception of causality and intentionality 
with respect to transgressions, particularly given the blamelessness and shared 
responsibilities surrounding many environmental issues (e.g., Markowitz & Shariff, 
2012). 
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Psychological Standing and Motivation 
Since the effectiveness of collective action solutions is dependent upon large 
number of people engaging, relevant stakeholders should be motivated to support and 
encourage cooperation among their peers (Rogers et al., 2018). An individual’s 
underlying motivation for a cause may be able to suppress the many notable barriers that 
render people reluctant to converse with others. In terms of interpersonal communication, 
individuals may derive motivation from a variety of sources (for review see Berger, 
2014), including a desire to reduce situational uncertainty (Berger & Calabrese, 1974), 
reveal personal information to others (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), achieve a preferred 
personal and societal goal (Berger, 1997), or actively manage elements uncertainty 
(Brashers, 2001). In terms of the latter, people can be problematically motivated to 
maintain levels of uncertainty as a coping mechanism to distant themselves from the 
reality of environmental risks, such as refraining to speak about issues with others (e.g., 
Norgaard, 2011).  
Extant research suggests that individuals are motivated to engage in pro-
environmental, health, and other domain-specific behaviors in order to satisfy or 
maximize their underlying interests, concerns, or values (e.g., Karp, 1996; Poortinga, 
Steg, & Vlek, 2004). Recent correlational research supports this, suggesting that 
individuals who are more concerned about the state of a natural resource (e.g., fishing 
population) are more likely to sanction others’ (in)appropriate behaviors (Chapman et al., 
2018; Guckian et al., 2018). Additionally, experimental work has demonstrated that 
women highly motivated by gender equity were more likely to confront a confederate’s 
prejudice expressions (Swim & Hyers, 1999). Thus, participation in interpersonal 
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communication may rely on individuals who are highly motivated by a cause or else, feel 
more entitled to express their beliefs to others (Miller, Effron, & Zak, 2011; Maki & 
Raimi, 2017).  
Psychological standing, is defined as the subjective feeling of entitlement or 
legitimacy to perform a particular act, such as protesting an injustice (e.g., sanctioning; 
Miller et al., 2011). People derive psychological standing based on the extent to which 
they perceive they are materially affected by or have a moral stake in an issue (Miller et 
al., 2011). When it comes to interpersonal communication, it is likely that people will 
question whether engagement is worth the trouble or cost? Responses to this question are 
more likely to be affirmative when individuals harbor the belief that they themselves 
have a vested and significant interest in the issue (Miller et al., 2011). For instance, 
approach motivation should be amplified when an individual fully comprehends that 
increasing their resilience to an environmental risk (e.g., Ratner & Miller, 2001), such as 
wildfire or invasive pests, is contingent on widespread action among their proximate 
peers (Elliot & Thrash, 2002). Thus, possessing psychological standing in the context of 
collective action problems requires that people perceive these issues as personally 
relevant, and furthermore, understand that benefits are contingent on many people 
engaging in the target behavior.  
This may be the most critical piece in determining whether discussions among 
relevant stakeholders will materialize or if interpersonal communication is even a fitting 
intervention approach to pursue in a particular collective action issue. Situations that are 
marred by uncertainty, lack identifiable victims or immediate threats, may undermine 
people’s capacity to perceive that they have a definitive material or moral stake in an 
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issue. However, when others’ behaviors unequivocally pose direct consequences on your 
life—whether it be access to a resource or the provision of a public good—possessing 
some degree of psychological standing should support individuals’ willingness to 
encourage cooperation via interpersonal communication.  
Conceivably, the effects of psychological standing should be driven by a shared 
understanding about who has the right to say something in a particular context (Miller, 
2001; Miller & Ratner, 1996). Although people may have immense standing relative to 
their experience of a social injustice (e.g., racism, sexism), research suggests that 
confrontational acts by non-traditional targets of prejudice are received more powerfully 
than confrontations expressed by traditional targets of prejudice (e.g., women, people of 
color; Czopp & Montieth, 2003). Thus, for certain and more divisive collective action 
problems, highly identifiable environmentalists (or victims) may be taken less seriously 
and viewed less favorably given their membership to a stigmatized group (Bashir, 
Lockwood, Chasteen, Nadolny, & Noyes, 2013). However, other research suggests that 
people are evaluated negatively for taking action on behalf of a cause in which they are 
perceived as having no material stake in (Ratner & Miller, 2001). To that end, it remains 
unclear how psychological standing will impact engagement in and outcomes of 
interpersonal communication in the context of collective action issues.  
For instance, in some situations, such as recreational fisheries, people are 
similarly subjected to the same level of loss (e.g., lack of access) if a fishery were to 
collapse. With that said, however, the majority of environmental collective action issues 
tend to differentially affect disparate populations. In the case of the fisheries example, 
people who live near the resource and frequently use it are subjected to a greater degree 
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of loss than those who intermittently use it. These circumstances are more characteristic 
of large-scale collective action problems, where more vulnerable populations (e.g., poor, 
indigenous communities) are disproportionately subjected to a greater degree of harm 
than others (e.g., sea-level rise, air pollution; Brulle & Pellow, 2006; Morello-Frosch, 
Zuk, Jerrett, Shamasunder, & Kyle, 2011). Although these populations have more 
standing to speak up (e.g., Ratner & Miller, 2001), socially-constructed and actual 
differences in power and status may prevent individuals from engaging in forms of 
interpersonal communication (e.g., Shelton & Stewart, 2004) and whether their voices 
will be acknowledged (e.g., Czopp & Montieth, 2003).  
Although a string of literature has begun to reveal how different individual, 
contextual, and social characteristics may impact individuals’ willingness to 
communicate with others and the implications of such engagement, it is unclear how 
these dynamics will emerge and unfold across disparate environmental collective action 
problems. Environmental issues present different challenges in terms of the immediacy 
and overall threat of the problem, the degree of heterogeneity within the social 
environment, the nature of the target behavior as well as the social and political climate 
surrounding it. For instance, though people rarely report discussing the issue of climate 
change with others (Maibach et al., 2016), it may be unlikely for a similar silence to exist 
with respect to issues of local resilience or other environmental collective action issues. 
Although limited research has examined these dynamics in the environmental domain, 
many collective action problems and behavioral solutions share similar characteristics 
that position interpersonal communication as a potentially powerful mechanism for 
spearheading change and diffusing information.  
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Behavioral and Contextual Fit 
Environmental collective action problems share a number of behavioral and 
situational characteristics that make it more or less difficult for social, cognitive, and top-
down (e.g., policies) processes to foster widespread cooperation. At the same time, these 
characteristics, such as the invisibility of collective action, the biophysical nature of the 
issue, and lack of management and personnel capacities, situate interpersonal 
communication as a more relevant social influence approach for driving coordination and 
cooperation. Indeed, one of the many reasons interpersonal communication can facilitate 
change, is that it can intentionally reveal critical—otherwise difficult to access—
information about others’ behavior as well as raise the salience of psychologically distant 
issues (e.g., Spence et al., 2012). The purpose of the following section is to elaborate on 
several common behavioral and situational features of environmental collective action 
problems that situate interpersonal communication as a relevant approach for ushering 
positive change.  
Uncertainty 
Casting environmental issues as collective action problems reveals a lot about the 
way people psychologically perceive, process, and respond to resource constraint, 
uncertainty, competition, and environmental risks (Dawes, 1980; Van Lange et al., 2013). 
Some of the many possible social psychological challenges that can weaken coordination 
and cooperation within these situations are the absence of issue salience and lack of 
social proof with respect to what relevant others do and/or what is socially approved of 
action. Such uncertainty can derail people from engaging in collective-benefitting 
actions, particularly if no one else is perceived as taking action (e.g., Wit & Wilke, 1998). 
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This dynamic is especially important considering that the effects of social influence are in 
part conditional on the salience of social—injunctive and descriptive—norms, the degree 
to which a person’s non-cooperative behavior is observed by others, and the extent to 
which one perceives that others comply with the norm (Cialdini, 2009; Cialdini & 
Goldstein, 2004). Amidst many environmental collective action challenges, however, 
these conditions are rarely met: injunctive and descriptive norms are often in conflict or 
entirely ambiguous, target behaviors are not always publicly observable, and social 
misperceptions exist relative to group-level compliance. 
Visibility 
Many collective management behaviors, such as those that take place on people’s 
private properties (e.g., removing woody debris), are not publicly observable to others. 
This can be problematic because recent research distinguishing between publicly 
observable and non-observable behaviors suggests that visible behaviors are more 
susceptible to traditional social influence processes, such as modeling and observation, 
than are non-observable behaviors (Brick et al., 2017; Griskevicius et al., 2010; Sexton & 
Sexton, 2014). Although not all collective-benefitting behaviors are equally susceptible to 
social influence processes, there is reason to suggest that intentional social interactions 
can increase the occurrence of private behaviors (Geiger, Swim, & Glenna, 2019). For 
instance, in a recent social network analysis, Geiger et al. (2019) found that connections 
to opinion leaders (intentional interaction sources) predicted engagement in private-
sphere behaviors, such as household energy consumption. Other related findings suggest 
that intentional conversations about a topic can increase the transparency and perhaps, 
engagement with otherwise difficult to observe behaviors (Abrahamse & Steg, 2013; 
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Hopper & Nielsen, 1991). Thus, in situations where the target behavior is not publicly 
observable, interpersonal communication may function by creating the social proof that is 
needed to foster a better understanding of prevailing social norms. 
Social Misperceptions 
Because social norms are seldom formally or explicitly stated (Cruz et al., 2000), 
people often misinterpret them and subsequently fail to accurately interpret the extent to 
which others hold a certain belief or engage in a specific behavior (Lapinski & Rimal, 
2005). Social misperceptions can problematically lead people to act in a manner that is 
incongruent with their personal beliefs and/or adopt erroneous perceptions about 
prevailing social norms (Miller & McFarland, 1987; Prentice & Miller, 1993). For 
instance, although an individual privately rejects an idea or behavior, such as the 
excessive consumption of alcohol, they may publicly endorse it because they incorrectly 
assume that most others accept it (‘pluralistic ignorance’, Prentice & Miller, 1993; 
Shamir & Shamir, 1997). Unfortunately, there is fairly widespread evidence documenting 
social misperceptions across environmental collective action issues, including beliefs 
about climate change and policy support for renewable energy technologies (e.g., 
Leviston et al., 2013; Mildenberger & Tingley, 2017; Sokoloski et al., 2018). In a recent 
study, participants holding the majority opinion—that climate change is due to 
anthropogenic causes—greatly overestimated the percentage of climate change deniers 
(up to 21%), when the actual percentage was closer to 6%. Inaccurately perceiving the 
distribution of public opinion may suppress individuals support for collective action, 
especially in terms of voting for policy measures that endorse action (Leviston et al., 
2013). 
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Although interpersonal communication may be able to defuse common 
misperceptions, by increasing the salience and transparency of individuals support for 
action, pluralistic ignorance can reduce individuals’ willingness to communicate with 
others (Geiger & Swim, 2016; Rios & Chen, 2014). For instance, when presented with a 
false distribution of climate change opinion favoring the denialist viewpoint, participants 
most concerned about the issue (and whom held the majority opinion), were less willing 
to discuss the topic in a subsequent group discussion (Geiger & Swim, 2016). 
Problematically, Noelle-Neumann (1974; 1991) posits that normative misperceptions can 
create a self-perpetuating spiral-of-silence. The more people misperceive that their 
opinion is not held by the majority, the more the perceived majority opinion is reinforced 
publicly, the more reticent they will be to express their opinion (or vice versa). Thus, 
although interpersonal communication has the potential to correct existing social 
misperceptions, the prevalence of pluralistic ignorance may act as a significant behavioral 
barrier. 
Issue Salience 
 Interpersonal communication may also help overcome notable cognitive barriers 
associated with the characteristics of the collective action problem. Why the gravity of 
collective action problems and the compelling body of scientific evidence surrounding 
them has not galvanized greater cooperation is partly due to the unique physical nature of 
the issues themselves (Gardiner, 2011). Climate change, in particular, is a vast, slow-
moving, multifaceted problem and like many environmental collective action problems, 
the most damaging impacts are projected to occur in the future and impact distant places 
and people (IPCC, 2014). The physical and social characteristics of some environmental 
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collective action issues create a uniquely daunting confluence of forces that make it 
deeply challenging for individuals to cognitively comprehend or ascribe personal 
relevance to (e.g., Spence et al., 2012). This is especially the case when the immediate 
costs of taking action significantly overshadow the benefits that may not accrue during an 
individual’s lifetime (e.g., Jacquet et al., 2013). Because many of these issues are not top-
of-mind problems (e.g., Pew Research Center, 2014; Riffkin, 2014), interpersonal 
communication may play a critical role in increasing the salience of otherwise 
psychologically distant issues (Spence et al., 2012). Other environmental risks, such as 
wildfires, may not suffer from a similar lack of issue salience, provided wildfires present 
more immediate threats to people living in vulnerable areas (e.g., Colorado, California). 
Thus, peer-to-peer conversations may serve a dual function, either by bringing distant 
issues into the present or by amplifying the salience and need to take action for more 
immediate threats.   
Limited Enforcement 
Interpersonal communication and social influence approaches more broadly may 
be critically important in situations where enforcement and monitoring capabilities are 
limited. The physical scale of environmental collective action problems present 
significant challenges in terms of regulating user or stakeholder behavior, particularly 
when resource managers lack access to the requisite resources (e.g., money, personnel) to 
effectively monitor and enforce behavior (e.g., Sutinen, 1993; Stern, 2008). Many 
resource-based recreation areas are forced to rely on voluntary compliance among users, 
who likely possess different motivations, values, and outdoor ethics. Individual 
motivation for compliance among natural resource users may, for instance, be attenuated 
 157 
in expansive areas, such as fisheries or hiking areas, where a desire to maximize one’s 
experience with a resource significantly outweighs concerns about (and the likelihood of) 
being caught (Van Lange et al., 2013). For areas that lack requisite enforcement and 
management capabilities, relying on peer-to-peer monitoring offers a low-cost 
mechanism for enforcing community norms and conservation objectives (Chapman et al., 
2018; Granek et al., 2008; Guckian et al., 2018). Indeed, people are more likely to 
comply with prevailing norms when they are led to believe that their behaviors are 
observable and thus open to evaluation by others (e.g., Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; 
Delmas & Lessem, 2014; Yoeli, Hoffman, Rand, & Nowak, 2013). In sum, there are 
many features of collective action problems that make interpersonal communication a 
good fit for enhancing cooperation. However impactful, important questions remain 
about how conservation managers and practitioners can encourage productive 
conversations among relevant stakeholders. 
Intervention Considerations for Conservation Managers and Practitioners 
 Forms of interpersonal communication that leverage the power of social influence 
offer a powerful, yet low-cost way to persuade individuals to act in ways that maximize 
long-term collective interests rather than satisfy immediate self-interests. However, 
accruing any benefits of interpersonal communication ultimately rests on individuals’ 
willingness and ability to engage in meaningful conversations with others. Limited 
research has explored the efficacy of interventions that harness people’s capacity to 
promote positive ecological outcomes through their intentional interactions with others. 
For resource managers and/or practitioners that rely on voluntary compliance and 
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cooperation, identifying and integrating approaches that increase peer-to-peer 
conversations among relevant stakeholders could help foster widespread cooperation.  
Drawing on direct and indirect evidence, I present several interventions and 
approaches that resource managers or practitioners could employ to encourage peer-to-
peer discussions. To a varying degree, all of these approaches share one common 
characteristic, which is to create and maintain intentional channels of communication. 
With that said, not every approach is plausible or fitting for every collective action 
problem. The conditions under which these approaches are more or less effective is likely 
dependent on the characteristics of the target behavior, the situational context as well as 
the make-up of the social network. Accordingly, some approaches may be uniquely 
situated to evoke change in a particular situation, whereas others may be more universally 
applied. For instance, publicly non-observable behaviors are less likely to be faced with 
public scrutiny, thus limiting the opportunity for individuals to impose sanctions on 
others’ compliant or non-compliant behavior.  
Approach 1: Create Opportunities for Interaction 
Perhaps the most involved approach includes creating spaces, events, or 
programming where relevant stakeholders can come together, interact, and discuss the 
underlying issue and the potential for pursuing collective solutions. Intervention 
techniques that facilitate structured interactions may be especially important when 
dealing with target behaviors that are not publicly observable or in situations where 
interactions between stakeholders are unlikely due to situational constraints (e.g., 
physical distance between neighbors). Under such conditions, conservation managers and 
practitioners should look for ways to create and scaffold face-to-face interactions among 
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relevant stakeholders. Although practitioners are likely to experience additional 
challenges in terms of people showing up for these social arrangements, the embedded 
benefits of engagement could be plentiful. 
The thrust of this approach stems from early research delineating the strong 
effects of group discussion on the uptake of unattractive consumption behaviors (e.g., 
cooking with glandular meats during World War II; Lewin, 1947). Although identical 
information was detailed in two experimental conditions, Lewin (1947) found that the 
effects of group discussion led to greater and sustained action over time compared to 
information provision (e.g., lecture format). Lewin (1947) suggested that the effects of 
group discussion were predicated on individuals’ ability to experience group standards 
and freely discuss the advantages and disadvantages of engagement. Additional support 
for the effect of group discussion has been well-documented in social dilemmas research 
(for reviews see Balliet, 2009; Sally, 1995). Stemming from early research in which brief 
discussions prior to social dilemma games were found to increase cooperation (Deutcsh, 
1958), a large body of literature has since replicated the effect of communication on 
cooperation (Dawes et al., 1977; Ostrom et al., 1992; Shank et al., 2018).  
Despite evidence for the effects of group interaction as well as others’ argument 
that self-sustaining pro-environmental behavior is partly conditional on a supportive 
social environment (De Young, 1993), interventions based on direct social interaction 
have rarely been implemented when promoting pro-environmental and/or collective-
benefitting behaviors (Abrahamse & Steg, 2013). The EcoTeam approach is one 
intervention, which combines feedback, information provision, and social support to 
motivate individuals to adopt a range of private, household-level mitigation behaviors 
 160 
(Staats, Harland and Wilke, 2004). Over a three-year period, Staats et al. (2004) 
examined the efficacy and durability of the EcoTeam approach, where people were 
encouraged to share their trials and tribulations with regard to specific household actions. 
Social support consisted of 6-10 person teams, who met once a month over an 8-month 
period to discuss assigned topics and behaviors, which ranged from waste reduction to 
transportation. Participants in the program significantly increased their household 
environmental behavior, including a 7% reduction in water consumption and 32% 
decrease in solid waste deposition (Staats et al., 2004). In terms of durability, behavioral 
gains remained two years after the completion of the program. Perhaps more 
interestingly, analyses revealed that social influence predicted behavioral engagement: 
the greater people reported experiencing social influence, the more likely they were to 
engage (Staats et al., 2004).  
These findings suggest that providing individuals with the opportunity to interact 
with relevant others has the potential to promote durable change, by generating shared 
beliefs and meanings about what is socially approved of behavior. However, as 
previously detailed, the effects of group discussions are dependent on the extent to which 
conversations entail issue-specific information as well as on the level of group consensus 
that is reached (Bouas & Komorita, 1996; Dawes et al., 1977). With respect to the 
organizational framework presented here, conversations that convey information about 
the descriptive and injunctive norm are likely to lead to greater transformation, by 
facilitating situation-appropriate social norms (Shank et al., 2018). There are a variety of 
ways recreational managers and practitioners could go about facilitating formal social 
interactions. For resource managers, this could involve coordinating with established 
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social networks (e.g., community organizations) nested within socio-ecological systems. 
For instance, recreational angling, hunting or hiking clubs offer immediate networks 
where individuals could assist in the rapid diffusion of community norms and behaviors. 
With respect to community resilience, one approach could be to gather neighborhoods 
together for discussions about increasing their collective resilience to an environmental 
risk.  
Approach 2: Promote a ‘See Something, Say Something’ Campaign 
 The creation of formal peer-to-peer monitoring programs, such as a ‘see 
something, say something’ campaign or ‘neighborhood watch’ program, may offer an 
important backdrop for encouraging peer policing and productive conversations among 
relevant stakeholders. Crowdsourcing enforcement has gained increasing attention in 
communities across the United States in response to public security threats (e.g., Reeves, 
2012; Bennett, Holloway, & Farrington, 2006). Within the context of environmental 
collective action, such campaigns could redistribute responsibility to relevant 
stakeholders by activating their role in the direct monitoring and enforcement of a shared 
resource. The potential of these programs, and interpersonal sanctioning more broadly, 
depends on people’s ability to detect a norm-violating action and their willingness to 
confront it (Guglielmo et al., 2009). Thus, clear injunctive norms must be established, 
endorsed, and understood by the broader community. A neighborhood watch regiment is 
just one example of how individuals in communities with shared interests in the use and 
preservation of a common resource may join together and aspire to maintain the long-
term prosperity of it by monitoring and enforcing consumption patterns among the 
community members (Bennett et al., 2006). 
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When dealing with target behaviors that occur repeatedly and that are visible to 
others, individuals are presented with greater opportunities to impose social sanctions on 
others’ compliant or non-compliant behavior. Apart from game theory research, however, 
literature suggests that individuals are generally unwilling to express approval or 
disapproval of others’ actions (Nolan, 2013; Guckian et al., 2018). This may be attributed 
to the social costs associated with confrontation as well as shared beliefs that view 
confrontation as a non-normative communicative action (Steentjes et al., 2017). The 
implementation of a formal peer-to-peer enforcement campaign may help alter the norms 
associated with confrontation and, in turn, either reduce or remove notable barriers to 
engagement (Nolan, 2017). The benefits of a crowdsourced enforcement program may 
not only be reaped from individuals actively imposing sanctions on others behavior, but 
from the mere threat of increasing the visibility of non-compliance. The anticipation of 
negative social evaluations matters a great deal in the decision-making process and can 
lead people to engage in more altruistic (and pro-environmental behaviors) based on their 
desire for social approval (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Thus, when individuals expect 
that their behaviors are viewed by others and that their actions are susceptible to peer 
enforcement, cooperation may increase. For instance, research has found that cooperation 
increases during ‘public’ versus ‘anonymous’ rounds of decision-making (Milinski et al., 
2006).  
Approach 3: Foster and Support Perceptions of Efficacy 
 A more universal approach recreational managers and practitioners can employ 
involves improving individuals’ confidence in their ability to talk about collective action 
issues and furthermore, ensuring individuals that their voices matter in ushering change. 
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One of the most widely cited and studied social psychological predictors of behavior 
involves perceptions of efficacy (Ozer & Bandura, 1990; Witte, 1992). Bandura 
described self-efficacy as ‘the belief in one’s capabilities to organize and execute a 
course of action’ (1977, p. 2-3). Comparatively, response efficacy is described as one’s 
belief that engagement in a behavior will result in a desired outcome (Ajzen, 2002). 
Individuals tend to avoid actions they believe exceed their capabilities and similarly 
avoid those that they believe will not produce an anticipated outcome (Ajzen, 2002; Ozer 
& Bandura, 1990; Witte, 1992).  
With respect to interpersonal communication, efficacy beliefs can be undermined 
by justified concerns about speaking to collective action problems that are embedded in 
political and social meanings (McCright & Dunlap, 2011; Kahan et al., 2012). For 
instance, impression management concerns with respect to appearing less competent (i.e., 
self-efficacy) have been shown to reduce college students’ willingness to discuss climate 
change with their peers (Geiger & Swim, 2016). Correlational work supports this finding, 
suggesting that those with low self-efficacy about their ability to discuss climate change 
report talking about the issue less frequently than those with greater self-efficacy (Swim, 
Fraser, & Geiger, 2014). Additionally, it may be equally important to foster individuals’ 
belief that interpersonal discussions matter in bringing about positive change (Guckian et 
al., 2018; Nolan, 2013: Norgaard, 2011). For instance, Guckian et al. (2018) found that 
recreational anglers who perceived sanctioning as an effective means to encourage the 
engagement with a desired behavior, were more likely to sanction than those who held 
such beliefs to a lesser degree. The large effect of perceived sanctioning efficacy 
compared to other predictors suggests that response efficacy may be critical in 
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determining whether an individual will impose social sanctions on another’s behavior 
(Guckian et al., 2018).  
Given that people are more likely to converse with others when they feel better 
equipped and that conversations will amount in some desired change, fostering efficacy 
beliefs is critical. Recent work has started to examine whether education-based 
interventions can promote interpersonal discussions of environmental issues. For 
instance, Geiger, Swim, and Fraser (2017) demonstrated that watching short, 
informational videos about climate change counteracted impression management 
concerns and amplified individuals’ perceived ability to discuss the issue. A better 
understanding of how to foster efficacy beliefs could lead people to view conversing with 
others as a ‘less insurmountable endeavor’ and furthermore, empower them to believe 
that discussions with others can engender positive change (Geiger et al., 2017). Although 
much research is needed to understand how best to facilitate stronger efficacy beliefs 
around interpersonal discussions of collective action problems, working with and training 
trusted in-group messengers offers one potential outlet for getting started.  
Approach 4:  Train and Employ Change Agents  
Because people’s understanding of and beliefs about particular issues is largely 
mediated by the messengers individuals are exposed to (Moser, 2010; Nisbet & Kotcher, 
2009), conservation managers and practitioners should work closely with trusted 
community leaders to disseminate information. Indeed, certain individuals are likely to 
play an outsized role in influencing others’ attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors towards 
certain issues (Valente & Davis, 1999). The two-step theory of influence proposes that 
the diffusion of ideas and information from mass media and experts to the public is 
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mediated by community opinion leaders, who take in information and relay it to those 
with whom they interact (Nisbet & Kotcher, 2009). For instance, a recent meta-analysis 
of pro-environmental behavior suggests that the most effective social influence 
approaches are those that leverage and integrate block leaders (Abrahamse & Steg, 2013). 
The block leader approach involves changing behavior within existing social networks by 
having opinion leaders directly communicate and encourage engagement with a specific 
behavior (Hopper & Nielson, 1991). In one experiment, Hopper and Nielson (1991) 
found that people in the block leader condition reported the highest mean increase in pre-
post social norm perceptions, which suggests that interpersonal interactions via block 
leaders can help facilitate the formation of behavior-specific norms of cooperation.  
Recruiting and training local messengers to disseminate information to relevant 
stakeholders may be particularly important in contexts where individuals are unlikely to 
be reached by traditional top-down channels of communication or among more 
antagonistic audiences who dismiss environmental issues or distrust traditional 
messengers (e.g., government agencies, environmental non-profit organizations). The 
Massachusetts Keystone Project is one conversation-oriented program that integrates this 
approach, by investing resources (e.g., educational programs, reference materials) to 
educate and train select individuals—forest landowners, members of land trusts—on 
isssues pertaining to forest ecology, sustainable forest management, wildlife 
enhancement, and land protection (Catanzaro & Kittredge, 2019). Following formal 
training, these ‘keystone cooperators’ go on to serve as advocates and opinion leaders for 
forest conservation in their own communities. Provided opinion leaders are more likely to 
share a common social identity, programs like this and their messages may be given a 
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greater degree of attention (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). As previously detailed, the 
identification and activation of opinion leaders could also help support the broader 
adoption of publicly non-observable behaviors (Geiger et al., 2019).  
Approach 5: Commit People to Conversing with Others 
 From a practical point of view, the most important behaviors to target are those 
that significantly and meaningfully impact collective outcomes, either by directly 
contributing to a public good (e.g., maintaining fuel breaks on property) or by sustaining 
the long-term viability of a natural resource (e.g., restricting household watering; Dietz et 
al., 2009). However, in addition to encouraging high-impact target behaviors, asking 
stakeholders to commit to signaling or communicating with others about their actions 
may promote cooperation. Commitment strategies, which involve asking individuals to 
make a verbal or written pledge to engage in a specific behavior (Lehman & Geller, 
2004), have been successful in encouraging a range of pro-environmental behaviors (e.g., 
Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek, & Rothengatter, 2005; Lokhorst, Werner, Staats, van Dijk, & 
Gale, 2013; Pardini & Katzev, 1983;). For instance, hotel guests who made a specific 
commitment at check-in (and wore a pin signaling their commitment), more frequently 
reused their towels compared to guests in the control condition (Baca-Motes, Brown, 
Gneezy, Keenan, & Nelson, 2012).  
Commitment strategies encouraging interpersonal communication might involve 
making requests to relevant stakeholders whom have already engaged (or engage) with a 
target behavior to pledge to speak with a number of people (e.g., neighbors, friends) 
about the behavior. Encouraging stakeholders to commit to communicating with others 
may be particularly helpful when low motivation exists to engage (e.g., communicating 
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with others; Katzev & Wang, 1994) and/or in situations where the target behavior is not 
observable to others (e.g., increase norm salience; McKenzie-Mohr, 2000). Depending on 
the nature of the target behavior (e.g., degree of effort, difficulty) and the make-up of the 
social network (e.g., close or distant), such approaches could be viewed as foot-in-the-
door or door-in-the-face techniques (Freedman & Fraser, 1966; for review see Burger, 
1999). The former characterizes situations wherein a relatively small ask (e.g., easy or 
costless target behavior) is followed by a larger communication request (e.g., speaking 
with neighbors), whereas the latter describes situations wherein a relatively large ask 
(e.g., difficult or costly target behavior) is followed by a simpler communication request 
(e.g., talking to close friends).  
The basic psychological motive underlying these effects is attributed to changes 
in individuals’ self-perceptions, whereby people infer traits and characteristics about their 
identity based on the initial request (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995; Cialdini, 2009). 
Consequently, commitment strategies can motivate people to act in ways consistent with 
their salient identity (Festinger, 1954) and/or out of fear of the potential social sanctions 
one might incur for defaulting (Abrahamse et al., 2005). Commitment strategies may 
serve a dual function. On one hand, commitments may help increase the frequency and 
extent of conversations taking place in a social network. On the other hand, committing 
to speaking with others may strengthen the likelihood that the communicator engages in 
the target behavior (e.g., collective-benefitting action) by internalizing the behavior as an 
aspect of their identity (Cialdini et al., 1995). 
However, given the potential costs associated with interpersonal communication 
(e.g., perceived efficacy, social isolation; Steentjes et al., 2017), asking individuals to 
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communicate with others may be met with some reluctance (e.g., Cobern, Porter, 
Lemming & Dwyer, 1995). In cases where individuals are highly reticent to engage in 
direct forms of interpersonal communication, people may be more open to subtler, albeit 
still publicly visible, forms of interpersonal signaling (McKenzie-Mohr, 2000). For 
instance, a common approach of the community-based social marketing strategy involves 
using implicit social signals, such as placing a decal on a curbside recycling receptacle. 
The decal serves as a form of commitment as well as increases the social visibility of a 
publicly non-observable behavior (e.g., backyard composting; McKenzie-Mohr, 2000). 
Thus, other forms of interpersonal communication, including implicit signals—pins, 
patches, decals—could be used. While they may not explicitly signal injunctive 
information, they can implicitly reveal important information relative to the descriptive 
norm (e.g., social evidence endorsing a particular behavior). Although commitment 
strategies offer possible approach for increasing interpersonal communication, much 
research is needed to understand whether and how such strategies will impact issue 
engagement. 
In sum, there are several well-established approaches resource managers and 
practitioners can employ to create and scaffold intentional channels of communication 
among relevant stakeholders. Whereas some of the research on social networks points to 
the importance of targeting influential members of a community, other insights—mostly 
from domains outside of environmental conservation decision-making—suggest that 
fostering efficacy, leveraging commitments, and peer-to-peer monitoring programs may 
help overcome notable barriers to engagement. Although more research is certainly 
needed to better understand what drives engagement as well as the implications of 
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interventions that attempt to activate people as communicators within their social 
networks, there are reasons to suggest that interpersonal communication can foster 
coordinated collective action.  
Conclusion 
The interconnectedness of the landscapes and biophysical systems within which 
society lives and operates pose major collective action problems. Unless concerted 
collective action takes place, the production of public goods (e.g., clean air, resilience) 
and/or long-term maintenance of common pool resources (e.g., fish stocks, fresh water) 
will not be achieved. In this chapter, I argue that interpersonal communication can 
support widespread cooperation, in part, by combatting the cacophony of noise that 
social, behavioral, and situational uncertainty injects into the decision-making process. 
Leveraging forms of interpersonal communication holds broad implications across a 
variety of collective action challenges from correcting existing misperceptions, fostering 
and maintaining social norms, to spreading critical context-dependent conservation 
management information and practices. 
This chapter proposed a basic—yet far from conclusive—typology that details the 
nature of possible informational exchanges that can exist between individuals, and how 
such interactions may differentially influence collective outcomes. Specifically, I suggest 
that informational exchanges can be characterized by the degree that they impart 
injunctive information and the extent to which they result in the uptake of a desired 
behavior. Individuals’ willingness to communicate with others as well as the 
consequences of engagement, as reviewed throughout the chapter, is contingent on a 
number of individual-, group- and contextual-level factors. Many real and perceived 
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barriers, such as the degree of similarity between the communicator and receiver, will 
determine whether individuals choose to communicate with others and whether 
information is received and acted upon or not. The recognition that individuals’ decisions 
influence others and that collective benefits only accrue with widespread adoption may 
provide individuals with the psychological standing and motivation necessary to suppress 
notable barriers to communicating with others. Thus, interpersonal communication may 
serve a more meaningful role in collective action contexts where community members or 
resource users fully comprehend the interdependent nature of cooperation in maximizing 
collective outcomes. 
However, just as interpersonal communication can generate shared meanings and 
social expectations about what should or ought to be done in a given context, such 
exchanges are likely to diffuse inaccurate information or beliefs that may undermine 
positive engagement and collective action goals. Thus, resource managers and 
practitioners must be mindful of their approach when activating stakeholder’s voices. The 
approaches outlined here, such as leveraging commitment strategies and leaning on 
trusted (and motivated) in-group members, could help foster important conversations 
among relevant stakeholders and maximize the power of social influence. Such 
interactions could be particularly important in contexts where target behaviors are not 
publicly observable or for conservation managers that rely on voluntary compliance. 
Increasing the occurrence of interpersonal communication may fulfill a powerful need in 
creating and maintaining social norms that support action as well as increasing the 
salience of collective action problems and need for collective action in people’s everyday 
lives. While much work remains in illuminating the potential of interpersonal 
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communication in these contexts, the direct and indirect evidence presented here suggests 
that it could assist in driving collective action solutions forward. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
 In an ideal world people would be intrinsically motivated to act on behalf of both 
people and the planet. More often than not, however, people look to others for clues 
about how to behave and what to think (Cialdini, 2009). While these extrinsic processes 
can be a force for good, in the absence of salient social signals that affirm rather than 
deny a collective commitment to the environment, people are problematically prone to 
continue down the path of inaction or non-compliance. As detailed throughout this 
dissertation, forms of interpersonal communication may be uniquely positioned to 
mobilize change, in part, by increasing the salience of individuals’ underlying beliefs 
about the need to take action. Although extant literature has revealed how interpersonal 
communication can buttress cooperation (Ostrom, 2015; Sally, 1995; Shank et al., 2018), 
relatively little work has explored what drives individuals to communicate with others 
and, furthermore, what the existing norms are surrounding recreational and conservation 
activities and how individuals present their experiences to others online. This is 
troublesome because we know that interpersonal interactions are critical in fostering 
shared beliefs about appropriate behavior and enhancing widespread cooperation (Balliet, 
2009; Kerr, 1995; Ostrom, 2015). A more robust understanding of what factors shape 
engagement as well as how anglers perceive handling practices and imagery depicting 
these practices can reveal important insights for practitioners seeking to scaffold 
interactions among relevant stakeholders and/or promote best handling and social media 
sharing practices.  
 
 173 
Core Findings and Future Considerations 
 
 The empirical work presented throughout this dissertation examines several 
different aspects of interpersonal communication. Across the first two empirical chapters 
(Chapters II and III), findings reveal that individuals’ willingness to confront perceived 
environmental harms is driven by a number of individual-level and contextually salient 
factors. For instance, in Chapter II, I presented work detailing brand patrons’ responses to 
an unexpected, personally-relevant environmental collective action problem. Drawing on 
the Volkswagen diesel emissions scandal, this work highlights how attributional 
conclusions concerning the cause of intentional corporate wrongdoing differentially 
impacts vehicle owners’ reactions, including their intentions to badmouth the corporation 
to others. While those attributing blame to a corrupt corporate culture report greater 
intentions to sanction—negative word-of-mouth, boycott products—Volkswagen (as 
mediated by feelings of anger and trust), it is unclear whether differences in consumers’ 
causal attributions—either to a handful of bad actors or else, corrupt corporate culture—
consistently and reliably predicts consumers’ responses to disparate corporate scandals. 
Thus, future work should examine how blame attributions that characterize the enduring 
debate between individual (i.e., ‘few bad apples’) versus collective (i.e., ‘corrupt 
corporate culture’) responsibility generalizes when predicting consumer responses across 
disparate corporate scandals (Orts & Smith, 2017).  
Instead of examining how individuals indirectly punish transgressing actors, 
Chapter III explored individuals’ willingness to directly impose social sanctions on their 
peers’ inappropriate angling practices. Specifically, I found how efficacy beliefs as well 
as concerns about one’s own reputation predicted anglers’ past and future sanctioning 
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behavior and intentions, respectively. The finding that relatively few recreational anglers 
sanctioned others in the past starkly contrasts anglers’ elevated intentions to sanction in 
the future. Although it is unclear what is driving this effect, possible explanations suggest 
that either (1) the study increased the salience of sanctioning or, (2) the conditional if-
then structure of the self-report measure heightened the salience of the perceived norm 
and thus made clear that a norm-violation had occurred. Given the inherent difficulties 
and costs associated with confronting others’ inappropriate actions, this finding, along 
with related research, suggests that formal policies or well-established social norms may 
reduce the barriers for confronting instances of non-compliance, likely by reducing the 
uncertainty of what constitutes socially approved of behavior (Nolan, 2017; Steentjes, et 
al., 2017). This idea warrants particular attention in the context of catch-and-release 
angling to the extent that the endorsement of scientifically-validated capture and handling 
practices is not yet well-established. Indeed, practitioners have only recently begun to 
promulgate best practices to recreational anglers (Danylchuk et al., 2018). Thus, we 
might not expect widespread endorsement and in turn, the enforcement of best practices 
for some time.  
The findings from Chapter II and Chapter III, in concert with other research 
documenting how the normative status of an issue can support or hinder interpersonal 
communication (e.g., Steentjes et al., 2017; Czopp & Montieth, 2003), raise an important 
question about how disparate environmental issues may evoke more or less intentional 
discussions among relevant stakeholders. As detailed in the conceptual framework 
chapter (Chapter V), I suggest that interpersonal communication is more likely to 
materialize when individuals possess greater psychological standing, defined as a feeling 
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of entitlement derived by the extent to which individuals feel materially affected by a 
situation (Miller et al., 2011). Thus, issues that are perceived as presenting immediate, 
personally-relevant threats (e.g., climate adaptation, community resilience to 
environmental risks) or are viewed as a moral imperative may provide the underlying 
motivation needed to overcome the notable social-psychological barriers that otherwise 
dampen engagement with interpersonal communication. However, future work is needed 
to examine the relationship between psychological standing and interpersonal 
communication as well as whether and how interpersonal communication may be 
moderated by the type or nature of the collective action problem people are faced with 
(e.g., Molenmaker et al., 2014).  
In Chapter IV, I show how recreational anglers’ personal beliefs and normative 
perceptions are often misaligned, particularly in terms of the appropriateness of handling 
practices and of sharing catch-and-release imagery online. Evidence of pluralistic 
ignorance, in particular, suggests that correcting for existing misperceptions may play an 
important role in transitioning the actual and perceived norms concerning anglers’ 
handling and social media sharing practices. Although this research was driven by 
intuitions about how repeated exposure to images depicting the outcome of a catch-and-
release angling may convey information that conflicts with scientifically-validated best 
practices (e.g., extensive air exposure), it is unclear whether such images influence 
anglers’ attitudes towards and intentions to engage with best practices. Thus, future work 
is needed to understand whether and how nature-based imagery shared online, including 
those depicting a catch-and-release angling event, impacts anglers’ normative perceptions 
of and attitudes towards best practices. An understanding of whether and how recreation-
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based imagery shared online influences others will add to the growing body of work 
delineating the impacts of visual imagery on issue engagement (e.g., Chapman et al., 
2016). Since Chapter IV also revealed that perceived prevalence of both handling and 
social media differed across two primary subpopulations of the angling community (e.g., 
fly vs. conventional fishing), future work—leveraging a more representative sample—is  
needed to better understand whether and how differences emerge between these two 
groups, which could inform how practitioners need to tailor communication and/or 
intervention efforts. 
Collectively, this research adds to the growing body of work aimed at 
understanding the dynamics of interpersonal communication as well as the role of visual 
imagery in the context of environmentally relevant decision-making. As part of Chapter 
V, I attempt to provide a conceptual and practical overview of the implications and 
drivers of interpersonal communication. Specifically, the conceptual framework 
highlights the nature of information exchanged during a communicative act, and how 
exchanges detailing declarative or descriptive information, for example, can differentially 
increase the salience of the injunctive norm and/or result in a desired outcome. As noted 
throughout this dissertation, the potential of interpersonal communication to produce 
meaningful and significant change cannot be overlooked when seeking ways to enhance 
public, stakeholder, and/or consumer engagement. Thus, along with detailing the 
situational contexts that would benefit from interpersonal communication, I outlined 
some rudimentary approaches practitioners and/or recreational managers could employ to 
create and scaffold interactions among relevant stakeholders and users. Although I 
acknowledge there are several significant limitations to this framework and outreach 
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approaches, including the reliance on indirect evidence, the chapter begins to paint a 
picture of interpersonal communication in the environmental domain and what we might 
expect if and when individuals are provided with structured opportunities to converse 
with their peers or voluntarily speak up for positive change. With that said, there is 
significant room and need for more intervention-oriented research concerning how group 
discussions or neighborhood watch programs impact compliance and collective action 
across disparate environmental issues. Although I have recommended commitment 
making as a tool to encourage communication with others, it is unclear whether and how 
pledges will impact individuals’ future engagement in interpersonal communication.  
Limitations 
 
 As discussed throughout each empirical chapter, it is important to note several 
overarching limitations. First and foremost, the findings in Chapter’s II, III, and IV are 
derived from correlational designs that rely on self-report measures of behavior. While 
such measures and assessments are adequate in determining simple associations and other 
(mediating) effects, self-report measures alone do not sufficiently address or unravel the 
nature, quality, or character of interpersonal conversations (Southwell & Yzer, 2007). 
Additionally, although these self-report studies are useful in identifying potential drivers 
of engagement, they do little in terms of generalizing how these outcomes will manifest 
in real-world settings. Interpersonal communication presents a challenge in producing 
generalizable findings given the socially embedded nature of engagement (and the issues 
being discussed) that simply cannot be replicated in self-report surveys or laboratory 
settings. Amidst valid concerns relative to the ecological validity of the findings in this 
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dissertation, future field work is needed to ascertain whether and how forms of 
interpersonal communication will materialize in real-world settings.  
Additionally, this work, particularly Chapter’s III and IV, is limited by the 
sampling frame used to recruit participants. While the recruitment approach, which relied 
heavily on social media promotions, provided access to a greater number of participants 
in the recreational fishing domain, the sampling frame possibly and likely did reach a 
pool of participants already concerned about, or in the very least aware of, the 
consequences their angling behavior has on the biological fitness of angled and released 
fish. For instance, the Patagonia Fly Fishing social media accounts, which regularly 
promote responsible and ethical handling practices (and corresponding imagery of fish 
predominantly submerged in water), are likely to attract a characteristically different 
subset of the angling community compared to the social media platforms of less 
ethically-driven and responsibility-forward angling organizations. Thus, it is critical to 
note that the findings here, particularly in Chapter IV, may be more representative of a 
highly motivated and knowledgeable subset of recreational anglers who have previously 
been exposed to handling and sharing guidelines, rather than your typical, everyday 
angler. 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 As environmental issues become increasingly embedded in social meanings, it is 
hard to imagine how progress will be made without consideration of the social processes 
that can support or hinder engagement. Here, I argue that interpersonal communication 
represents a potentially powerful, albeit underutilized social influence approach for 
driving positive social and ecological change. The research presented in this dissertation 
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adds to the growing body of literature in understanding the dynamics of interpersonal 
communication, including what shapes individuals’ intentions to converse with others, 
confront their peers’ inappropriate practices, and how recreation-based imagery is 
perceived among users. Perhaps most importantly, this body of literature recognizes that 
tackling the pressing environmental issues facing society will require tapping into the 
capacity of individuals to promote change through their everyday interactions with 
others. Since creating a culture of conservation may be partly contingent upon individuals 
signaling their beliefs and commitments to others, it is my hope that the work presented 
here adds to our understanding of how we can best facilitate meaningful and civilly 
appropriate social interactions moving forward.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ACCOMPANYING CHAPTER II 
 
 
Participant vehicle-related information: 
 
 Participants also reported on specific vehicle-related information. The majority of 
our sample consisted of primary vehicle drivers (n = 573). The most common TDI model 
year was 2013 (n = 54), while most non-TDI owners reported owning vehicles made in 
2012 and 2013 (n’s = 33, Minimum = 1971, Maximum = 2016). For the majority of TDI 
owners, this was their first TDI vehicle (n = 189), while 24 non-TDI owners reported 
previously owning a TDI vehicle. Most TDI participants reported owning a Jetta TDI (n 
= 111) vehicle model, while the majority of non-TDI participants owned a non-TDI Jetta 
(n = 110). Of the participants owning TDI vehicles, 168 had applied for and received the 
Goodwill Compensation package from Volkswagen (Not Received: n = 81, Unsure: n = 
8). 
Study and participant screening information:  
 
 The measures described and analyzed here appeared as part of a larger study on 
the Volkswagen emissions scandal, which was answered by existing VW owners (i.e. 
TDI and non-TDI) and members of the general public and included measures for other 
hypotheses unrelated to the present paper. As the focus of this research is on how patrons 
affected by a corporate scandal intend to engage with the brand in the future, data from 
non-VW owners were not analyzed to test these specific hypotheses. However, these data 
can be provided upon request to the authors.  
 Additionally, the original recruited sample size for TDI owners included 319 
participants. However, due to several errors in the survey eligibility screening, data from 
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62 participants in the TDI group had to be eliminated prior to analysis due to not meeting 
the appropriate eligibility for the study. Participants in this group who responded ‘none of 
the above’ to owning an affected diesel engine vehicle (n = 56) or else reported owning a 
TDI vehicle model prior to the affected model year range (i.e., prior to 2009; n = 9) were 
dropped prior to data analysis. Thus, a total of 257 participants were included in the final 
analyses for TDI owners. No data points were excluded from the VW non-TDI group. 
Description of Bayes Factors Analysis: 
 
 Bayes factors (BF; Jeffreys, 1961; Kass and Raftery, 1995; Morey et al., 2016; 
Rouder et al., 2016) are derived from Bayes’ theorem using a Bayesian model 
comparison method to quantify the extent to which the observed data are in favor of one 
hypothesis over another (for brief introductions to Bayesian hypothesis testing, see 
Andraszewicz et al., 2015 and Wagenmakers et al., 2016). In the case of Bayesian data 
analysis, one must formalize “prior” beliefs about the models being tested (see 
Wagenmakers et al. 2016). Bayes factors greater than 1 provide evidence in favor of the 
alternative, with larger values providing stronger evidence. For example, a Bayes factor 
of 10 can be interpreted as indicating that the data are ten times more likely under the 
alternative than the null hypothesis. Bayes factors less than 1 provide evidence in favor of 
the null. In the case of our Bayesian independent samples t-tests, BF10 provides evidence 
for how likely the observed data are under the alternative hypothesis (i.e., that the true 
effect size is > 0) relative to the null hypothesis (i.e., that the true effect size = 0). Bayes 
factors reported throughout the paper were calculated with the BayesFactor package for R 
(Morey, Rouder, & Jamil, 2015, version 0.9.12-2). For Bayesian t-tests and regression 
models, default Jeffrey-Zellner-Siow priors were used (Rouder and Morey, 2012; Rouder 
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et al., 2009). The Bayesian χ2 test reported derives from Gunel and Dickey (1974), with 
the prior of an expected deviation of 1 from the null to the alternative hypothesis, which 
is considered a ‘default’ prior for Bayesian χ2 (Jamil et al., 2016). 
 Credibility intervals are a Bayesian estimate somewhat similar to confidence 
intervals. Whereas confidence intervals treat a point estimate as fixed and the interval 
bounds as variable (i.e., over infinite replications, 95% of the confidence intervals will 
contain the “true” parameter estimate), credibility intervals calculate fixed bounds, while 
the parameter is considered to be variable (Morey, Hoekstra, Rouder, Lee, & 
Wagenmakers, 2016). Therefore, under the model tested, 95% credible intervals can be 
interpreted as indicating that there is a 95% chance that the true parameter estimate lies 
within the interval. 
Table B1. Effects of corporate culture beliefs on individual items from the patronage 
composite 
 
‘Rotten’ Corporate 
Culture 
(n = 172) 
‘A Few Bad 
Apples’ 
(n = 419) 
   
 M SD M SD t (df) 
Cohen’s d 
[95% CIs] 
BF10 
Future Vehicle 3.913 2.063 5.277 1.657 
-7.711*** 
(265.961) 
-.764  
[-.948, -.581] 
2.030e+13 
Recommend 
VW 
2.785 1.824 4.146 1.913 
-8.120*** 
(332.561) 
-.721 
[-.904, -
.538] 
6.185e+11 
Encourage 
Others to Avoid 
VW (Reverse 
Coded) 
4.988 2.035 6.308 1.244 
-7.919*** 
(225.367) 
-.870  
[-1.055, -
.686] 
1.814e+17 
Note. *** p < .001. 
 
 
Table B2. Regression analyses predicting future car purchasing intentions from corporate 
culture beliefs, future expectations of ethical action, and anger 
Predictor b SE P lmg 
95% Confidence 
Intervals of b 
LCI UCI 
Corporate Culture Beliefs  
(0 = rotten culture) 
.155 .156 .319 .111 -.151 .462 
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Expectations of Future Ethical 
Action 
.578 .043 < .001 .702 .493 .662 
Anger -.105 .037 .005 .187 -.177 -.032 
Note. Adjusted R-squared = .3785. 
 
 
Table B3. Regression analyses predicting motives to recommend vw in the future from 
corporate culture beliefs, future expectations of ethical action, and anger 
Predictor b SE p lmg 
95% Confidence 
Intervals of b 
LCI UCI 
Corporate Culture Beliefs  
(0 = rotten culture) 
.041 .161 .797 .093 -.276 .359 
Expectations of Future Ethical 
Action 
.658 .044 < .001 .742 .570 .745 
Anger -.087 .038 .022 .165 -.162 -.013 
Note. Adjusted R-squared = .3979. 
 
 
Table B4. Regression analyses predicting motives to encourage others to purchase vw 
vehicles in the future from corporate culture beliefs, future expectations of ethical action, 
and anger 
Predictor b SE p lmg 
95% Confidence 
Intervals of b 
LCI UCI 
Corporate Culture Beliefs  
(0 = rotten culture) 
.670 .149 < .001 .283 .377 .962 
Expectations of Future Ethical 
Action 
.126 .041 .002 .256 .045 .206 
Anger -.237 .035 < .001 .461 -.306 -.168 
Note. Adjusted R-squared = .2408. 
 
 
Table B5. Indirect effects of corporate culture on each item from patronage composite 
 
   
95% Bootstrapped Confidence 
Intervals 
 Mediator b se (bootstrapped) LCI UCI 
Future Car 
Purchasing 
Intentions 
     
 Trust 1.020 .121 .797 1.270 
 Anger .189 .068 .062 .331 
Recommend 
VW 
     
 Trust 1.161 .131 .915 1.435 
 Anger .158 .077 .014 .318 
Encourage 
Others to 
Purchase from 
VW 
     
 Trust .222 .090 .057 .411 
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 Anger .428 .078 .284 .595 
 
 
 
Table B6. Indirect effects of corporate culture on each item from patronage composite 
while controlling for proximity 
    95% Bootstrapped Confidence 
Intervals 
 Mediator b se (bootstrapped) LCI UCI 
Future Car 
Purchasing 
Intentions 
     
 Trust 1.022 .120 .805 1.277 
 Anger .147 .066 .024 .283 
Recommend 
VW 
     
 Trust 1.158 .132 .923 1.444 
 Anger .133 .075 -.006 .285 
Encourage 
Others to 
Purchase from 
VW 
     
 Trust .241 .088 .076 .421 
 Anger .342 .072 .212 .497 
 
 
 
Table B7. Effects of proximity on individual items from the patronage composite 
 
TDI Owners 
(n = 257) 
Non-TDI Owners 
(n = 335) 
   
 M SD M SD t (df) 
Cohen’s d 
[95% CIs] 
BF10 
Future Vehicle 4.591 1.959 5.090 1.814 
-3.166* 
(528.431) 
-.266 
[-.429, -
.102] 
13.091 
Recommend 
VW 
3.537 1.966 3.916 1.985 
-2.318* 
(553.418) 
-.192 
[-.355, -
.028] 
1.249 
Encourage 
Others to Avoid 
VW (Reverse 
Coded) 
5.506 1.833 6.248 1.372 
-5.427*** 
(458.348) 
-.467 
[-.632, -
.302] 
343928 
Note. * p < .05, *** p < .001. 
 
 
 
Table B8. Regression analyses predicting future car purchasing intentions from 
proximity, future expectations of ethical action, and anger 
Predictor b SE p lmg 
95% Confidence 
Intervals of b 
LCI UCI 
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Proximity to the Scandal 
(0 = TDI Owner) 
.208 .130 .110 .019 -.047 .462 
Expectations of Future Ethical 
Action 
.597 .041 < .001 .770 .517 .677 
Anger -.095 .037 .011 .211 -.169 -.022 
Note. Adjusted R-squared = .3802. 
 
 
Table B9. Regression analyses predicting motives to recommend vw in the future from 
proximity, future expectations of ethical action, and anger 
Predictor b SE p lmg 
95% Confidence 
Intervals of b 
LCI UCI 
Proximity to the Scandal 
(0 = TDI Owner) 
.108 .134 .422 ..009 -.156 .372 
Expectations of Future Ethical 
Action 
.664 .042 < .001 .801 .581 .748 
Anger -.080 .039 .039 .189 -.157 -.004 
Note. Adjusted R-squared = .3985. 
 
 
Table B10. Regression analyses predicting motives to encourage others to  
purchase vw vehicles in the future from proximity, future expectations of  
ethical action, and anger 
Predictor b SE p lmg 
95% Confidence 
Intervals of b 
LCI UCI 
Proximity to the Scandal 
(0 = TDI Owner) 
.409 .125 .001 .130 .164 .655 
Expectations of Future Ethical 
Action 
.196 .039 < .001 .351 .119 .274 
Anger -.238 .036 < .001 .519 -.309 -.167 
Note. Adjusted R-squared = .2287. 
 
 
Table B11. Indirect effects of proximity on each item from patronage composite 
    
95% Bootstrapped 
Confidence Intervals 
 Mediator b se (bootstrapped) LCI UCI 
Future Car 
Purchasing 
Intentions 
     
 Trust .163 .087 -.010 .335 
 Anger .114 .045 .032 .213 
Recommend 
VW 
     
 Trust .181 .096 -.007 .370 
 Anger .096 .049 -.004 .201 
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Encourage 
Others to 
Purchase 
from VW 
     
 Trust .053 .033 .000 .132 
 Anger .285 .062 .178 .423 
 
 
Table B12. Indirect effects of proximity on each item from patronage composite 
 while controlling for corporate culture beliefs 
    
95% Bootstrapped 
Confidence Intervals 
 Mediator b se (bootstrapped) LCI UCI 
Future Car 
Purchasing 
Intentions 
     
 Trust .078 .075 -.069 .225 
 Anger .092 .041 .017 .180 
Recommend 
VW 
     
 Trust .088 .085 -.079 .249 
 Anger .083 .046 -.001 .182 
Encourage 
Others to 
Purchase 
from VW 
     
 Trust .018 .020 -.012 .068 
 Anger .213 .051 .129 .330 
 
 We also tested for the presence of interactions between corporate culture and 
proximity on each of the dependent items independently (note, as reported in the main 
text, there was no significant interaction for the composite measure).There was not a 
significant interaction on future car purchasing intentions: F(1,587) = .891, p = .346. 
There was also not a significant interaction on motivations to recommend VW to others, 
F(1, 587) = .187, p = .665. There was however a small but significant interaction effect 
on motivations to encourage others to purchase from VW, F(1, 587) = 4.447, p = .035. 
However, comparison of bayes factors for a regression model including the interaction 
versus only the main effects indicates the interaction model was only 1.016 times better 
than the model without the interaction, suggesting that this interaction effect is not a 
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substantial improvement over only considering the main effects. As our originally 
hypothesized interaction effects were all not statistically significant (i.e., interaction 
effects on future expectations of ethical action, anger, and the full patronage composite), 
and was only statistically significant for one of the three patronage items independently, 
this interaction effect was not investigated further.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ACCOMPANYING CHAPTER III 
 
 
Map of study site: 
 
 
Figure C1. The Skeena River watershed, including the Bulkley River (Morten, 1999). 
 
 
Item descriptions for past sanctioning behavior: 
 
Over the course of the past fishing season, how often, if at all, did you engage in each of 
the following (1 = never; 7 = all the time): 
[Past_socialmedia] Made a comment on social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram) addressing an individual’s inappropriate post-catch handling practices 
[Past_educate] Educated an angler about catch-and-release best practices 
[Past_disapproval] In person, verbally expressed your disapproval of an angler’s 
inappropriate post-catch handling practices 
[Past_praise] Applauded or praised an angler for their post-catch handling practices 
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Item descriptions for future sanctioning intentions: 
 
[Fut_bestpractice] If researchers were able to develop species-specific catch-and-release 
best practices for Bulkley River Steelhead based on solid scientific research, would this 
make you more or less likely to approach and educate others who do not adopt Steelhead 
specific catch-and-release best practices? (1 = much less likely; 4 = neither less nor more 
likely, 7 = much more likely) 
[Fut_airtime] If exposing a Steelhead to air for more than 5 seconds was found to be 
harmful to Steelhead survival, how likely or unlikely would you be to approach and 
educate an angler who you saw holding a Steelhead out of water for more than 5 
seconds? (1 = not at all likely; 7 = extremely likely) 
[Fut_handle] If using a fishing net were found to be more harmful to Steelhead than tail 
grabbing, how likely or unlikely would you be to express your disapproval to an angler 
who you saw using a fish net to land a Steelhead? (1 = not at all likely; 7 = extremely 
likely) 
[Fut_socialmedia] If you saw an image of an angler on social media holding a Steelhead 
high above the water, how likely or unlikely would you be to leave a comment suggesting 
your disapproval of their action? (1 = not at all likely; 7 = extremely likely) 
 
 
Table C1. Factor loadings and descriptive statistics for sanctioning items  
Items 
F1 F2 
M SD Past Sanctioning Future Sanctioning 
Past_socialmedia 0.46 
 
2.09 1.55 
Past_educate 0.79 
 
3.77 1.85 
Past_disapproval 0.69 
 
3.14 1.78 
Past_praise 0.73 
 
3.81 1.91 
Fut_bestpractice 
 
0.54 5.62 1.17 
Fut_airtime 
 
0.60 5.61 1.39 
Fut_handle 
 
0.80 4.88 1.72 
Fut_socialmedia 
 
0.65 3.69 1.95 
Note. The proportion of variance explained by the two factors was 24% and 23%,  
respectively.  
 
T-test comparing past and future sanctioning: t (182) = -17.75, p < .001. 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin overall MSA = .80. 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity: χ2(7) = 76.35, p < .001 
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Item descriptions for perception of threat items: 
 
When thinking about the Bulkley River Steelhead population, to what extent do you think 
each of the following poses a threat to the Bulkley River Steelhead population (e.g., 
population size)? (1 = not at all; 7 = extremely): 
[Threat_handling] Inappropriate angling and handling practices (e.g., extended air 
exposure, illegal gear use) 
[Threat_bycatch] Overharvesting (e.g., bycatch from commercial salmon fishing)  
[Threat_climatechange] Impacts of climate change (e.g., water temperature increases) 
[Threat_illegal] Illegal river harvesting 
[Threat_overfish] Overfishing from recreational anglers 
[Threat_habitat] Habitat degradation and pollution from industrial activities (e.g., mining, 
resource extraction) 
[Threat_gillnet] Gillnetting practices 
 
Table C2. Factor loadings and descriptive statistics for perceptions of threat items 
Items 
F1 F2 F3 
M SD 
Angler 
threat 
Other catch        
threat 
Environ.       
threat 
Threat_handling 0.79   5.09 1.42 
Threat_overfish 0.74   4.03 1.72 
Threat_bycatch  0.72  6.47 0.88 
Threat_gillnet  0.80  6.51 0.99 
Threat_climatechange   0.66 5.32 1.57 
Threat_habitat   0.66 5.79 1.5 
Threat_illegal 0.35   4.73 1.62 
Note. The proportion of variance explained by the three factors was 19%, 19%, and 13% 
respectively.  
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin overall MSA = .67  
Bartlett’s test of sphericity: χ2(6) = 132.94, p < .001 
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Table C3. Pearson's R correlation coefficients between independent and dependent study variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Age (1)             
 
Perceived concern (2) .192            
 
Angler threat (3) .078 .223           
 
Management familiarity (4) -.086 .075 .011          
 
Years fishing Bulkley (5) .282 .158 .042  .278         
 
Country of residence (6) -.152 -.084 .054  .159  .191         
 
Club membership (7) .115 .200 .073 .136 -.007 -.079       
 
Sanction efficacy (8) .082 .271  .262 .058 -.022 -.036  .203       
 
Belief in science (9) .197 .174  .396 -.190 .013 -.051  .187   .277     
 
Norm perception (10) -.097 -.244 -.336 .038 .047 .090 .010 -.177 -.119    
 
Reputational concern (11) .013 .123  .179 .020 .035 .144  .178  .273  .266 -.028   
 
Past sanction behavior (12) -.203 .261  .231  .152 .120  .197 .070  .373  .163 .019  .324   
Future sanction intent (13) .011 .269  .343 .041 .084 .095 .133  .597  .305 -.155  .342 .464  
Note. Country of residence referent (1 = Canada; 0 = non-Canadian); Club membership referent (1 = Yes; 0 = No). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 193 
Table C4. Results of linear regression predicting past sanctioning behavior and future 
sanctioning intentions, including the predictors ‘environmental threat’ and ‘other 
threat’ 
    Past Sanctioning 
 Behavior 
  Future Sanctioning 
Intentions 
Model Predictor b t p lmg   b t p lmg 
           
1 Age -0.029 -3.66 .000 .064 
 
-
0.006 
-0.86 .393 .002 
 
Perceived concern 0.287 2.76 .007 .052 
 
0.194 2.06 .041 .041  
Angler threat 0.182 2.21 .029 .033 
 
0.320 4.30 .000 .121 
 Environ. threat -0.084 -1.00 .321 .004  -
0.041 
-0.54 .589 .005 
 Other catch threat 0.235 1.77 .079 .034  0.081 0.68 .498 .015  
Management 
familiarity 
0.070 1.03 .303 .020 
 
0.000 0.00 .999 .001 
 
Yrs Bulkley 0.012 1.08 .280 .010 
 
0.005 0.49 .628 .002  
Country of residence 0.300 1.39 .166 .023 
 
0.129 0.66 .508 .005  
Club membership 0.080 0.39 .699 .002   0.210 1.13 .259 .012   
R2 = .24; Adj. R2 = .20              
df (9,148) 
R2 = .21; Adj. R2 = .16           
df (9,148) 
           
2 Age -0.032 -4.46 .000 .075 
 
-
0.009 
-1.51 .134 .006 
 
Perceived concern 0.203 2.10 .037 .036 
 
0.057 0.71 .481 .022  
Angler threat 0.030 0.37 .714 .014 
 
0.133 1.93 .056 .059 
 Environ. threats -0.151 -1.97 .051 .011  -
0.071 
-1.11 .267 .004 
 Other catch threat 0.218 1.85 .066 .028  0.059 0.60 .547 .011  
Management 
familiarity 
0.111 1.84 .067 .025 
 
0.035 0.69 .493 .004 
 
Yrs Bulkley 0.013 1.36 .175 .011 
 
0.008 0.99 .324 .004  
Country of residence 0.219 1.14 .256 .02 
 
0.067 0.42 .675 .004  
Club membership -0.169 -0.91 .367 .002 
 
0.012 0.08 .940 .005  
Sanction efficacy 0.296 4.43 .000 .114 
 
0.403 7.21 .000 .252  
Belief in science 0.151 2.10 .038 .028 
 
0.077 1.28 .204 .042  
Norm perception 0.002 0.46 .649 .002 
 
-
0.004 
-1.04 .298 .014 
 
Reputation concern 0.160 3.04 .003 .063   0.136 3.11 .002 .062 
    R2 = .43; Adj. R2 = .38              
df (13,144) 
R2 =.49; Adj. R2 = .44            
df (13, 144) 
Note. Regression analysis was completed on complete pairwise observations (n = 158). 
Country of residence referent (1= Canada; 0 = non-Canadian); Club membership referent 
(1=Yes; 0 = No). 
 
Lasso regression analyses: 
 
Least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO; Tibshirani, 1996) linear 
regression was also performed to address potential overfitting given the large number of 
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predictors in the models. Lasso is a conservative regression technique, which maximizes 
model fit by minimizing the usual sum of square and imposing a constraint on the sum of 
the absolute values of the model parameters. This results in some parameter coefficients 
being pulled to zero (McNeish, 2015; Tibshirani, 1996). All analyses were performed in 
R version 3.3.1 (R Core Team, 2016), including the ‘glmnet’ (Friedman, Hastie, & 
Tibshirani, 2010) and ‘relaimpo’ packages (Grömping, 2006).  Given the number of 
predictors (k = 13), lasso regression was performed on Model 2 for to predict past and 
future sanctioning propensity.  
Results from the lasso regressions revealed a similar predictive structure for both 
past sanctioning behavior and future sanctioning intentions. Table 4C presents the 
LASSO regression results for both past sanctioning behavior and future sanctioning 
intentions. Figures 2C and 3C depict a visualization of the LASSO regression coefficients 
for both past and future sanctioning, respectively. Taken together, the results of the 
LASSO analyses mirror the findings of ordinary least squares regression results. For past 
sanctioning behavior, age, management familiarity, country of residence, sanctioning 
efficacy and reputation concern emerged as significant predictors, while angler threat, 
sanctioning efficacy and reputation concern predicted future sanctioning intentions. 
Table C5. Results of LASSO regression predicting past sanctioning behavior and future 
sanctioning intentions 
 Past Sanctioning Behavior 
Future Sanctioning 
Intentions 
Predictor B % B > 0 B % B > 0 
Age -.143 100.00 .000 0.00 
Perceived Concern .083 100.00 .000 0.00 
Angler threat .000 0.00 .054 99.78 
Management familiarity .077 100.00 .000 0.00 
Years on Bulkley .001 15.02 .000 0.00 
Country of residence .035 99.88 .000 0.00 
Club membership .000 0.00 .000 0.00 
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Sanction efficacy .262 100.00 .375 100.00 
Belief in science .007 58.54 .000 1.72 
Norm perception .000 0.00 .000 0.00 
Reputation concern .152 100.00 .057 99.78 
Note. Coefficients (Bs) represent the mean standardized regression coefficients drawn from 5,000 
resamples of the regression model. ‘% of B’s > 0’ indicates the percent of regression coefficients in the 
5,000 resamples which were greater than 0. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C2. A visualization of the LASSO regression coefficients predicting past 
sanctioning behavior. Each curve corresponds to a variable. Green curves indicate 
positive coefficients, whereas red curves indicate negative coefficients. The vertical gray 
line at lambda .12 represents the penalization cut off for one run that minimizes cross 
validated error plus one standard error. Coefficients loading to the right of the vertical 
line are pulled to zero (e.g., gray curved lines). This process was resampled 5,000 times. 
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Figure C3. A visualization of the LASSO regression coefficients predicting future 
sanctioning intentions. Green curves indicate positive coefficients. The vertical gray line 
at lambda .18 represents the penalization cut off for one run that minimizes cross 
validated error plus one standard error. Coefficients loading to the right of the vertical 
line are pulled to zero (e.g., gray curved lines). This process was resampled 5,000 times. 
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